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Preface
This report sets out the results of an independent investigation of the UK’s life 
company business model in the context of the dramatic changes to the private-
sector pensions market. The main focus is the defined contribution (DC) market, 
including the back books of the pre-2001 era and the books of more recent 
workplace schemes and individual plans for the periods of accumulation 
(contributions) and decumulation (withdrawals of cash and regular retirement 
income). We also consider insurance solutions in the defined benefit (DB) 
pensions market, namely, bulk-purchase annuities (BPAs).
These life company markets are vast, but the estimates of aggregate assets under 
management (AUM) – and aggregate liabilities, where relevant – vary considerably. 
Here we offer the following broad estimates:
• £420bn: The ‘back book’ market of pensions and long-term savings policies 
(largely pre-2001, but also including pre-2005-06 with-profits bonds). Some 
experts put the figure significantly lower at about £330bn, while others put it 
significantly higher at about £530bn.1 
• £280bn: The workplace DC pension market post-2001.2
• £300bn: The retail DC pension market post-2001.
• £1.2trn: The private-sector DB scheme market by AUM. We classify these schemes, 
most of which are closed, as the back books of employer-sponsored schemes. 
• £50bn: The value of the BPA market post-2007.
Since the turn of the century, both the DB and the DC markets have changed 
beyond recognition:
• DB: Change is due to the widespread closure of schemes (about 87% by number of 
schemes3) and the trend towards the transfer of these liabilities from the employers’ 
corporate balance sheets to the balance sheets of BPA insurers and their reinsurers. 
This market is relevant to life companies, in their capacity as providers of BPAs, 
and also as third-party asset managers to DB schemes – a business line that is 
declining as more and more BPAs (largely bond-backed) are transacted.
• DC: Change is due to the development of modern mass-market auto-
enrolment workplace schemes. With the exception of a small number of large 
single-employer trust-based schemes, mass-market workplace schemes began 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as a grouping together of personal 
pensions under a voluntary pension system. Today, the market is dominated by 
large-scale multi-trust, multi-employer schemes (known as master trusts) under 
a quasi-compulsory pension system. Auto-enrolment, which will be fully 
implemented by 2018, is compulsory for all private-sector employers and 
employees, although the latter have the right to opt-out (the ‘soft compulsion’ 
feature that distinguishes auto-enrolment from full compulsion). 
1 The wide variation between these estimates is due to differences in the definition of ‘legacy’. 
For example, the higher end of the spectrum includes older books of retail annuity business and 
takes into account some or all of the reserves held to honour guarantees on certain pension 
policies if they are maintained until maturity. 
2 We do not include trust-based small self-administered schemes (SSASs), which are unusual 
arrangements, peculiar to the UK, used by small family businesses.
3 Source: PPF. See also PPF 7800 Index, November 2015:  
http://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/DocumentLibrary/Documents/PPF_7800_november_15.pdf 
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In the DC market, a series of major policy and regulatory changes has broken 
the life company’s historic monopoly of the ‘value chain’, by which we mean 
asset management and administration, in particular, which historically have been 
combined in-house under the life company ‘bundled’ or ‘vertically integrated’ 
business model, and which is still the case for many providers. This trend away 
from the life company dominance is particularly evident in the workplace scheme 
market, but it is also increasingly evident in the retail market for both 
accumulation and decumulation products. 
Taken as a whole, the changes in the DC market call into question the 
fundamental purpose of the traditional UK life company business model. The 
largest and, arguably, the most visibly successful life companies are restructuring 
in order to compete with a diverse range of challenger-providers. Several of 
these challenger-providers have already demonstrated the merits of alternative 
business models in the master-trust auto-enrolment market and have gained 
a significant market share at the expense of traditional life companies. 
As these challenger-providers move into the decumulation market – in which 
the historic distinction between ‘retail’ and ‘workplace’ will increasingly be 
recognised as an anachronism – life companies will find themselves beset on 
all sides. By 2020, the report predicts, certain well-known life companies will 
no longer exist in their present form. They will either be bought wholesale by 
a larger and more competitive life company, or they will be sold-off piecemeal 
as a series of books of business. These books will include pre-2001 life-company 
policies, but also more recent workplace schemes, retail accumulation products, 
drawdown products, and annuities. 
At this watershed in the long history of UK life companies, clarity of understanding of 
market conditions, together with a clear vision for the future, is essential for survival. 
While most of this report is dedicated to the analysis of the UK market, at times, 
we draw relevant lessons from overseas markets with national DC pension 
systems. Examples include: the Australian market, which has witnessed a massive 
consolidation of life companies involved in accumulation, and where a new trend is 
underway towards a DC decumulation market that incorporates a longevity hedge; 
the US market, which is characterised by the dominance of asset managers, rather 
than life companies in both the accumulation and decumulation stages; and the 
resilient popularity of the lifetime annuity (LTA) in Chile and Switzerland. 
The research for this report took place between the beginning of April and the 
25th of November, the date of the 2015 Autumn Statement. The first use of key 
definitions used in the report are highlighted in bold type and are explained in the 
‘A-Z of key definitions’. There is also a full glossary of terms at the end of the report.
We would like to thank the organisations and individual experts who helped with 
the research. Where we use quotations from published sources, these are cited 
in full. Where we quote from confidential interviews, the quotations are 
anonymised. This technique, pioneered by the Pensions Institute in 2004 for its 
practitioner reports, enables us to express the views of experts more candidly 
than might otherwise be the case. The organisations that were happy to be 
named are listed in the acknowledgements.
We would particularly like to thank the sponsor of this research, Phoenix Group 
Holdings, which is the UK’s largest publicly-quoted closed life company. The 
views expressed in the report are those of the authors and not necessarily those 
of the sponsor, which did not seek to influence the research. Moreover, the views 
are not of the Pensions Institute as a whole, which takes no policy positions. 
Debbie Harrison and David Blake  
Pensions Institute, November 2015
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Executive Summary
Findings in the workplace DC pension scheme market
1. Between 2016 and 2020, DC workplace pension scheme assets under 
management (AUM) are expected to double from about £280bn4 to £550bn; 
but, by 2020, about 90% of these assets will be ‘owned’ by a ‘premier 
league’ of between five and seven major providers.
2. Massive consolidation in the auto-enrolment scheme provider market is 
inevitable and needs to be well-managed by the industry and the regulators 
in order to avoid market instability. The consolidation trend will intensify as 
further reforms – such as those from the legacy policy review – come into force. 
3. Further market disruption and confusion would follow if, in the March 2016 
Budget, the Government announces its intention to introduce an ISA-type tax 
model for pensions. This could bring into question the continued purpose of 
life company tax wrappers for contract-based pension schemes and products. 
Pension-ISA taxation would also undermine the purpose of auto-enrolment 
for lower earners – the very category of private-sector workers it was meant 
to benefit. This, combined with the understandable fear that a future 
government might decide to tax withdrawals – the main tax benefit of ISAs is 
that withdrawals are tax-free – could eliminate the last vestiges of trust in 
long-term government pension policy.
4. For weaker ‘mid-tier’5 life companies, the traditional ‘bundled’ business 
model and reliance on commission-based intermediaries is anachronistic. 
It is not clear where the strengths of these life companies lie. Protection 
insurance is ‘under-sold’ at present and may represent an opportunity. 
5. Policy and regulatory reforms have broken the near-monopoly of life 
companies in the DC market for accumulation and decumulation, facilitating 
the entrance and growth of powerful competitors in the master trust market.
6. Direct-to-customer (D2C) will be the main distribution channel in the auto-
enrolment market for smaller employers. Larger employers may consider a 
switch to D2C in future, once the market has stabilised, in order to save costs.
7. Auto-enrolment schemes, in particular, are failing to meet employers’ 
requirements: following the introduction of ‘freedom and choice’ and age 
discrimination legislation, the DC pension system no longer works as a 
corporate retirement-management tool. 
8. Auto-enrolment is failing half of previously unpensioned private-sector 
employees, as 50% are not eligible for auto-enrolment, due to the terms of 
their contracts of employment. 
9. While pension reforms are essential – for example in the markets for legacy 
pension policies, annuities and drawdown products – the fragmented approach 
adopted by the Government and FCA has led to confusing overlaps and 
inconsistencies and does not represent a coherent long-term policy strategy. 
10. Understanding the tough lessons experienced by relevant overseas DC 
markets is crucial for predicting the success of the UK’s auto-enrolment 
system for decumulation. Of particular note is the global trend towards 
greater security of income in retirement, which the UK has rejected in favour 
of ‘freedom and choice’.
4 Based on data from Spence Johnson. See http://www.spencejohnson.com/deeper-perspectives
5 The first use of key definitions used in the report are highlighted in bold type and are explained 
in the ‘A-Z of key definitions’.
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Findings in the back book (legacy policy) market
1. The report predicts a surge in sales of legacy back books, as life companies 
struggle with reducing member charges and increasing capital requirements 
under Solvency II, which comes into force in January 2016. The introduction 
of an ISA-type tax model for pensions could lead to the closure of many open 
books of pension business, including those in the auto-enrolment market.
2. Life companies with back books already struggle to deal with an unprecedented 
level of Government scrutiny, regulatory reviews, and consultation processes. 
This pressure may intensify if consumer groups argue persuasively that not 
enough is being done to address the estimated £30-50bn AUM, out of total 
AUM worth £420bn, held in individual (retail) policies which, relative to 
modern products, have high charges and restrictive terms and conditions.
3. Value for money for small legacy pots is undermined by fixed annual 
administration costs. Up to 50% of policies may be worth less than £10,000 
and up to 20% may be worth less than £1,000.
4. The definition of ‘back book’ is out of date. In 2015, it should include 
private-sector closed DB schemes and bulk purchase annuities. The 
aggregate AUM of DB scheme ‘back books’ is almost three times the value 
of the legacy DC pension and long-term savings back book market, at about 
£1.2trn vs. £420bn, respectively. 
5. More recent DC back books will come to market over the next five years. 
Retail annuity books will also be sold, creating the potential for commoditised 
funds in an alternative asset class. Equity release is likely to be a ‘back book 
of the future’.
6. The market suffers from a skill shortage. The heyday of the with-profits policy 
– broadly mid-1970s to mid-2000s – is long over, although a few life 
companies still sell products based on this type of fund and, in some cases, 
have significant AUM. Despite these modern with-profits investment bonds 
and plans, the evidence of the report indicates that the market holds little or 
no attraction for younger actuaries, resulting in a skill shortage for life 
companies that manage back books.6
6 Data sources. These are provided in the footnotes throughout. In addition we drew on research 
from Magnus Spence, which provides an excellent source of regular data on the DC market. See, 
for example, Deeper Perspectives, Jan. 2015. http://www.spencejohnson.com/deeper-perspectives. 
We also used data from Autonomous, May 2015. Insurance Roadmap: UK Life – Still Life in the 
Old Dog Yet; Towers Watson, 2011. With-profits: adapting to a changing environment.  
http://www.towerswatson.com/en-GB/Insights/IC-Types/Ad-hoc-Point-of-View/2011/Insights-
With-profits-adapting-to-a-changing-environment; and FSCP, 2007. Are customers in closed with 
profits funds being treated fairly? http://www.pensions-institute.org/closedlifefunds.pdf.
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Recommendations – A cross-industry debate on the future of the life company
All the evidence of this report points to an urgent need to reconsider the design 
of the life company business model, so that the sector can continue to play a 
central role in the private pensions market. Therefore, we offer a single 
overarching recommendation, which is as follows: 
The Pensions Institute calls for an urgent cross-industry debate on the future of the life 
company, and its business model in relation to the changing needs of the private-
sector pensions market. We recommend that the debate has full cross-party support 
at policy level and has full regulatory support across the FCA, the PRA and TPR. 
1.  Participants in the life company sector need to address the following set 
of questions in relation to developing new business lines
1.1  In the light of the potential for significant consolidation in the life company 
market between 2016 and 2020, should the FCA, Prudential Regulation 
Authority (PRA) and The Pensions Regulator then (TPR)  develop, agree and 
publish a clear regulatory position with the Government on how this will be 
supervised?
1.2  What are the alternative sustainable lines of business for mid-tier life 
companies that cannot make a profit out of auto-enrolment? Examples 
include annuities (retail), bulk-purchase annuities (BPAs), equity release, 
‘schemes’ for employees ineligible for auto-enrolment, simplified or robo-
advice third-party services, and workplace group protection insurance. 
1.3  What would be the best solution for the regulation of all forms of consumer 
and employer advice and guidance, which would meet the needs of both 
DC savers and advice/guidance service providers, and which would also 
eliminate barriers to innovation? 
1.4  Could the life company sector play a role in encouraging the implementation 
of protection insurance in the workplace? One option might be to suggest 
employers bolt on the cost of group life assurance to auto-enrolment 
contributions, with a provision for employees to opt out. However, we are not 
optimistic about employers’ interest, if they are not already committed to 
group protection insurance. Like pensions, under the old voluntary system, 
protection insurance needs to be sold; it is not willingly bought. Therefore, 
while we acknowledge that there are currently low levels of provision for 
both supply and demand reasons – with the exception of employees with 
substantial DB benefits (active members or deferred) – we believe that only a 
policy change could make a significant difference if protection assurance 
was believed to be socially desirable. 
1.5  What are the opportunities for life companies in the market for non-pension 
workplace-based savings schemes that give employers the control they need 
over the retirement management of key staff? What structure might these 
schemes adopt, for example, in relation to trust law and the use of a life 
company wrapper? 
1.6  What, if anything, could the industry do to persuade the Government to 
change its piecemeal approach to pension reform to one that is coherent, 
integrated and reflects a long-term cross-party policy consensus? Only in 
this way will trust in the pension system – which has been lost due to 
conflicted and inconsistent policy interventions, as well as due to life 
company mis-selling scandals – be restored. 
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2.  Participants in the life company sector need to address the following set 
of questions in relation to the management of existing and new types of 
back books
2.1  The review of legacy workplace pension scheme charges, terms and 
conditions does not apply to books of retail policies. This is inconsistent in 
relation to treating customers fairly (TCF). Are there any plausible arguments 
– from a TCF, rather than life-company perspective – against a similar review 
of retail policies? Could life companies undertake a convincing but voluntary 
review of retail policies and agree reforms with the Government and the 
FCA on a voluntary basis?
2.2  Should the Government and regulators consider introducing a ‘de minimis’ 
return of fund for small legacy policies? If so, how would value for money 
be quantified to avoid the de minimis being applied to policies that are 
expected to result in a good outcome at maturity? Should the de minimis 
include a facility to return policy values to customers without requiring their 
permission, where they do not respond to an initial communication? 
2.3  What is the evidence that consolidators could achieve improved economies 
of scale and a more efficient deployment of skills by managing both retail 
and institutional (BPA) back books?
2.4  What is the best way for the actuarial profession and the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) to address the with-profits skill shortage? 
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Findings
Overview
1. Traditional life companies are at a cross-road. Life companies are experts in 
identifying, analysing, quantifying, and managing risks. The decisions they 
make between 2016 and 2020 will determine the future of individual 
companies and also the business model as a whole in relation to the UK’s 
private sector pensions market. 
2. A clear understanding of the needs of the rapidly-changing market will 
enable life companies to determine the most sustainable business lines for 
the future. 
3. Without this understanding of the market, life companies may be forced to 
withdraw from important lines of business, such as auto-enrolment, before 
they have developed more sustainable alternatives. Doing nothing is an 
action in itself and will make life companies vulnerable to a takeover, 
potentially on unfavourable terms. 
4. The main risk facing life companies, and which is impossible to hedge, 
is unexpected changes in policy. The lack of consultation on the 2014 March 
Budget announcement to change the pension system from April 2015 is just 
one example where the Government has destabilised the market. 
5. Life companies represent a very powerful force in the UK economy, as a 
major component of the UK insurance and long-term savings industry, which 
is the largest in the EU and third largest in the world.7 As such, life companies 
are in a strong position to shape the future of the defined contribution (DC) 
pensions market going forwards. 
6. This will not be easy, however, given the increasing fragmentation of the 
‘voice’ of life companies. Over the past two years, it has become evident that 
major life companies and asset managers in the DC market prefer to engage 
on a one-to-one basis with the Government and the regulators, rather than 
as an industry, via trade bodies such as the Association of British Insurers 
(ABI) and the Investment Association (IA). Life companies, therefore, need to 
consider how best to develop their autonomy without losing a shared 
commitment to managing change. 
7 UK insurers, in aggregate, hold £1.9trn AUM in invested assets and in 2012 contributed almost 
£30bn to the gross domestic product (GDP), which equates to more than 20% of the total gross 
value added for the financial services industry. There are about 9m individual customers with a 
long-term savings and/or protection product. Source: ABI key facts 2015. https://www.abi.org.
uk/ 
~/media/Files/Documents/Publications/Public/2015/Statistics/Key%20Facts%202015.pdf
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The changing shape of the DC pensions market; impact on life companies
1.  Between 2016 and 2020, DC workplace pension scheme assets under 
management (AUM) are expected to double from about £280bn8 to 
£550bn, but, by 2020, about 90% of these assets will be ‘owned’ by a 
‘premier league’ of between five and seven major providers.
 Predictions for the auto-enrolment market in 2020: 
• £550bn AUM in aggregate – double the current figure
• About 90% of these assets (almost £500bn) will be ‘owned’ by a ‘premier 
league’ of between five and seven major providers – halving the current 
number of major providers in the market of about 14.9 
 – The premier league will be dominated by large-scale multi-trust 
DC schemes.
 – The ‘relegated’ providers will include ‘mid-tier’ life and pensions 
companies and smaller master trusts that do not have the scale and 
deep pockets to succeed in a market characterised by scale and a 
cut-throat pricing war. Assets held by relegated providers may be 
bought by the successful life companies in the auto-enrolment market 
and by the consolidators – a life-company category that is expected to 
grow in terms of AUM and the number of participants. 
• Several major UK life companies – including those with overseas parents 
– are expected to sell-up and exit, unless they secure premier-league 
status. Exits will be due to the increasing cost of regulatory compliance, 
including capital requirements, and the potential growth of overseas 
markets, for example, in Europe, the US and the Asia-Pacific region.
2.  Massive consolidation in the auto-enrolment scheme provider market is 
inevitable and needs to be well-managed by the industry and the 
regulators in order to avoid market instability. The consolidation trend 
will intensify as further reforms – such as those from the legacy policy 
review – come into force. 
 Consolidation triggers will include:
• Increased capital requirements under Solvency II (from January 2016). 
Once the impact of Solvency II is better understood, several interviewees 
said they expected ‘a feeding frenzy’ in life company M&A activity. 
• Annual stress-testing under the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) 
requirements.10 This is expected to affect the largest life companies, based 
on the size of their global business. If caught by the rules, a life company 
might be required to increase capital reserving further. This, in turn, is likely 
to prompt a more risk-averse approach to the company’s business model, 
with greater emphasis on business lines that are less capital-intensive. 
8 Based on data from Spence Johnson. See http://www.spencejohnson.com/deeper-perspectives 
9 The largest GPP providers include Aviva, Aegon, Fidelity, L&G, Prudential, Scottish Life, Scottish 
Widows and Standard Life. Source: Employee Benefits Oct. 2015. For a list of ABI members that 
provide qualifying auto-enrolment schemes, see https://www.abi.org.uk/Insurance-and-savings/
Products/Pensions/Saving-into-a-pension/Automatic-enrolment/Providers 
10 See, for example, FT March 17 2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1940e7dc-ccd4-11e4-b252-
00144feab7de.html?ftcamp=crm/email/_2015___03___20150317__/emailalerts/Keyword_
alert/product&siteedition=uk#axzz3UiiZq295
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• Reduced sales of annuities: by 2020, we expect sales of annuities to 
stabilise at about 50% of pre-2014 levels, i.e., c. £6bn p.a. 
• The ban, in April 2016, of the consultancy charge, which many corporate 
advisers used as a way around the sales commission ban that came into 
force in January 2013 under the Retail Distribution Review (RDR). For a 
swathe of employers, this will be the first time that they have been asked 
to pay a fee for advice, as intermediaries seek to replace the consultancy 
charge with a direct employer-borne charge.
 – The total ban might be softened, so that the consultancy charge might 
continue where it is demonstrated that this adds direct value for 
members, for example, where a member actively seeks advice. This 
could be a dangerous loophole, however, because the success of 
auto-enrolment is predicated on member inertia. It is not yet clear how 
providers and intermediaries might justify the consultancy charge with 
reference to demonstrable member engagement. Nor is it clear what 
the distinction would be between a fee for advice deducted from the 
member’s fund or contributions, and a consultancy charge.
• The prospect of the increased use of pension charge caps, including: 
 – A further reduction in the cap for auto-enrolment default funds, 
currently 0.75%.
 – The inclusion of transaction costs in the auto-enrolment default fund 
charge cap.
 – A cap on exit charges for older pension policies, which would reduce 
profits from this source and also reduce the potential to cross-subsidise 
new business costs from back books.
 – A cap on drawdown and hybrid annuity/drawdown annual charges.
• Over-capacity in terms of the number of providers chasing the 
same business.
• Auto-enrolment new business costs. Many life companies do not expect 
their auto-enrolment scheme(s) to break even for a minimum of another 
two-to-three years.
• The cost of modern technology, including building and maintaining new 
platforms11 and building new advice/guidance models.
• Consolidation is also a major trend in the advice and platform market. 
Buyers include life companies and also firms of advisers taking over 
other advisers. 
• Life company and adviser ownership of platforms is a high-risk business, 
due to excess capacity. The UK life and pensions market has about 30 
platforms, whereas Australia and the US both have about 10.12
11 Platforms use technology to enable pensions and investment providers, advisers, and their 
clients, to manage their assets efficiently. Features vary but can include open-architecture with 
access to a wide range of funds, consolidated valuations, fee collection, fund blending, automatic 
re-balancing, same-day fund switching (minimising out-of-market exposure), and transition 
management for customers joining and leaving. See, for example, http://mobiuslife.co.uk/
solutions/fund-platform/
12 Coredata, Sept. 2015. Coredata Investment Platform Study 2015.  
http://www.coredataresearch.co.uk/research/investment-platform-study-2015/
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3.  Further market disruption and confusion would follow if, in the March 
2016 Budget, the Government announces its intention to introduce an 
ISA-type tax model for pensions. 
• This could bring into question the continued purpose of life company tax 
wrappers for contract-based pension schemes and products. Pension-ISA 
taxation would also undermine the purpose of auto-enrolment for lower 
earners – the very category of private sector workers it was meant to 
benefit. This, combined with the understandable fear that a future 
government might decide to tax withdrawals, contrary to the ISA tax 
principle, could eliminate the last vestiges of trust in long-term 
government pension policy.
• HMT’s July 2015 consultation13 set out three options for tax reform: no 
change, a single flat-rate of tax relief, and a switch from tax relief upfront 
to tax relief on withdrawal. The last option is the most controversial, as it 
converts the system of tax relief from front-ended to back-ended, which is 
how individual savings account (ISAs) are taxed, and which is why this 
potential reform is known as the ‘pension ISA’.14
• DC savers with small private pensions, who do not pay tax in retirement, 
would be worse off under this system. This raises questions about the 
benefits of auto-enrolment for lower earners – whether the employer 
contribution, based on a very small band of earnings, is worth the risk. 
• Entry level for providers offering a Pension-ISA are likely to be lower than 
is the case for FCA-regulated life companies that offer contract-based 
DC pension products. The Government should consider influx of poorly-
capitalised providers of master-trust pension schemes - many of which 
we expect to close down - as a warning of one of the unintended 
consequences of the Pension-ISA.
• The position of lower earners is also under review in relation to the 
single-tier state pension under new rules that come into force in April 
2016. As with many reforms, there will be winners and losers.15
13 HMT, July 2015. Strengthening the incentive to save: A consultation on pensions tax relief.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/strengthening-the-incentive-to-save-a-
consultation-on-pensions-tax-relief 
14 The current pension tax system is known as EET – exempt contributions, growth of the fund is 
exempt, and taxed withdrawals (with the exception of the 25% tax-free lump sum). The ISA system 
is TEE, which means that contributions are paid out of taxed earnings, fund growth is exempt, 
and withdrawals are exempt or tax-free.
15 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/work-and-
pensions-committee/news-parliament-2015/state-pension-launch-15-16/
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4.  For weaker ‘mid-tier’ life companies, the traditional ‘bundled’ business 
model and distribution via commission-based intermediaries is 
anachronistic: the days of making money from being a ‘jack-of-all-trades 
and master of none’ are over. It is not clear where the strengths of these 
life companies lie. 
• Under the bundled model,16 a life company owns and manages all of 
the component parts of a pension scheme or plan, including the product 
design, the technology that acts as a client/adviser interface, the asset 
management (investment strategy and investment management), and the 
administration. Asset management is now seen as the most important 
feature of auto-enrolment. 
• Mid-tier life companies are sinking under the weight of new business costs 
for auto-enrolment and, in several cases, the prospect of a significant 
reduction in profits from back books. They cannot compete with major 
providers that can demonstrate excellence in asset management.
• ‘Mid-tier’ also denotes providers that have relied on paying sales 
commission and, more recently, the consultancy charge to corporate 
advisers, in order to secure distribution. From April 2016, all forms of sales 
commission may be banned, although, in October 2015, the Government 
indicated it might permit consultancy charging to continue in certain cases. 
• Major life companies have repositioned themselves in the market as asset 
managers. The exit from the ABI of L&G in particular – one of the biggest 
life companies in the auto-enrolment market – is symptomatic of this 
trend.17 However, it is also symptomatic of a wider trend for major asset 
managers to ‘go it alone’ in terms of lobbying, with several of the largest 
managers expected to leave the IA, including Aberdeen, Fidelity 
Worldwide Investment, Invesco Perpetual, M&G, and Schroders.
• The business model of asset-manager-providers is based on the 
assumption that this skill will enable them to increase auto-enrolment 
market share for accumulation, and, importantly, for decumulation – 
a market worth about £13bn p.a., in which income drawdown 
(i.e., investment) products are expected to take an equal share of what 
was formerly a compulsory purchase annuity (i.e., insurance) market.18
• Mid-tier life companies should be aware that they need to demonstrate to 
their shareholders that they have a clear and achievable strategy for the 
future of the business. Analysts are questioning the business prognosis of 
these companies – will these companies survive and if so for how long 
and in what form? 
16 Note: Bundled refers primarily to pensions asset management and administration. ‘Composite 
insurer’ is quite different, as this denotes a company that has business lines in the life and 
pensions market, and also in the insurance market, for example protection insurance.
17 L&G left the ABI at the end of 2014, citing changes in its business model as the rationale. 
Reasons given included the transfer of the ABI’s investment business to the Investment 
Association. Importantly, L&G said: ‘the business of Legal & General has significantly evolved 
and in 2014 our business is now as much investment management as insurance.’ Moreover, 
L&G said that it preferred to lobby the Government and regulators on a unilateral basis rather 
than via a trade organisation whose membership is very diverse and which includes L&G’s 
competitors. See http://www.legalandgeneralgroup.com/media-centre/press-releases/2014/
lg-to-withdraw-from-membership-of-the-association-of-british-insurers.html. In September 2015, 
Aegon followed L&G’s lead and cited similar reasons.
18 ABI data published on 3 November 2015 showed that £4.7bn had been withdrawn under the 
new pension freedoms since April. https://www.abi.org.uk/News/News-releases/2015/11/
Pension-Stats-six-months-on
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5.  Policy and regulatory reforms have broken the near-monopoly of life 
companies in the DC market for accumulation and decumulation, 
facilitating the entrance and growth of powerful competitors in the 
master trust market.
 Competitors include:
• Providers of master trusts for accumulation, which are regulated by TPR, 
rather than the FCA. Several of the most successful master trusts do not 
conform to, or even remotely resemble, the traditional life company. 
The three best-known providers in this category are NEST, NOW: Pensions 
and The People’s Pension. 
According to the research organisation Spence Johnson,19 master trusts 
have about one-third of the auto-enrolment market – a figure that is 
expected to increase as smaller employers (with fewer than 30 employees) 
reach their staging dates over the next two years. NEST accounts for about 
40% of employer memberships. Much of this business is low-value, 
however, with monthly member contributions averaging at about £35-40. 
Contribution rates will increase once the full 8% (employer, plus 
employee, plus tax relief) is required from October 2018.20
• Providers of master trusts for decumulation schemes will present a 
powerful challenge to life companies that offer contract-based drawdown 
in the workplace and retail markets. NEST has established the blueprint for 
low-cost simple drawdown schemes that offer a later life longevity hedge. 
From 2017, we expect NEST to operate as an aggregator for employers 
that do not want to offer their own schemes – and also for the self-
employed and employees who are not eligible for auto-enrolment under 
their contracts of employment. This second category is important, because 
the traditional distinctions between ‘retail’ and ‘workplace’ should no 
longer apply at the point of decumulation. We expect national scheme 
decumulation models to be launched by B&CE’s The People’s Pension and 
by schemes designed by major consultants in conjunction with major asset 
managers. The latter represent a powerful partnership model and a very 
serious challenge to traditional bundled life companies, combining strong 
employer relationships (via consultants) with innovative investment 
strategies (via asset managers). However, there are concerns about the 
conflicts of interest that arise where an independent consultant is also a 
provider of pension schemes in its own right.
• Asset managers, which are regulated by the FCA, and which play a vital 
role in the provision of third-party investment services to providers of DC 
products and also to DB schemes. These companies can offer drawdown 
products in their own right. If the tax system for pensions changes to that 
of the ISA savings system, asset managers will no longer need life 
company wrappers for the accumulation and decumulation markets.
• Advisers and asset managers, which offer their own SIPP. About 50% of 
this market is held by non-life company providers.
19 See http://www.spencejohnson.com/deeper-perspectives
20 See http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/employers/contributions-funding-tax.aspx
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• DC and DB legacy-book consolidators are usually defined as: life 
companies that have acquired by default (replacement of older products, 
acquisition of life companies with back books, for example), and by 
business model (where the primary purpose of the life company is to buy 
back books and to manage these as the main or only source of profit). 
This market also includes the BPA buy-out providers, which we class as 
consolidators and which we expect to grow AUM significantly, as 
sponsoring employers to closed DB schemes offload their liabilities to 
insurers. BPA providers are also interested in retail back books. To date, 
this interest has been confined to the back books of annuities. In future, 
we expect it to extend to retail books of mature with-profits policies. These 
policies are part-investment, but also part-insurance, particularly the 
with-profits policies that include guarantees of locked-in annual 
investment returns during accumulation and, at decumulation, offer a 
guaranteed annuity rate (GAR). 
6.  Direct-to-customer (D2C) will be the main distribution channel in the 
auto-enrolment market for smaller employers. Medium and larger 
employers may consider a switch to D2C in future, once the market have 
stabilised, in order to save costs.
• Developments in the rapidly-changing private-sector pensions market 
have triggered a revival in direct sales, under an updated model known 
as direct-to-customer (D2C). 
• More than 1m employers, with fewer than 50 employees, are required to 
implement auto-enrolment by 2018. Some of these will have only one or 
two eligible workers. In aggregate, we expect at least 50% of these 
employers – about 500,000 – to select a scheme directly with providers. 
The decision to do so will be dictated by several factors, including 
employer preference, but also adviser/provider interest. The latter will 
want to know if the business will be profitable and this will depend largely 
on the profile of the employees in relation to earnings and length of 
service. 
• Employers looking for a D2C option should not assume that 
implementation is free, as some of the traditional life companies make an 
implementation charge. 
• As the major providers improve their D2C services, employer confidence 
will grow and the use of D2C will become more widespread, cutting out 
consultants and corporate advisers.
To support D2C, advisers and providers are developing a range of 
cheaper advice models. These tend to focus solely or mainly on the 
client’s pension requirements. At present the terminology – ‘focused’, 
‘simplified’, and ‘robo’ advice, for example – is confusing and requires 
regulatory clarity. 
• Our research indicates that the success of low-cost advice models is 
predicated on the ease with which providers obtain clients. New business 
costs would be reduced considerably where the advice is offered on a 
D2C basis to members of a pension scheme that wish to draw on their 
DC pots. The same efficiencies could apply where a provider offers this 
type of service to its retail pensions customers. 
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7.  Auto-enrolment is failing to meet employers’ requirements: under 
‘freedom and choice’ and age-discrimination rules, the DC pension 
system no longer works as a corporate retirement-management tool. 
• Employers are very concerned about the freedom workers now have to 
choose their retirement date and to draw on their DC pots from age 55. 
Employers fear that a log-jam of older workers – those who want to retire 
but cannot afford to do so, because they have already drawn on their DC 
pots – will stall company recruitment and retention of younger talent. 
• Larger employers are likely to introduce an additional workplace savings 
scheme for valued employees, in which the minimum age for access will 
be determined by the employer in relation to its recruitment and 
retirement strategy.
• It is important to remember that under the voluntary system many 
employers with good-quality DC schemes and generous employer 
contribution rates did not necessarily encourage all employees to join. 
Instead, they targeted employees they considered of particular value 
and also employees who would be likely to stay with the company for 
a long time. 
8.  Auto-enrolment is failing previously unpensioned private-sector 
employees, as 50% are not eligible for auto-enrolment due to the terms 
of their contracts or lack of employment. 
• While opt-out rates for auto-enrolment have been lower than expected – 
at between 8% and 15%, as opposed to the predicted 28%21 – this success 
masks a much broader concern, namely the huge number of employees 
who are ineligible for auto-enrolment. As at the end of October 2015, 
5.5m eligible employees had been auto-enrolled and another 5.3m were 
classed as ineligible.22
• Employees classed as ‘ineligible workers’ occupy a liminal territory 
between the employed and the self-employed. They might work for an 
employer for up to six years – broadly the average period employees as a 
whole spend in a specific job – yet they are classed under the auto-
enrolment system as though they are self-employed.
21 NAO/DWP, Oct., 2015. Automatic enrolment to workplace pensions. https://www.nao.org.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Automatic-enrolment-to-workplace-pensions.pdf 
22 TPR, Oct. 2015. Automatic enrolment: Declaration of compliance report.  
http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/automatic-enrolment-declaration-of-compliance-
monthly-report.pdf
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9.  Lack of clear and consistent data on the DC market undermines 
regulation and independent evaluation of areas of success and failure. 
It also creates the potential for regulatory arbitrage, for example, where 
contract-based schemes, which are regulated by the Financial Conduct 
Authority, can have their form replicated by master-trusts, which come 
under the lighter-touch entry requirements and ongoing regulation of 
The Pensions Regulator.
 Problems arise in the DC market due to:
• Inconsistencies in product classification, for example, the blurred 
distinction between early workplace DC schemes, such as group personal 
pensions (GPPs) and individual (‘retail’) contract-based personal pensions.
• The aggregation of legacy pension and long-term savings policies, for 
example, with-profits pension policies and with-profits endowments.
• The confusion between legal regimes, that is, between contract-based 
pensions arrangements and trust-based arrangements.
• The different rules for entry and ongoing regulation of contract-based 
schemes under the FCA and for trust-based schemes under TPR, which is 
considered a ‘light-touch’ regulator of DC schemes in comparison with 
the FCA.
• Double-counting, whereby transfers of pension assets, from one product 
or workplace scheme provider to another, are classed as new business, 
thereby distorting aggregate totals.
 Problems arise in the DB market due to:
• The range of actuarial assumptions used to calculate assets and liabilities, 
which is due to the accounting rules for different types of valuations.
• The difficulty in predicting which schemes might be able to afford a BPA 
buyout and which schemes might end up in the Pension Protection Fund 
(PPF),23 which pays compensation to members of underfunded schemes 
that become insolvent.
23 The DB compensation scheme of last resort, established by the Pensions Act 2004.  
http://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/Pages/homepage.aspx
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10.  Understanding the tough lessons experienced by relevant overseas DC 
markets is crucial for predicting the success of the UK’s auto-enrolment 
system for decumulation. Of particular note is the global trend towards 
greater security of income in retirement, while the UK has just started 
heading in the opposite direction.
  UK life companies, the Government and the regulators can learn a great 
deal from overseas DC markets, but must consider carefully the legal and 
regulatory context to ensure lessons are relevant to the UK. Among other 
examples, they need to understand:
• Australia: Why freedom and choice has been such a disaster for Australian 
DC retirees, due to the high number (c. 50%) of DC savers who empty their 
pots before age 70. Why the new annuity-based decumulation market, 
instigated by the influential Murray Review,24 will ensure that most DC savers 
are protected from longevity risk, at a time when the UK’s DC savers are 
eschewing this protection because they no longer have to buy an annuity. 
• Chile and Switzerland: How the government and regulators have built 
consumer trust in the annuity market through tight control of pricing 
and rates.
• US: Why asset managers, and not life companies, dominate the US 
workplace DC scheme (401k) market for accumulation and the retail 
drawdown (individual retirement account or IRA) market, and why the US 
Government is likely to promote the greater use of annuities in future – 
again counter to the UK’s policy-driven direction of travel.
11.  The market in third-party asset management services to private-sector 
DB schemes has a finite future. However, the demand for bulk purchase 
annuity (BPA) buy-outs will increase. Only composite insurers, whose 
business model offers both asset management and insurance services, 
might be able to compensate for the loss of business in the former line 
by increasing business in the latter.
• The demand for asset-management services will shrink significantly over 
the next 10-15 years, as employers transfer their liabilities from the 
corporate balance sheet to insurance companies via a BPA buy-out, or, in 
the case of schemes that are significantly underfunded when an employer 
becomes insolvent, by a transfer of the scheme into the PPF. Annuity 
companies invest in a wide range of debt instruments, but tend to have 
either nothing or very little in equities, hedge funds or direct property. 
Most BPA providers manage their assets in-house. Moreover, the PPF uses 
very few life company asset managers and is expected to move its asset 
management function in-house over time. 
• While there is scope for new entrants to the BPA market, this requires a 
very different business model from asset management, and also requires 
significant levels of capital reserves – a requirement that will increase 
when Solvency II comes into force in January 2016. 
24 FSI, Dec. 2014. The Murray Review. http://fsi.gov.au/publications/final-report/. See also the 
Australian Treasury announcement: http://treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/
Consultations/2014/FSI-Final-Report. We are grateful for permission to include analysis here 
from ‘the lang cat’, an independent research centre. See the lang cat, April 2015. When the 
levee breaks: What next for the UK retirement savings market? http://langcatfinancial.co.uk/
white-paper/when-the-levee-breaks/
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The challenges for the back book market
1.  The report predicts a surge in sales of legacy back books, as life companies 
struggle with reducing member charges and increasing capital 
requirements under Solvency II, which comes into force in January 2016.
 The expected increase in sales of back books is due to: 
• Solvency II: As noted above, once the impact of the new capital 
requirements are better understood, we expect this to accelerate the trend 
towards sales of back books, so that less well-capitalised providers can 
reduce the inefficiencies in the use of capital. It will also drive the trend 
towards increased scale and prompt further mergers and acquisitions. 
• Downward pressure on legacy policy charges: Life companies are under 
pressure from the Government and regulators to reduce charges and exit 
penalties on legacy policies. Life companies will need to determine if 
previously profitable legacy books have become unprofitable relative to 
the business as a whole. The sale of unprofitable back books will free up 
capital to invest in new business development opportunities. 
• Cost of administration relative to AUM: For non-consolidators, 
managing books in run-off is likely to become high-cost relative to 
shrinking AUM. Where the owner of back books is a quoted life company, 
shareholders and equity analysts will review the incentives and 
disincentives to maintain investment in the back book capital at risk, in 
comparison with the alternative of disposal of the book.25
• Reputational risk associated with ‘tarnished’ back books: We expect 
certain life companies to sell back books for reasons other than purely 
financial. Even where a legacy book remains profitable, the increasing 
regulatory focus on legacy business will draw media attention to the 
ownership of old brands, some of which had a very poor reputation in the 
1980s and 1990s. Life companies will be concerned about the risk of 
cross-contamination, where an old and tarnished or discredited brand 
becomes more visibly linked with the modern successful brand.
• Division of a mutual society’s common fund: For mutual societies, the 
opportunity to sell a back book is likely to be triggered by the decision to 
divide the ‘common fund’ of with-profits and unit-linked businesses, which 
is now possible under new regulatory freedoms.26 The objective for some 
mutuals will be to ring-fence with-profits policies and then sell the book in 
order to invest in new unit-linked business development. Mutuals with 
with-profits policies in run-off, and which do not have a viable future in 
the unit-linked market, may seek a buyer for the entire business.
• The potential replacement of the pension tax model with the ISA-type 
tax model: This could render obsolete many of the DC pension schemes 
and individual plans currently in use, if they are not able to make all the 
necessary adjustments. This would create overnight a swathe of back 
books that would need to be managed in isolation from schemes that met 
the new rules.
25 See, for example, http://www.towerswatson.com/en-GB/Insights/IC-Types/Ad-hoc-Point-of-
View/2011/Insights-With-profits-adapting-to-a-changing-environment. See also Autonomous May 
2015. Insurance Roadmap: UK Life – Still Life in the Old Dog Yet. http://www.autonomous.com/ 
26 FCA, March 2014. Response to CP12/38 – Mutuality and with-profits funds: A way forward. 
https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/policy-statements/ps14-05.pdf 
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• A potential review of retail policy back books: If the Government 
decides that there is inconsistency between the treatment of consumers in 
legacy workplace pension schemes, which are under review, and 
consumers with legacy retail pension policies, which are not, it might 
launch a review of the latter, possibly after it has explored a voluntary 
review on the part of back book life companies. This would probably 
trigger further sales of retail back books, as profit margins are squeezed 
and administration costs increased.
 – The OFT investigation into competition in workplace DC pension 
schemes found £30bn in schemes characterised by high charges and 
restrictive terms and conditions relative to more modern schemes. This 
figure represents about 25% of the market, as defined by the OFT. 
 – We estimate that an equivalent £30bn AUM in legacy retail pension 
policies are similarly affected. If long-term savings policies are 
included, such as endowments and single-premium bonds, the figure 
rises to an estimated £50bn.
 – The retail market is more extensive than the workplace market. For 
example, with-profit bonds were sold until about 2005. Some of these 
will have high charges, largely due to the above-average upfront sales 
commission life companies paid to advisers, worth up to 7.5% on 
single premium investments.27 Legacy unit-linked policies, which had 
largely replaced with-profits business by 2000 in the pensions and 
endowment markets, are also affected. 
 – If the Government and FCA fail to address the problem of charges on 
retail legacy policies through the reviews already underway, it is likely 
that consumer bodies will raise a ‘super complaint’ with the FCA, which 
can require the regulator to investigate ‘any details about market practice, 
product features and/or pricing in relation to the relevant product’.28
2.  Value for money for small legacy pots is undermined by fixed annual 
administration costs. Up to 50% of policies may be worth less than 
£10,000 and up to 20% may be worth less than £1,000.
• Small pot values are a pressing problem for life companies with pre-2001 
back books. We estimate that as many as 50% of these policies are worth 
less than £10,000 and 20% are worth less than £1,000. The very small 
pots (less than £1,000) are a result of the poor persistency rates in the 
market in the 1980s and 1990s, by which we mean that retail or workplace 
scheme customers paid just a few contributions (‘premiums’) many years 
ago, since when low investment returns – often a result of a de-risking 
strategy for mature books – combined with fixed annual administration 
costs, have meant that returns do not outstrip administration costs.
• Life companies argue that if they treat policyholders with smaller pots 
more favourably – for example, by applying a cross-subsidy of 
administration costs from policyholders with larger pots – this would be 
financially disadvantageous and unfair to the latter cohorts. 
27 Cazalet Consulting, ‘Polly Put the Kettle On: Pensions Profitability’, January 2006. The report 
stated that 50% of new pension policies [at the time] lapsed within the first four years. Initial 
commission ranged from 3% to 7.5% at the end of 2005 for single premium policies, while the 
annual management charge was between 0.75% and 1%. The period over which providers 
recouped the cost of commission varied from 3.8 to 9.5 years. Commission clawback for early 
lapses ranged from 2 to 4 years and was 3 years on average.
28 FCA, June 2013. Guidance for designated consumer bodies on making a super-complaint under s234C.
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3.  The definition of ‘back book’ is out of date. In 2015 it should include 
private-sector closed DB schemes and bulk purchase annuities. The 
aggregate AUM of DB scheme ‘back books’ is almost three times the 
value of the legacy DC pension and long-term savings back book 
market, at about £1.2trn vs. £420bn respectively. 
• The original back book market refers mainly to books of pre-2001 
with-profits, unitised with-profits, and unit-linked policies, plus with-profits 
bonds sold pre-2005. The total value of these books is estimated to be 
about £420bn, although, as mentioned above, some experts put the 
figure significantly lower at about £330bn, while others put it significantly 
higher at about £530bn. The stark differences are due to the definition 
of ‘legacy’. 
• Today, it is evident that a back book is not necessarily an old book or a 
closed book, that there is synergy for providers that manage DC and DB 
back books, and that more recent books of DC workplace scheme 
business are expected to come onto the market in the future. Insurers that 
recognise these trends have the opportunity to use transferable skills and 
operational efficiencies to combine different types of back book under a 
single business model. 
• The BPA buy-out/buy-in market has grown by about £50bn since 2007, 
which represents less than 5% of the remaining DB scheme liabilities.
• Of the 6,000 schemes in the Pensions Protection Fund (PPF) Index, 13% 
are open to new members and/or future accrual, 5,000 are in deficit and 
1,000 are in surplus on a ‘Section 179’ (s179) actuarial valuation basis, 
which represents the cost of buying out liabilities that match PPF 
compensation levels (‘PPF funding level’).29 As at the beginning of 
November 2015, total assets held by closed private-sector DB schemes 
were worth about £1.2trn and total liabilities were worth about £1.5trn on 
an s179 basis.30 Experts told us that the aggregate cost of BPA buy-outs 
that would secure full replication of member benefits under existing 
scheme rules would be closer to £2trn. 
• Employers will either transfer their liabilities to insurers via BPA buy-outs 
or, if they become insolvent and the scheme is significantly underfunded, 
the scheme will pass into the PPF.
• Market analysts have estimated that BPA providers will capture between 
25% and 50% of the market in total.31 The value of these deals in 
aggregate will depend on whether BPAs reflect the full cost of scheme 
liabilities, or a reduced cost due to changes in TPR’s requirements. If full 
scheme liabilities are secured, the future BPA market will be worth 
between £500bn and £1trn.
29 The PPF provides a monthly update on the aggregate position of all 6,000 schemes here:  
http://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/Pages/PPF7800.aspx. PPF-level compensation is lower 
than the full cost of benefits under individual scheme rules because the PPF does not pay 
non-statutory indexation and it also caps compensation for members who had yet to reach their 
scheme’s normal retirement age (NRA) at the date the sponsoring employer became insolvent.
30 http://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/Pages/PPF7800.aspx. The PPF Index data is updated monthly.
31 See, for example, Oliver Wyman, 2014. The future of the UK life industry.  
http://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/global/en/files/insights/financial-services/ 
2014/September/LON-MKT10307-001%20-%20Future%20of%20UK%20Life%20-%20FINAL.pdf
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• There are fewer than 10 providers in the BPA market – a market which 
has undergone considerable change since 2007, when employers started 
to offload their DB liabilities to insurers, via a series of acquisitions and 
mergers. At the time of writing the line-up included: 
 – Pre-2015 entrants: Aegon, AIG, Aviva, Just Retirement/Partnership  
(in the process of merging), L&G (which took over Lucida), PIC, 
Prudential, and Rothesay Life (which took over Paternoster and MetLife, 
which in turn had already taken over AIG).
 – Recent entrants: Canada Life, Lloyds Banking Group, LV=, and 
Scottish Widows.
• We do not rule out further changes in market participants:
 – We expect more life companies to enter the market in a bid to recoup 
profits lost as a result of the fall in retail annuity sales and in response 
to other policy and regulatory reforms, such as the expected reduction 
in charges on legacy workplace pension schemes.
 – M&A activity is high in the BPA-provider market and we expect further 
deals in future. Private owners may seek to sell off their stakes in life 
companies in this market once the impact of Solvency II is better 
understood. 
4.   More recent DC back books will come to market over the next five years. 
Retail annuity books will also be sold, creating the potential for 
commoditised funds in an alternative asset class. Equity release is likely 
to be a ‘back book of the future’.
 We expect the ‘new-wave’ of back books to include:
• Post-2006 books of with-profits business: Several providers continue to 
sell with-profits business, e.g., Prudential, which has £76.7bn AUM in this 
fund, or have done so until very recently, for example L&G, which closed 
its £12bn with-profits book in 2015.
• Group DC 2001-2012, i.e. pre-auto-enrolment: These schemes generally 
will not look competitive relative to the modern large-scale master-trusts 
and are likely to be replaced when employers re-broke the market. 
• Auto-enrolment schemes sold between 2012 and 2018: Over the next 
five years, we expect several mid-tier life companies to pull out of the 
auto-enrolment market because they will fail to secure a sufficiently 
profitable share and will suffer losses due to the cost of new business 
acquisition and to the loss of the ability to pay corporate advisers a 
consultancy charge to secure distribution. Apart from the contract-based 
schemes heavily sold in this market, we estimate that fewer than 10% of 
the estimated 70 master trust providers will also withdraw for the same 
reasons. These early auto-enrolment books of open business are likely to 
be transferred in to more competitive schemes when an employer makes 
the switch, but we expect some to be put up for sale.
• Retail annuity books: Following the introduction of freedom and choice, 
which has temporarily decimated the retail annuity market, life companies 
will need to reconsider their role as annuity providers. Books that come up 
for sale be of interest to the BPA specialists, as well as the traditional 
consolidators, such as Phoenix, Swiss Re and Chesnara. 
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• Equity release: We predict new products that offer flexible drawdown 
facilities will replace older policies, which may be sold as ‘back books’. 
This market will be a ‘slow burner’, since we expect growth to be gradual 
in terms of demand and also in terms of life company appetite, since, at 
the time of writing, it was not clear if it was possible to use these books as 
assets to back annuity liabilities under Solvency II. Nevertheless the signs 
are promising, with Q3 2015 figures at a record high, according to the 
Equity Release Council.32
5.  The market suffers from an actuarial skill shortage. The heyday of the 
with-profits policy – broadly mid-1970s to mid-2000s – is long over, 
although a minority of life companies continue to offer this investment 
strategy. The market holds little or no attraction for younger actuaries, 
resulting in a skill shortage for life companies that manage back books. 
  With-profits technical expertise is concentrated in a shrinking pool of 
talented actuaries with long experience in the market. Life companies will 
find it increasingly difficult to replace retirees from this skill pool.
32 http://www.equityreleasecouncil.com/news/equity-release-breaks-new-ground-with-biggest-
quarterly-rise/
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Recommendations Part 1: Participants in the life company 
sector need to address the following set of questions in 
relation to developing new business lines
1.  In the light of the potential for significant consolidation in the life 
company market between 2016 and 2020, should the FCA, PRA and 
TPR develop, agree and publish a clear regulatory position with the 
Government on how this will be supervised?
  The key concern here is the potential for uncertainty and instability in the life 
company market, which, in turn, would undermine employer and employee 
confidence in workplace schemes pre- and post-auto-enrolment.
2.  What are the alternative sustainable lines of business for mid-tier life 
companies that cannot make a profit out of auto-enrolment? 
Examples include annuities (retail), bulk purchase annuities (BPAs), 
equity release, ‘schemes’ for employees ineligible for auto-enrolment, 
simplified or robo-advice third-party services, and workplace group 
protection insurance? 
  Potential business development markets for mid-tier life companies:
• Annuity market (retail): Lack of innovation in the annuity market (e.g., 
later life annuities and hybrid drawdown/annuity products) may present 
opportunities, but growth will be slow and the barriers to success may be 
insuperable. There has been little innovation in this market, in part due to 
the uncertainty over what customer buying patterns will emerge. 
However, we predict a backlash in the drawdown mass market by the 
early-to-mid 2020s, when customers who have used drawdown for 
smaller pots and have no other significant private source of retirement 
income, recognise that they cannot tolerate the volatility in investment 
returns and hence the income that can be taken from drawdown 
products. It is vital for life companies to maintain a competitive open 
market in lifetime annuities. They also need to develop deferred annuities, 
which NEST, for example, has indicated it plans to use as part of its 
decumulation scheme, otherwise NEST may look to the US annuity market 
for a third-party provider or counterparty for risk.
Further opportunities may arise in the retail annuity market if life 
companies were able to develop commoditised annuity funds which 
would represent an alternative asset class for financial institutions seeking 
to diversify overall risk. 
This opportunity could be developed further if the Government introduces 
a secondary market for the c. 5m individuals with annuities. The 
consultation will be published in December 2015. To enhance the 
prospects of this market, life companies or the Government and FCA 
might develop a ‘selling money’s worth’33 measure of value for money 
for policyholders.
33 See, for example, http://www.bath.ac.uk/management/research/pdf/tonks-cannon-annuity-
markets.pdf and https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10036/52333/rrep563.
pdf?sequence=1 
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• BPA: This is the biggest opportunity for life companies, in terms of market 
size. BPA insurers currently have c. £50bn AUM, which represents less 
than 5% of the potential market, which has liabilities of £1.5trn34 (some 
put the figure as high as £2trn), but assets worth 20% less at £1.2trn. The 
BPA market is tough and has witnessed a series of exits and takeovers and 
mergers, since it took off in 2007. Success requires keen pricing, a strong 
insurance company covenant, and evidence of a long-term commitment 
to the market.
• Equity release: DC customers who do not have a DB pension will turn to 
equity release to top up their income in later retirement. Flexible plans, 
that enable customers to make ad-hoc withdrawals, will be well-aligned 
with the way that DC customers use their pension pots.
We strongly expect that the equity release market will grow. What is 
uncertain is the timing. If the build-up is slow, then life companies might 
need to tie up their capital in the expectation of low profit margins for the 
next 5-to-10 years. 
• ‘Schemes’ for employees ineligible for auto-enrolment. The challenge 
in this market is to create a scheme that mirrors the best features of 
mass-market schemes for auto-enrolment, where choices are simplified 
on the assumption that members will not be actively engaged in decision-
making. NEST already permits the self-employed to join; life companies 
might consider offering a similar facility in order to capture a market that 
otherwise might become part of the non-life company SIPP market. Apart 
from appealing to potential customers, the simplified approach would 
have the advantage of reducing costs. Moreover, a simplified scheme 
could be sold via robo-advice (see below) to employers that wanted to 
cater for workers who are not auto-enrolled and who, under a master 
trust, could maintain membership if they continued in a self-employed 
capacity after the contract of employment expired.
An investigation into the market for contract workers would be very useful, 
as little seems to be known about the hiring practices used to appoint 
these millions of individuals. What is known is that employers tend to 
avoid hiring contract workers directly, but instead use a recruitment 
agency for this purpose, in order to distance themselves for tax purposes. 
An industry-wide ‘scheme’ for recruitment agency workers, therefore, 
might be feasible. 
• Workplace group protection insurance for auto-enrolment 
accumulation and drawdown: Lack of innovation in the group protection 
insurance market35 may also present opportunities, but again growth will be 
slow. Despite under-provision of life assurance (only 24% of UK households 
have life assurance according to the ABI) and income protection 
insurance, for example, these products are notoriously hard to sell, unless 
employers contribute or pay in full for group protection schemes.
34 This is a conservative estimate because it is based on the cost of replicating the compensation 
provided by the PPF, which is lower than the full benefits provided by most schemes.
35 See, for example, KPMG, Sept. 2015. A new world of opportunity: The insurance innovation 
imperative. https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2015/09/the-insurance-innovation-
imperative.html
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3.  What would be the best solution for the regulation of all forms of 
consumer and employer advice and guidance from the perspective of 
both users and service providers, and which would eliminate barriers to 
innovation? 
Life and pensions providers need to convince the FCA once and for all that 
the current regulatory system for advice and guidance, and for commission 
and fees, is absurdly complicated, both from a user and provider 
perspective. The result is a system that nobody understands, that delays and 
prevents transfers, and which leaves the door wide open for unscrupulous 
firms seeking to mislead or defraud DC savers. 
Fee-based advice for DC pots typically starts at about £1,000, irrespective 
of the pot size. This is worth a year’s income for an annuity purchased with 
a pot of £30,000. Undoubtedly, there is an advice gap, but innovation is 
being stifled by the regulatory uncertainty over the design and delivery of 
‘simplified’ services, which generally offer guidance or recommendations 
that are DC-pension specific, and which can be delivered by a web-based 
system (‘robo-advice’), with or without a telephone or web-based helpline. The 
FCA’s innovation hub is thought to contain new models for advice services.36 
4.  Could the life company sector play a role in encouraging the 
implementation of protection insurance in the workplace?
• If life companies are concerned about private-sector employees’ lack of 
protection insurance, they need to develop evidence-based arguments to 
support a call for change: for example, arguments to support the case 
that protection assurance might be appropriate once minimum 
contributions have been increased to a level that delivers an adequate 
retirement income of, say, £12-15,000 per annum. 
• A glance back in time will reveal that protection insurance has been a 
core component of state and private pension systems in the UK since the 
post-WWII welfare state was established between 1945 and 1949. The 
system that emerged from the Beveridge report (after William Beveridge’s 
1942 report, Social Insurance and Allied Services) provided insurance to 
protect employees from loss of earned income in the event of serious 
illness, death, and becoming too old to work (retirement). DB schemes 
emulated this system by providing disability pensions, death-in-service 
benefits, and pensions. When employers closed their DB schemes, 
protection insurances were not replaced in the move to DC.
• To keep employee costs down, there would need to be an appropriate cap 
on the decreasing term assurance, e.g. £50,000. So, on death, a younger 
saver’s estate would get the larger of the pot size and £50,000. As pot 
sizes grow, the cost of the decreasing life cover would reduce, so on a 
scheme basis there would be a cross-subsidy from those with larger pots 
to younger members and lower earners. An alternative would be for 
decreasing life cover to be provided on a per-member basis, so the 
individual premium would decrease over time. However this second 
approach would add to the cost of administration, whereas, a key factor 
in the success of auto-enrolment is the ability of employer payroll systems 
to forward a single monthly premium to their providers, on behalf of all 
scheme members.
36 See FCA, No. 2015. Regulatory sandbox. http://www.fca.org.uk/news/regulatory-sandbox
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5.  What are the opportunities for life companies in the market for non-
pension workplace-based savings schemes that give employers the 
control they need over the retirement management of key staff? What 
structure might these schemes adopt, for example, in relation to trust law 
and the use of a life company wrapper? 
• We expect larger employers in particular to seek to introduce some form of 
trust-based savings scheme for their most valued employees, over which 
employers have control, i.e., they would set the minimum age for access. 
• Life companies should be well-placed to develop this type of product, 
which is likely to be trust-based, but not a pension product. 
• The fact that such trusts would not be as tax-efficient as DC pensions is 
less important to employers than the ability to retain control over when 
their employees begin to draw from their pots, especially in the light of 
Government changes to pension taxation, including the annual allowance 
for higher earners.37
6.  What, if anything, could the industry do to persuade the Government 
to change its piecemeal approach to pension reform to one that is 
coherent, integrated and reflects a long-term cross-party policy 
consensus? Only in this way will trust in the pension system – which has 
been lost due to conflicted and inconsistent policy interventions, as well 
as due to life company mis-selling scandals – be restored. 
37 The lifetime allowance (LTA) is a limit on the amount that can be withdrawn from a pension 
scheme without triggering an extra tax charge. It was introduced in 2006 at a level of £1.5m and 
increased to £1.8m by 2010. In the 2015-16 tax year the LTA was reduced to £1.25m. It falls to 
£1m from April 2016.
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Recommendations Part 2: Participants in the life company 
sector need to address the following set of questions in relation 
to the management of existing and new types of back books
1.  The review of legacy workplace pension scheme charges, terms and 
conditions does not apply to books of retail policies. This is inconsistent 
in relation to treating customers fairly (TCF). What are the arguments for 
and against a similar review of retail policies? 
• The arguments in favour of this approach appear to be compelling from 
a TCF perspective. However, there may be a case for a voluntary review 
by life companies, rather than a prescriptive regulatory thematic review, 
at least in the first instance. 
2.  Should the Government and regulators consider introducing a ‘de minimis’ 
return of fund for small legacy policies? If so, how would value for money 
be quantified to avoid the de minimis being applied to policies that are 
expected to result in a good outcome at maturity? Should the de minimis 
include a facility to return policy values to customers without requiring 
their permission, where they do not respond to an initial communication? 
• The reference point the Government and regulators might consider is 
the ‘pot-follows-member’ de minimis, which is expected to be £10,000. 
This was due to be phased in from the autumn of 2016, but has now 
been deferred.38
• If a de minimis for small legacy pots is introduced, it would be essential 
for the FCA to investigate the smaller policy market and to incorporate 
appropriate rules to protect customers, for example, where a smaller 
policy has a good potential outcome if it is continued to maturity, due to 
the application of a guaranteed annuity rate. Consumer protection would 
need to be in line with the FCA rules, which permit transfers of policies 
with a GAR, provided the terms are fair. Another example would be 
selection on the part of a provider, whereby the life company sends 
automatic cash payments only to customers with policies that are 
unprofitable to the business. To the rest, it sends an ‘uninformative’ 
information sheet together with a complex application form to deter 
customers from requesting the de minimis right to cash. Given the 
endemic problem of legacy customer poor response rates to 
communication exercises, such a strategy would almost certainly work in 
the life company’s, rather than the customer’s, interests. The FCA would 
also need to ensure providers pay a fair value for policies and not take 
this opportunity to deduct disproportionate penalties. 
38 The DWP predicts there would be 50m dormant pots by 2050 if no action is taken. See DWP 
Feb 2015: automatic transfers. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/402860/automatic-transfers.pdf. In addition, the Pension Tracing Service is 
being expanded. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/bigger-and-better-pension-tracing-
service-ready-to-help
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3.  What is the evidence that consolidators could achieve improved 
economies of scale and a more efficient deployment of skills by 
managing both retail and institutional (BPA) back books?
• Mono-line insurers in the BPA market may be seen as attractive targets for 
acquisition by large multi-line life companies and by consolidators.
• Strongly capitalised BPA insurers may consider the acquisition of mature 
books of legacy with-profits policies, due to the synergy in the asset 
management of BPAs and closed books of policies with guarantees. The 
same synergy is already evident between the BPA and retail annuity-book 
market – the most recent example being Rothesay Life’s acquisition of 
Zurich’s retail annuity book.
4.  What is the best way for the actuarial profession and the FRC to address 
the with-profits skill shortage? 
• The first step would be to quantify the problem. This might be achieved 
by an investigation on the part of the actuarial profession, in association 
with the Financial Reporting Council and its Actuarial Stakeholder Group, 
to assess the extent of the skill shortage. This could be followed by a 
consultation with the industry – i.e., among the actuarial profession and 
also the users of actuarial services.
• It would be helpful for the regulators and industry as a whole to 
understand better the specific actuarial skills that are required to deal with 
with-profits books of business, and to draw comparisons with other similar 
lines of work, for example, underwriting BPA business, where this includes 
deferred as well as retired members. If there were common skills shared 
between legacy DC and legacy DB books of business, this might suggest 
a career path for younger actuaries that maximises the use of the 
transferable skills across the two markets.
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A-Z of key definitions used in this report
• Back books from the original legacy era (pre-2001-05) cover a wide range 
of policies, including retirement annuity contracts (RACs – the predecessors of 
personal pensions), personal pensions, free-standing additional voluntary 
contributions (FSAVCs – used to top up a workplace pension scheme), Section 
32 policies (s32, a type of deferred annuity, established under the relevant 
section in the Finance Act 1981), executive pension plans (EPPs), older group 
personal pensions (GPPs) and self-invested personal pensions (SIPPs), non-
profit deferred annuities, older drawdown plans, and hybrid products that 
combine with-profits and unit-linked funds.
• ‘Mass market’ definitions vary and by nature tend to be vague. In this report, 
we use this term to denote average earners, who do not have significant 
sources of wealth. Their investible (‘spare’) savings and investments outside of 
their DC pension are likely to be less than £30,000 at present, unless the 
individual has received a substantial bequest. In due course we would expect 
average DC pots to grow from about £15,000 – possibly to about £50,000 in 
20 years’ time39 – but this will depend on many variables, including potential 
policy changes to the taxation of pensions.
• ‘Mid-tier’ denotes a range of features that may make life companies struggle 
in the new DC market, including:
 – Size: Mid-tier life companies generally are medium-sized operations, as 
opposed to the ‘giants’, such as L&G and Standard Life, for example. 
 – Distribution: Mid-tier life companies historically have relied on sales 
commission – including the consultancy charge, which was introduced in 
January 2013 as a way to get around the commission ban under the retail 
distribution review (RDR) – from the main distribution channel, namely 
corporate advisers to employers in the workplace scheme market. The 
Government is expected to ban all member-borne commission charges 
from April 2016. While some employers may be prepared to pay an advice 
fee, we expect many others to review their scheme arrangements and to 
consider going direct to one of the major master-trust auto-enrolment 
schemes. It is not clear what will happen to schemes that are abandoned by 
employers when they take this step.
 – Weakness in bundled schemes and products: Mid-tier life companies may 
provide bundled workplace schemes and retail products, but do not 
necessarily excel across the board. A key determinant for success in the new 
DC market is a reputation for excellence in asset management.
39 Estimates of average pot sizes vary. The PPI has estimated that the average DC pension pot 
might grow from about £14,100 to £56,000 in 20 years’ time. See PPI, Nov. 2015. The Future 
Book: unravelling workplace pensions [2015 Edition]. http://www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/
publications/reports/the-future-book-2015-edition-unravelling-workplace-pensions
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• ‘Traditional life company’ refers to the ‘bundled’ or ‘vertically-integrated’ 
business model that combines, in-house, all of the component functions 
necessary to deliver DC pension products. This business model uses affiliated 
companies within the group to provide a range of services, including the asset 
management of the default fund, asset management for other funds offered 
by the scheme via investment platforms, administration, and, in some cases, 
investment transaction execution services. It also includes distribution, a key 
function that has undergone profound change. During the 1980s, most life 
companies transitioned from direct sales (now known as direct-to-customer 
or D2C), and increasingly relied for distribution on intermediaries which, 
typically, were remunerated in the form of sales commission (see mid-tier 
above).40
40 Many ‘fee-based’ intermediaries in the workplace and retail markets adapted this model, so that 
their fee was deducted from employer and employee premiums. In effect, this practice was just 
another form of sales commission, albeit with a known monetary amount that was pre-agreed 
with the employer or the individual customer.
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Summary of key reforms in the DC market 
• 2013: The retail distribution review (RDR), which banned commission-based 
sales of investment products via regulated advice, i.e., where the adviser or 
consultant makes a personal recommendation.41
• 2012-2018: The phasing in of auto-enrolment, which put paid to the notion 
that employers had to be ‘sold’ pension schemes. Under auto-enrolment, 
employers are required by law to ‘buy’ a scheme (albeit usually paid for in full 
by members). 
• 2013-ongoing: The investigation into legacy policies. At the time of writing, 
the results of the FCA investigation (FCA statement on fair treatment of long 
standing customers in life insurance42) were imminent. This began with the 
Office for Fair Trading report (2013) on the lack of competition in the DC 
workplace scheme market, continued with the Independent Project Board’s 
report (2014) on charges, and continues with the FCA’s current review of the 
treatment of legacy policyholders and also on the impact of exit charges on 
the ‘freedom and choice’ regime, which is under review by the Government.43
• 2015: The new pension tax regime for decumulation, which came into force 
in April 2015. The early results indicate that DC savers who want to access 
their pots from age 55, are largely eschewing the lifetime annuity (LTA, an 
insurance product) in favour of cash and, for larger pots, for drawdown (an 
investment product). Moreover, instead of passively accepting the LTA of their 
accumulation pension product provider, DC savers are much more likely to be 
proactive. This does not make them informed purchasers, which, in turn, 
provides support for the case for low-cost, simplified advice in the mass market, 
which is essential if DC savers are to avoid scams and unnecessary tax bills.
41 Where a ‘purchase’ is made by a customer, the adviser can still receive commission because 
there has been no recommended sale, even if the firm’s website provides clear guidance and the 
customer assumes he or she has received ‘advice’. This is a good example of the confusion in the 
current regulation of advice. 
42 FCA, March 2014. FCA Thematic Review into the fair treatment of legacy customers.  
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-statement-fair-treatment-life-insurance. The FCA are looking at: 
(1) The firm’s back book strategy (particularly around cross-subsidisation); (2) Performance of 
back book products and governance around asset management; (3) Allocation of expenses to 
the back book; and (4) customer communication. The FCA said that the review will not consider 
the suitability of historic advice; nor will it require a review of individual policies: ‘We are not 
planning to individually review 30m policies, nor do we intend to look at removing exit fees from 
those policies providing they were compliant at the time. This is not a review of the sales practices 
for these legacy customers and we are not looking at applying current standards retrospectively 
– for example on exit charges.’
43 See also OFT, Sept. 2013. Defined contribution workplace pension market study.  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131101164215/http:/www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/
market-studies/oft1505. Independent Project Board, Dec. 2014. Defined contribution workplace 
pensions: The audit of charges and benefits in legacy schemes. https://www.fca.org.uk/static/
documents/defined-contribution-workplace-pensions-ipb.pdf
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• 2015-16: FCA review of the DC retirement income decumulation market,44 
plus the House of Commons Work and Pensions Select Committee 
review,45 which examines how the market is working post-April 2015 and 
which will look at advised and non-advised product sales.
• 2016: The end of member-borne commission charges? From April 2016, 
the Government was expected to ban consultancy charging, which was a form 
of commission payment used from January 2013 that temporarily got around 
the RDR ban on sales commission. However, in October 2015, it appeared 
that the Government might be softening its position on the ban: further 
consultation46 suggests it might be possible for intermediaries to continue the 
consultancy charge where it is demonstrated that members value the services. 
• 2017: Default fund transaction costs review. DWP review of whether 
transaction costs should be included in the annual member charge cap for 
auto-enrolment default funds.47
• 2017: NEST’s restrictions lifted. The annual contribution limit (£4,700 in 
2015-16) and the ban on transfers in – will be lifted.48
• 2014-16: Investigation into the advice gap, undertaken by the FCA49 and 
also the Treasury.50 The advice gap relates to the mass market, where it is clear 
that a typical fee-based advice cost of £1,000 is inappropriate for DC 
customers with smaller pots. Simplified and ‘robo-advice’ models are already 
available. More are under development and many of these are being tested in 
the FCA ‘innovation hub’.51 Clarity of the regulation is essential if providers 
and advisers are to invest in these systems and to proceed with confidence.
• 2015-16: FCA review of drawdown charges and transfers.52 This may 
lead to the introduction of product regulation, for example in relation to a 
range of low-cost, well designed drawdown products suitable for mass-market 
DC savers.
44 FCA, March 2015. Review of the retirement income market. https://www.fca.org.uk/news/market- 
studies/retirement-income-market-study. The FCA’s original thematic review of the annuity market 
was published in Feb. 2014: https://www.fca.org.uk/news/tr14-02-thematic-review-of-annuities
45 https://www.abi.org.uk/~/media/Files/Documents/Publications/Public/2015/Pensions/ABI%20
response%20Department%20Work%20Pensions%20Select%20Committee%20inquiry%20
retirement%20advice%20guidance.pdf
46 DWP, Oct. 2015. Better workplace pensions: Banning member-borne commission in occupational 
pension Schemes. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/470489/banning-member-borne-commission-consultation-oct-2015.pdf
47 The consultation is DWP, 2015. Improving transparency in workplace pensions: Transaction costs 
disclosure. https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/improving-transparency-in-workplace-
pensions-transaction-costs-disclosure
48 Announced in 2014 by the DWP.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/victory-for-consumers-as-pension-saving-limits-to-be-scrapped
49 FCA, 2014. Advice gap analysis.  
https://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/research/advice-gap-analysis-report
50 FCA/HMT, 2015. Financial Advice Market Review.  
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/famr-cfi.pdf
51 https://innovate.fca.org.uk/
52 FCA, 2015. Pension transfers.  
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/financial-services-products/investments/pension-transfers
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Further policy and regulatory interventions are in the pipeline, which, if 
implemented, will continue the restructuring – or dismantling – of the DC pension 
system. These include:
• 2016: Reform of the pension tax regime.53 The results of the Government’s 
consultation in the autumn of 2015 will be announced in the March 2016 
Budget. A key point for life companies is that a decision to subsume the tax 
regime for pensions into the tax regime for individual savings accounts (ISAs) 
– one of three options under consideration – might eliminate the need for life 
company pension ‘wrappers’, the provision of which is one of the most 
significant roles for life companies.
• 2017: Pot follows member. This regime was due to be phased in from the 
autumn of 2016.54 It has now been deferred and the Government has not 
provided a revised timetable.
• 2017: A secondary market for annuities.55 This is mooted for 2017 
and will further undermine the concept of a DC pension as a product that 
provides a guaranteed income for life. There are about 5m annuity 
policyholders in the UK.56
53 HMT, July 2015. Strengthening the incentive to save: a consultation on pensions tax. Relief. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/442159/
Strengthening_the_incentive_to_save_consultation__print_.pdf
54 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-reforms-to-stop-savers-losing-mini-pension-
pots
55 HMT, March 2015. Creating a secondary annuity market: call for evidence.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/creating-a-secondary-annuity-market-call-for-
evidence
56 Source: The Actuary, Nov. 2015.
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Summary of key reforms and developments in the DB market
• 2000-01: Around the turn of the century, a series of developments 
transformed scheme surpluses into deficits: (1) the equity bear market 
following the dot.com crash, (2) new mortality tables that recognised increased 
longevity, and (3) accounting rules that put the deficit on the sponsoring 
employer’s balance sheet for the first time, affecting the company’s ability to 
conduct corporate transactions. (4) As a result of 1-3, employers start to close 
their DB schemes and replace them with DC schemes.
• 2004: Pensions Act replaced the Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority 
(OPRA) with the Pensions Regulator (TPR); established the Pension Protection 
Fund (PPF) – eligible DB schemes required to pay annual levies.
• 2007: Bulk purchase annuity (BPA) market takes off as employers seek to 
transfer their DB liabilities to life companies via BPA buy-ins and buy-outs. 
• 2008-09: Global financial crisis
• 2009: Beginning of quantitative easing, which negatively affected interest rates 
and gilt yields and, therefore, DB fund valuations.
• 2011: Statutory indexation basis switched from RPI to CPI.
• 2014: TPR’s statutory objectives widened to include minimising any adverse 
impact on the ‘sustainable growth’ of an employer.
• 2015: Fund deficits growing; employer contributions falling. Funding BPAs is 
made more challenging – a difficulty that is expected to be exacerbated under 
Solvency II in 2016.
• 2016: Solvency II will introduce new capital requirements for life companies, 
which are expected to increase the cost of BPAs.
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The UK back book market 
Here we set out our analysis of the location of older brands and their books of 
retail policies and workplace schemes as at the end of October 2015, providing 
web links for the more complex cases.57 The back book market is complex, partly 
because the term refers to different generations of policies, the best-known being 
pre-2001 books. That year broadly marked the end of multiple policy charges on 
new business, following the introduction of mono-charging stakeholder pension 
schemes. We discuss the movement of more recent books of closed and open 
business later in this report. Moreover, it is important to remember that back books 
do not only arise from acquisitions – in many cases, a major provider in the new 
business market will have back books under its own brand. A good example is 
L&G, which did not close its with-profits book until the end of January 2015.58 
The opacity and complexity is also due to the fact that the data on older DC sales 
– especially of contract-based policies – does not readily distinguish between a 
‘retail’ product, such as a personal pension plan (introduced in 1987) and a 
‘workplace’ scheme, such as a group personal pension (GPP). This is because 
GPPs originally (the 1990s and early 2000s) were little more than a grouping 
together of individual retail policies. 
Apart from the unreliability of data, the market is also characterised by a 
bewildering fragmentation of brands. This is because life companies have sold 
off their back books in stages, which means that several consolidators can own 
books previously run by the same life office – a life office that might still be open 
to new business. So, for example, Admin Re/ReAssure (owned by Swiss Re) has 
purchased books from Aegon in the past. Of course, Aegon is still open to new 
business and is a major provider in the auto-enrolment market. 
Some providers make access to their legacy products easy, while others do not 
mention them directly on their main sites. Examples of the former include the 
consolidators. Examples of the latter include many life companies that are open 
to new business, for example Aegon, which owns the Scottish Equitable legacy 
brand, and Aviva, which owns multiple back book brands, and, from 2015, 
owns Friends Life, which brought many more with it (see entry below). 
Aviva’s purchase of Friends in 2015 in a deal valued at c. £5bn illustrates the 
complexity of corporate structures with multiple brands under the bonnet.59 
It also demonstrates the complexity of book-management in-house. For example, 
following its acquisition, Friends announced it planned to switch more than 
1m pension savers – 58 funds valued at about £24bn – from AXA (previously 
Friends-owned) to Aviva funds. Many of the investors in these funds will be those 
who held a policy with AXA, or joined a pension scheme run by AXA, before the 
group sold its life insurance operations to Friends Life owner Resolution in 2010. 
AXA will continue to manage c. £11bn held in overseas equity and with-profits 
funds for Friends Life. Friends had already outsourced most pension assets, 
£12bn of which was still managed by Schroders at the time of writing, although 
Aviva has said outsourcing arrangements were subject to review.
57 Sources include IPB (Annex 7: Providers participating in the audit, December 2014), ABI, and ONS.
58 http://www.legalandgeneral.com/existing-customers/with-profits-information/with-profits-fund-
closure/ 
59 A useful source of analysis, used here, is Citywire 5 Aug, 2015.  
http://citywire.co.uk/money/over-a-million-friends-life-savers-to-switch-from-axa-to-aviva/a831031 
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List of back books 
• Abbey Life:60 Ceased operations 2007. Closed books include:
 – Abbey Life Assurance
 – Hill Samuel Life Assurance
 – Target Life Assurance
• Admin Re / ReAssure:61 Consolidator, owned by Swiss Re. Zurich-based 
Admin Re is Swiss Re’s business unit. Admin’s parent company, ReAssure, was 
previously known as Windsor Life. Admin/ReAssure has bought books from a 
long list of life companies, most, but not all of which are UK in origin. 
 – Back books include: Aegon, Aetna, Alico, Barclays Life, Combined Life, 
Continental Life, Crown Life, GAN, Gresham, Grosvenor, Guardian 
Financial Services (latest acquisition – see below), HSBC, Lifetime, New 
Zealand Life, NM Pensions Tomorrow, Reassure UK, Tyndall Life, UK Life, 
and Windsor Life.
 – In September 2015, Admin Re announced the acquisition of Guardian 
Financial Services for £1.6bn. Guardian was also a buyer and consolidator 
of back books. The acquisition adds 900,000 annuity, life insurance and 
pension policies in the UK and Ireland, bringing Admin’s total policies in the 
UK to more than 4m. 
• Aegon:62 A UK-based life company which is a subsidiary of Aegon N.V., 
a multi-national life insurance, pension and asset management company 
headquartered in The Hague, Netherlands. 
 – Legacy policies were written under the company’s previous brand name, 
Scottish Equitable. 
• Aviva (including Friends Life):63 
 – AXA 
 – CGNU Life
 – Commercial Union
 – Colonial Life 
 – Equity & Law 
 – Friends Life
 – Friends Provident
 – General Accident 
 – Hamilton Life
 – London & Manchester 
 – National Mutual 
 – National Westminster Life
 – Norwich Union 
60 https://www.abbeylife.co.uk/Pages/Home.aspx
61 https://www.reassure.co.uk/customers/pages/welcome.aspx 
62 https://www.aegon.co.uk/index.html – but note, we were unable to find a direct reference on the 
site to older brands.
63 We were unable to find details about back books on the main website, but there are details here: 
http://www.aviva.com/investor-relations/institutional-investors/regulatory-returns/
The meaning of life 38
 – Provident Mutual 
 – Royal Scottish Assurance 
 – Sun Life 
 – Winterthur Life 
• BlackRock Life Limited 
 – BlackRock 
• Canada Life 
• Chesnara64
 – Countrywide Assured
 – Save & Prosper Insurance
 – Save & Prosper Pensions
 – Direct Line life Assurance 
• Equitable Life Assurance Society 
• Fidelity Worldwide Investment 
• HSBC Life (UK) Limited 
• Legal & General 
• Mobius Life 
• NFU Mutual 
• The Phoenix Group65 
 – Phoenix Life Limited 
 – Phoenix Life Assurance Limited 
 – National Provident Life Limited 
• Prudential 
 – Prudential Assurance Company Limited 
• Reliance Mutual66 
 – Criterion Life Assurance 
 – Family Assurance/Time Assurance
 – Hearts of Oak Insurance
 – University Life Assurance Society 
• Royal London Group67 
 – Co-Operative Insurance Company
 – Scottish Life 
 – Royal London Plus 
 – Royal London (CIS) Limited 
64 http://www.chesnara.co.uk/about-us/who-we-are.aspx
65 For the Phoenix timeline, which gives the full breakdown of acquisitions see:  
http://www.phoenixlife.co.uk/about-phoenix-life/history.aspx 
66 https://www.reliancemutual.co.uk/about-us/with-profits/ 
67 http://www.royallondon.com/customers/ 
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• Scottish Friendly Assurance
 – Marine & General Assurance 
• Scottish Widows: Part of the Lloyds Banking Group68
 – Halifax Financial Services69 
 – Clerical Medical Investment Group70 
• Standard Life 
• Sun Life Financial of Canada 
 – Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (UK) Limited 
• Wesleyan Assurance Society 
• Zurich Insurance71 
 – Zurich 
 – Allied Dunbar 
 – Eagle Star
68 http://www.scottishwidows.co.uk/about_us/who_we_are/lloyds_banking_group_sites.html 
69 http://www.halifax.co.uk/
70 http://www.clericalmedical.co.uk/ 
71 http://www.zurich.co.uk/life/existingcustomers/manage-my-pension/my-statement/your-funds.htm
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Background to the Findings and Recommendations
Section 1: Challenges and opportunities for life companies in 
the new private-sector pensions market
To understand the reason why the end of 2015 represents a watershed for life 
companies in the defined contribution (DC) pension market, it is necessary first to 
consider the series of recent developments and reforms that have combined to 
break the sector’s near-monopoly. Only then is it possible for individual 
companies to perceive where the future of this sector lies and to make informed 
decisions that might involve restructuring or merger and acquisition activity.
This section is arranged as follows. After a brief introduction, we begin the 
analysis with an overview of the most pertinent features of the new DC pensions 
market – in particular, the auto-enrolment system for private sector employers and 
employees – and consider the ways in which the life company business model has 
changed in response both to demand and to policy and regulatory reform. We then 
turn to the future shape of the annuities market, following the start of the 
‘freedom and choice’ tax regime in April 2015 and the shift away from annuities to 
cash and drawdown. The advice and guidance market forms a crucial aspect of 
this analysis, given the complexity and risks associated with retirement income 
products that do not incorporate a longevity risk hedge. We conclude with an 
examination of the business models of competitors to traditional life companies in 
the auto-enrolment and retail markets for DC accumulation and decumulation, 
and consider how, in the light of this competition, life companies might future-
proof their businesses.
1.1 Introduction
Just a few days before the publication of this report, the Chancellor, in his 
November 2015 Autumn Statement, confirmed that he would postpone his 
review of the pension tax system until the March 2016 Budget. The 
announcement was broadly welcomed by providers, consultants, employers, and 
consumer groups alike, all of which were concerned that further radical change, 
so soon after the ‘freedom and choice’ regime was introduced, would disrupt the 
DC market – already under strain from an overload of reforms and reviews – 
and undermine confidence and trust in auto-enrolment at a time of peak activity. 
Auto-enrolment began in 2012 with the largest employers, and will not be fully 
phased in until 2018. Between January 2016 and March 2018, 1.8m employers 
will reach their staging (introduction) dates – an average of more than 100,000 
per quarter, which is ten times the number during 2012-2015. As traditional life 
companies and their competitors strive to meet the administration requirements 
of this massive influx of employers, they must also look to the near future and the 
changes it might bring.
HMT’s July 2015 consultation on pension saving incentives72 set out three main 
options for further reform: no change, a single flat-rate of tax relief, and a switch 
from tax relief upfront to tax relief on withdrawal. The second and third options 
72 HMT, July 2015. Strengthening the incentive to save: A consultation on pensions tax relief.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/strengthening-the-incentive-to-save-a-
consultation-on-pensions-tax-relief 
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are not mutually exclusive, but while simplification of the level of tax relief has 
been on the government agenda for many years, the prospect of a fundamental 
change in the timing of tax relief is new. The proposal is to convert the system 
of tax relief for pensions from front-ended (on contributions) to back-ended 
(on withdrawals), which is how individual savings accounts (ISAs) are taxed, and 
which is why this potential reform is known as the ‘pension ISA’. While simplicity, 
as a principle, generally is to be welcomed, the proposal, if implemented, would 
have a very negative impact on DC savers who retire with small private pensions 
and who do not pay tax in retirement. This is at odds with the Government’s 
wider objective for auto-enrolment, which is to help lower earners build up 
private pensions in order to reduce the burden on means-tested retirement 
benefits. For these workers, the rationale for saving in a pension scheme or plan 
would be questionable, given that the trigger for auto-enrolment is earnings of 
£10,000 per annum.73 
We might be concerned about the prospect of further change, but we should not 
be surprised. Arguably, the shift away from pensions as a distinct form of 
retirement savings, characterised by guaranteed lifelong incomes, was already 
well established at the turn of the century, by which time life companies and 
private sector employers alike were increasingly anxious to reduce their exposure 
to the open-ended liabilities associated with guarantees linked to uncertain 
longevity. 
In the 1990s, life companies questioned the case for selling with-profits policies 
with guaranteed bonuses and guaranteed annuity rates (GARs) and decided that 
it was unsustainable. At the time, this was due to unanticipated falls in interest 
rates and inflation, among other factors. Equitable Life, which collapsed under 
the weight of its GARs, was just the tip of the iceberg – the problem of large, 
unhedged liabilities was systemic. Over the course of that decade, life companies 
first reduced the level of guarantees and then began to abandon the with-profits 
structure altogether, in favour of unit-linked products, which were pure investment 
products with no guarantees. Already, the ‘life’ business was shifting to an 
investment-based model. 
By the time of the equity bear market of 2000-2003, employers had come to the 
same conclusions about the spiralling unhedged liabilities of their defined benefit 
(DB) pension schemes. They realised that, by providing these schemes, they ran 
similar risks to insurance companies, but with a difference. The sponsoring 
employer of a DB pension scheme was the sole underwriter of guaranteed 
salary-linked pensions and protection insurances (life assurance, ill-heath, 
dependants’ benefits, etc.). The fact that these costs related to benefits for 
ex-employees (deferred members), as well as existing staff (active members), 
confirmed to employers that the business case for DB was anachronistic in the 
modern labour market, which is characterised by increased job turnover. 
73 http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/automatic-enrolment-earnings-threshold.aspx  
Note: once this threshold is reached, contributions apply on earnings from £5,824 to £42,385 
in 2015-16.
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The equity bear market, combined with new and much less favourable (to 
employers) longevity assumptions, turned the DB surpluses of the 1980s and 
1990s – which employers had used for a range of business purposes74 – into 
a deficit, which in many cases was significant relative to the employer’s market 
capitalisation (or enterprise value, in the case of private companies). Under new 
accounting rules, employers were required to show the funding position of the 
pension scheme on the corporate balance sheet for the first time. They discovered 
that a significant DB scheme deficit could stall corporate actions, including merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activities and raising new investment finance. The result 
was the widespread closure of DB schemes and their replacement with DC 
schemes, which in many cases were outsourced to third-party providers – usually 
life offices. Workplace protection insurances – previously paid for out of the DB 
fund – were either paid for by employers, under group insurance arrangements, 
or, increasingly, offered as ‘flexible benefits’, which were paid for by employees. 
Some employers dropped protection insurances altogether.
For the traditional life company, the shift from DB to DC was a very attractive 
business opportunity in a market over which they had a near-monopoly and in 
which their legal and tax status appeared to confer a sustainably privileged and 
unassailable position. 
And so it did, until the years leading up to 2012 and the introduction of auto-
enrolment. At this point, it became apparent that the commission-based sales 
distribution model, on which mid-tier life companies in particular depended for 
distribution, would disappear in 2013 under the retail distribution review (RDR), 
and that auto-enrolment would attract a new breed of large-scale provider. A 
cut-throat pricing war began in 2012, followed, in 2015, by the 0.75% member 
charge cap for auto-enrolment default funds – the funds into which more than 
90% of members are auto-enrolled. 
Life companies now realised that this was a market in which success was 
predicated on economies of scale and a parent company with a deep pocket 
that could keep giving for the minimum of five years it would take to recoup new 
business-development costs and break even. The downwards pressure on 
charges is expected to continue, as is the focus on default fund investment 
returns, which vary significantly and therefore can make a big difference to the 
final pot size at the point of decumulation.75
New providers – NEST and NOW: Pensions, for example – had a particular 
advantage over traditional life companies in that they were unshackled by back 
books of older (legacy) policies. Legacy workplace DC schemes came under 
Government scrutiny in 2013 in relation to their complex charges, terms and 
conditions, which were unfavourable compared with modern auto-enrolment 
schemes. Life companies with a large back book component discovered that to 
be at one and the same time a provider of a new transparent auto-enrolment 
74 DB scheme surpluses were used to fund early-retirement programmes and employer pension 
contribution holidays, for example.
75 According to JLT Benefit Consultants, employees auto-enrolled into the lowest performing funds 
have been losing out on 6% returns per annum compared with those in the best performing 
funds. The firm’s calculations showed that an employee in their thirties, saving 8% of an annual 
salary of £30,000 in a lower-performing fund, could end up with about £185,000 at retirement. 
The same contributions in a higher-performing fund would provide a pot of about £715,000.  
See https://www.jlt.com/media-centre/news-and-press-releases/2015/november/auto-enrolled-
dc-members-could-lose-up-to-6pc-of-annual-return-on-their-pension-investments. 
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scheme and of back books with opaque and questionable charges, terms and 
conditions, created tensions between different business lines and could give rise 
to a fragmented and confusing brand identity. Paradoxically, it seemed, the more 
a life company embraced modernity, the more open to criticism it became if it 
failed to treat its legacy pension customers fairly and if it continued to rely on the 
profits from legacy books to fund new business development.
By 2015, it became evident that the new breed of master-trust provider had 
broken the historic life-company monopoly in the DC pension accumulation 
market – a monopoly similarly broken by non-life company providers (advisers 
and asset managers) in the retail self-invested personal pension (SIPP) market.
Moreover, little more than six months on from the start of the freedom and choice 
pension regime, it is also evident that the provider-challengers are breaking the 
life-company monopoly in the DC decumulation market. DC savers, who do not 
take the whole of their pot in cash, are largely eschewing annuities – hitherto a 
near-compulsory purchase at retirement for all but the very wealthy DC savers 
– in favour of ‘income drawdown’ products, which are available from as many 
asset managers and advisers as they are from life companies.
Losing one monopoly might seem unfortunate. Losing three in as many years 
– the DC workplace pension scheme market, the SIPP market, and the market for 
decumulation products – might seem careless, especially from the point of view 
of a life company’s shareholders. 
1.2 The changing shape of the DC accumulation and decumulation markets
The turn of the century broadly marked the end of the era of the insurance-based 
with-profits fund and also the end of multiple product charges. Since then, the 
DC accumulation market has been dominated by workplace schemes and retail 
plans that are investment-only in structure – that is, there is no formal 
‘smoothing’ of investment returns, as there is in with-profits (although some 
investment strategies do attempt to reduce the volatility of returns), and no 
guarantees of what the fund may buy in the form of an annuity at retirement. 
A similar shift from insurance to investment is now taking place in the 
decumulation market. Until the March 2014 Budget announcement of the DC 
decumulation freedom and choice tax regime, most DC savers were required 
to purchase a lifetime annuity (LTA) at retirement, that is, they would use their 
accrued investment fund – less the tax-free lump sum – as a premium to buy 
insurance against longevity risk (in this case, the risk of outliving their DC 
savings). Only a minority of wealthier DC savers opted for income drawdown, 
which is a pure investment product. Following the implementation of the new 
regime in April 2015, the clear demarcation in the mass market between DC 
accumulation, as pure investment, and DC decumulation, as pure insurance, no 
longer pertained. 
It is too soon to understand fully the impact of the new regime, although tensions 
are already evident. On the one hand, the success of the auto-enrolment 
accumulation stage is predicated on the behavioural trait of inertia. On the other 
hand, the success of the decumulation stage is predicated on the noble but 
somewhat unrealistic assumption that DC savers are capable of making rational 
choices when conferred with the freedom to take their retirement savings at 
whatever time and in whatever form they wish. 
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So far, DC savers have shown a marked preference for cash and drawdown over 
annuities, while the age at which DC savers are seeking access to their DC pot 
has fallen, with about 80% of withdrawals being made by those under the age 
of 65. In the second and third quarters of 2015, HMRC said that DC savers 
had withdrawn a total of £2.72bn.76 Just weeks after this announcement, on 
3 November, the ABI said the six-month figure had reached £4.7bn, comprising 
£2.5bn in cash lump sums and £2.2bn in income drawdown products.77
The early months of the new regime have been troubled by a series of issues, 
such as fraud and the inability of DC savers to access their funds in a timely 
manner without facing exit charges or advice fees that are large relative to most 
pot sizes. In October 2015, the House of Commons Work and Pensions Select 
Committee warned that unless DC savers were put in a position to make an 
informed choice, freedom and choice ‘could lead to the next major pensions 
mis-selling scandal’.78 The Committee called on Government to:
• Provide more anti-scam publicity and introduce stricter reporting requirements 
for pension providers;
• Reduce the use of jargon and complex pricing structures for savers trying to 
withdraw funds;
• Clarify the distinction between guidance and advice; and
• Clarify the definitions of safeguarded benefits.
Current trends in DC decumulation choices provide little indication of future 
patterns and preferences. This is not just because of fraud and mis-selling 
concerns. Over the next decade, many DC savers will reach retirement with a 
defined benefit (DB) pension from earlier employment. The DB pension may not 
be sufficient to cover all of a retiree’s lifestyle aspirations, but it is likely to 
provide, together with the state pension, the minimum income required for a 
basic standard of living.79 For these retirees, the DC pot could be used in more 
flexible ways involving greater investment risk than is likely to be the case in 
future, when the DC scheme will be the only source of supplementary pension 
income for private-sector workers. This is one very important reason why life 
companies have been slow to invest in innovation: it is difficult to justify to 
shareholders the costs associated with the design and launch of new 
decumulation products when it is impossible to predict future demand.
Where innovation is evident is in the auto-enrolment workplace scheme market, 
where a small, but significant minority of schemes now offer – or are developing 
– a ‘straight-through’ member journey from accumulation to decumulation in the 
form of ad-hoc cash lump sum withdrawals and regular income. It seems likely 
that such schemes will be well-placed to deliver good-quality administration, 
investment strategies and governance at a lower cost than is generally possible 
in the retail market, mainly due to economies of scale. The most notable example 
76 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/flexible-payments-from-pensions
77 https://www.abi.org.uk/News/News-releases/2015/11/Pension-Stats-six-months-on 
78 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/work-and-
pensions-committee/news-parliament-2015/pension-freedom-guidance-and-advice-op-
note-15--16/ 
79 This, of course, presumes that DB members will not cash out their pension, as they are also now 
entitled to do.
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of innovation is NEST, the Government-backed national scheme, which 
announced plans for its default decumulation strategy in 2015.80 Importantly, 
NEST’s blueprint looks beyond the demand for drawdown to the need for 
later-life annuitisation. The Pensions Institute has long argued that for mass-
market DC retirees, it is essential to hedge the tail of longevity risk to avoid 
pensioner poverty in old age. Drawdown – in the absence of paying for 
guarantees, which can be expensive – cannot guarantee to provide a regular 
income stream that will last a DC retiree’s full lifespan. 
As with the auto-enrolment accumulation stage, NEST has now set a clear 
benchmark for the design of decumulation schemes. Metaphorically speaking, 
it has thrown down the gauntlet to traditional life companies and asset managers 
to match or improve its blueprint. Life companies have good reason to be 
concerned about NEST, which is well-placed to extend membership of its 
decumulation scheme to firms that are not accumulation members. NEST is also 
open to the self-employed. Put simply, NEST has the potential to acquire 
a significant market share in both the workplace and retail decumulation markets. 
1.3 The changing role of life companies 
1.3.1 What is a life company?
We begin this subsection by asking: What is a life company? This is a surprisingly 
difficult question, as the purpose and business model of life companies has 
changed significantly over the years. The original life companies date back at 
least as far as the 18th Century and emerged as an important source of private 
welfare provision during the industrial revolution in the 19th Century.81 Their 
business model was relatively simple and generally confined to the sale of 
insurance policies designed to protect dependants against the risk of the family 
breadwinner’s loss of earnings. In exchange for a regular premium, life 
companies offered ‘the insured’ a hedge against a range of risks, such as death, 
disability or long-term illness, and old age (defined at the time as the age at which 
the insured was no longer able to remain in employment). Insurance policies 
were and still are legally-binding contracts between the insurer and the insured.
By the mid-C20th, life companies had expanded into the long-term savings 
market. Early products typically involved a combination of investment and 
insurance, most notably the with-profits policy, which, for many years, was the 
backbone of the DC retail and workplace pensions markets. With-profits funds 
were invested in a range of asset classes and used actuarial techniques to 
smooth returns and to provide valuable guarantees in the form of annual 
bonuses (once accrued, these bonuses could not be removed, even if markets 
fell) and a guaranteed annuity rate (GAR), which, at the retirement date, 
delivered an annual income expressed as a percentage of the final fund value. 
So, for example, a 12% GAR, in relation to a fund worth £100,000 at retirement, 
would provide a guaranteed income for life of £12,000. These guarantees 
represented the insurance element of the with-profits policy. 
80 NEST (2015).The future of retirement: A retirement income blueprint for NEST’s members, June, 
https://www.nestpensions.org.uk/schemeweb/NestWeb/includes/public/docs/The-future-of-
retirement,pdf.pdf
81 Most life ‘companies’ were actually set as mutual societies which are not in fact legally 
incorporated as ‘companies’ under company law. We will – in line with common parlance – use 
the term ‘life companies’ to cover both companies and mutuals.
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The following factors are relevant for our analysis:82
1. Insurance contracts represent a specific area of insurance law, incorporating 
concepts such us ‘utmost good faith’.
2. Winding up an insurance company is a proscribed process, involving the 
run-off of liabilities before the remaining assets can be distributed.
3. Insurance companies are highly regulated and insurance accounting is highly 
specialised. Valuations require calculations of embedded value in order to 
determine what can be taken as profit for distribution to shareholders, in the 
case of companies, and to members, in the case of mutuals. In particular, 
there are specific regulatory requirements in relation to capital adequacy – 
that is, the reserves a life company must hold in order to back its guarantees 
to policyholders. In the UK, life companies are regulated for prudential 
purposes (i.e., to determine the soundness of the business) by the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (PRA)83 and for conduct of business purposes by the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
4. The PRA and FCA are also responsible for implementing mandatory 
European regulations for life companies. For example, there is a so-called 
European embedded value calculation. 
5. Life companies benefit from special tax treatment which is why other financial 
services firms, such as assets managers, often have an insurance subsidiary. 
Life companies get special treatment because they enable transference of 
risk, for which they are paid a premium.  
6. Pension investments can be held in contracts of insurance, because the 
liability requires an uncertain event to crystallise, i.e., the death of the policy 
holder. This means that pension investments can be structured as an 
insurance contract (e.g., a unit-linked life policy), rather than as assets in a 
mutual fund (e.g., a unit trust). This explains why compensation 
arrangements can be different, depending on whether the assets are held in 
a life company’s unit-linked policy (a long-term insurance contract) or in an 
asset manager’s mutual fund (an investment fund). Self-invested personal 
pensions (SIPPs) can be set up under both models, but the compensation 
rules favour the life company model, since this is classed as a long-term 
insurance business rather than pure asset management.84
The main life companies in the DC market are part of a larger group of 
companies that, at the most general level, includes a holding company, an 
asset management arm, a general insurance arm, and an administration arm. 
This enables them to offer a range of ‘bundled’ products, in which all of the 
component parts and services are managed in-house, and to sell annuities 
to DC accumulation customers.
82 With thanks to Rajiv Jaitly, of Jaitly LLP, for his advice on insurance law.
83 See the PRA’s Prudential sourcebook for Insurers (INSPRU),  
https://fshandbook.info/FS/html/PRA/INSPRU
84 In the event of the provider’s insolvency, compensation for long-term life policies is uncapped, 
whereas for investments it is capped at £50,000. See http://www.fscs.org.uk/what-we-cover/
products/pensions/fscs-compensation-for-pensions/. The rules are complicated and are different 
in the case of mis-selling, for example. The FCA and the Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme (FSCS) are looking to review the distinction and to consider bringing non-life company 
SIPPs in line with life company SIPPs.
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1.3.2 1987-2012: From personal pensions to auto-enrolment – the heyday 
of the life company
In the late 1980s, when personal pensions and group personal pensions (GPPs) 
were introduced, life companies dominated the DC market. At this time, there 
were more than 100 life offices, building societies and friendly societies selling 
DC pension products in the corporate and retail markets. By 1990, the trend 
towards consolidation among life companies was well-established, driven by a 
combination of the personal pension mis-selling scandal in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, and by the cost of with-profits GARs, among other factors, which 
increased as interest rates fell from a high of 15% in 1990 to virtually zero in 2015.
The late 1990s and early 2000s were busy years for consolidation.85 This was 
also the era of demutualisation – when mutual life societies, owned by their 
members, converted to proprietary listed companies, owned by shareholders 
– which enabled life companies to tap into new sources of finance. Life 
companies took this opportunity to change their business model, broadly from 
one that focused on the accumulation of policies to one focused on selling 
profitable products with fewer long-term liabilities and, therefore, lower capital 
requirements. Some of the largest life companies, such as Standard Life, which 
demutualised in 2006, also shed thousands of jobs to reduce overheads. 
The consolidation trend continues today – the merger of Aviva and Friends Life in 
2015 being just the latest example. The result is that by 2015, there were only 
about 20 active providers of workplace and retail DC products. We expect this 
number to shrink further.
While life companies in aggregate still dominate the workplace DC pensions 
market, they no longer have the near-monopoly they enjoyed in the past. Life 
company status is still very valuable, since it enables the financial institution to 
provide tax and regulatory wrappers for DC funds, but today it is more a matter 
of convenience than a raison d’être.
1.4 Charge capping, product quality, and the continued price war
Product quality and charges have been very much on the minds of the 
Government and regulators for some time – and will continue to be so in future, 
whether the focus is on legacy books of pension business, new books of auto-
enrolment business, or annuities and drawdown products. This is understandable, 
because, while it is impossible to predict future investment returns with any 
certainly, it is perfectly possible to predict the impact of capping annual charges. 
1.4.1 The charge cap for auto-enrolment default funds (2015)
The value of the DC saver’s pension pot at the point of decumulation will depend 
largely on the level of employer and employee contributions paid during 
accumulation and the investment returns achieved, net of the member’s annual 
85 In 1998-99 alone, examples included the merger of Commercial Union and General Accident, 
Friends Provident and London and Manchester, the public auction for National Provident 
Institution (NPI) which was bought by Australian Mutual Provident (AMP), and the bid by AXA, 
through Sun Life and Provincial, for Guardian Royal Exchange.
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charge. Asset management86 is an important component of the member charge, 
as is administration. 
Over extended periods, apparently small differences in the annual member 
charge can make a material difference to the value of the final pot. The 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) has calculated that over a working 
lifetime, a 1% annual charge could reduce the value of a pension pot by about 
one-quarter.87 While DC savers are unlikely to appreciate the impact of this 
compounding effect, the industry knows full well that a 10 or 20 basis point 
reduction in the annual charge really does make a difference.
It is reasonable to assume that auto-enrolment schemes in the mass market will 
be lower cost than earlier workplace schemes. This is partly a function of scale, 
but it is also because under the voluntary system, providers’ new business 
expenses included a large allocation to the cost of actively selling schemes, first 
to employers and then to employees, assuming the employer did not operate 
auto-enrolment on a voluntary basis.88 Under auto-enrolment, employers are 
obliged by law to put a qualifying scheme in place and to auto-enrol eligible 
workers, so there is no costly ‘hard sell’ to employees involved. Instead, there is a 
‘hard sell’ to employers – competition remains fierce in providers’ bids to sign up 
employers through marketing campaigns and through intermediary (for example, 
corporate advisers) awareness.
As mentioned above, from April 2015, the annual charge cap for employees 
auto-enrolled into the default fund, is a total expense ratio (TER) of 0.75% p.a. 
Regulatory changes that come into force in 2016, together with two potential 
policy changes, are likely to result in downward pressure on the charge cap, 
as we now show.
1.4.2 Crackdown on poor quality master trusts (2015-16)
The Pensions Regulator (TPR) has been very concerned about the proliferation 
of smaller poor-quality and under-resourced master trusts, which could leave 
members’ pension assets at risk if they fail. The Government is supporting TPR 
in its bid to tighten the security of peoples’ pensions. In October, the pensions 
minister, Baroness Altmann, said that the Government planned to address 
concerns about the quality and sustainability of master trusts, while in an article 
in the Financial Times,89 Lesley Titcomb, chief executive of TPR, said she was 
particularly worried about the low level of entry requirements for master-trust 
86 See the Financial Services Consumer Panel 2014 report on investment costs: https://www.fs-cp.
org.uk/sites/default/files/investment_david_pitt_watson_et_al_final_paper.pdf and https://www.
fs-cp.org.uk/sites/default/files/investment_discussion_paper_investment_cost_and_charges.pdf
87 Illustrative calculations by the DWP in November 2013 (Pensions Bill 2013: Information Pack for 
Peers) show that an individual who saves throughout their working life into a scheme with a 0.5% 
annual charge could lose around 13% of their pension pot at retirement as a result of charges. 
A 1% annual charge could reduce that pot by 24%.
88 This was very rare in the private sector ever since the Thatcher government ended mandatory 
participation in occupational pension schemes in the 1980s. By contrast auto-enrolment has 
been the norm in public sectors DB schemes, which accounts for the c. 90% take-up rates at a 
time when private sector employers experienced much lower participation rates – in some cases 
below 10%.
89 FT, 16 Oct. 2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/033804d0-7403-11e5-a129-3fcc4f641d98.
html?ftcamp=crm/email/_2015___10___20151016__/emailalerts/Keyword_alert/
product#axzz3qG5JMxRJ 
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providers. ‘There is no financial requirement on master trusts, on solvency or 
minimum capital levels’, she said, echoing concerns raised previously by the 
Pensions Institute.90 At the time of writing, TPR was examining the master-trust 
workplace pension market as a ‘matter of urgency’ after highlighting the fact that 
employees could be auto-enrolled into unsustainable schemes. At present only 
six master trusts, out of about 70, had achieved TPR’s voluntary assurance 
framework for quality out of more than 50: 91 NEST, NOW: Pensions, SEI Master 
Trust, The People’s Pension, Tower Watson’s LifeSight, and Welplan.92
1.4.3 The ban on active member discounts (2016)
From April 2016, there is expected to be a ban on active member discounts 
(AMDs), a charging system that favoured active members over deferred members 
who were required to pay a higher charge. Depending on the ratio between 
active and deferred members, the ban could have a significant impact on 
providers’ profits. The two most obvious choices are to take the cut in profits by 
bringing the deferred member charge in line with that of active members, or to 
set a charge for all categories of member that represents a compromise between 
the active and deferred rate. 
1.4.4 The expected price war in the re-broking market for auto-enrolment 
schemes (2016)
Given that auto-enrolment is the Government’s flagship pension system for the 
private sector, it may well decide that a further reduction in the default fund 
charge cap would be in the best interests of employees. However, the DWP is 
unlikely to consider taking this step until the phasing in of auto-enrolment is 
completed in 2018.
Several of the largest master-trust schemes – Legal & General (L&G), NEST, NOW: 
Pensions, and The People’s Pension, for example – have an explicit or effective TER 
of about 0.5%,93 which may give them a competitive edge as they gear up for the 
major re-broking exercise in auto-enrolment schemes that is taking place for the 
larger employers that reached their staging dates in 2012 and 2013. Employers 
are required to re-enrol opt-outed employees every three years. If the employer 
has experienced problems with the administration or with the payroll processing 
of its selected provider, this might well be a trigger point for checking whether 
other providers have developed a better reputation for these important features. 
Therefore, we expect 2016 to be a busy year for auto-enrolment scheme reviews. 
The Government and regulators will see this as the natural duty of trustees of 
trust-based schemes and investment governance committees (IGCs) of contract-
90 See Pensions Institute: Jan. 2014, Value for money,  
http://www.pensions-institute.org/reports/ValueForMoney.pdf; and Oct. 2012, Caveat venditor, 
http://www.pensions-institute.org/reports/CaveatVenditor.pdf 
91 Professional Pensions provided the full list of master trusts as at August 2015:  
http://www.professionalpensions.com/professional-pensions/news/2352950/pension-master-
trusts-the-definitive-list-of-providers
92 http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/trustees/master-trust-assurance.aspx#s19297 
93 We say ‘effective’ because while most schemes have a single charge, some schemes – for 
example NEST and NOW: Pensions – have a dual charge. In addition to the annual 
management charge, NEST has a contribution charge and NOW has an administration charge.
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based schemes, which are required to ensure that their schemes continue to 
represent value for money for members. No doubt employers, trustees and IGCs 
will be encouraged in this exercise by consultants, corporate advisers and, of 
course, providers, all of which will be eager to pick up the big-ticket business they 
missed first time around.
The three-year anniversary of the auto-enrolment staging of larger employers 
also coincides with the FCA’s final ban on consultancy charging, which firms 
used as a way of getting around the RDR ban on sales commission introduced 
in January 2013.94 In its consultation in 2015,95 the DWP explained that 
consultancy charging ‘was introduced following the Retail Distribution Review 
(RDR) and consists of a fee being agreed between an adviser and employer and 
then recouped through a member-borne charge’ – i.e., it was commission in a 
barely disguised new form. 
At the time of writing, it seemed that the DWP was minded to soften the impact 
of an outright ban, for example, where it can be demonstrated that members 
received a service, such as advice or guidance that they value. Given that, as 
mentioned, the whole success of auto-enrolment is predicated on member inertia, 
we argue that it would be difficult to provide convincing evidence to this effect.
Under the consultation, the ‘advice’ component of the consultancy charge might 
also refer to the advice the employer receives from the intermediary. 
Many trustee boards for master-trust schemes, and IGCs for contract-based 
schemes, include provider representatives. This raises questions about whether 
such governance arrangements can be genuinely independent, for example, 
whether the board or committee would be willing to reject a provider’s position on 
the consultancy charge.
The issue of member-borne commission charges is not limited to contract-based 
workplace schemes sold by ‘bundled’ life companies. In its October consultation, 
the DWP said:
Commission is more likely to occur in bundled pension schemes (where the 
employer or trustees procure administration and investment services through a single 
pension provider) than unbundled schemes (where the trustees procure investment 
management or administration services directly from separate providers). However, 
there is some evidence to show the presence of commission in unbundled schemes, so 
we consider that the commission ban should cover bundled and unbundled schemes 
as well as single and multi-employer schemes such as master trusts.
The FCA gave firms that had used this form of charging three years to change their 
remuneration arrangements, implying that they had to switch from a form of 
commission paid by providers to an explicit fee paid by the employer by 
April 2016. We do not know how many employers agreed to the consultancy 
charge adviser-remuneration model in 2012-13, but we understand the practice 
was widespread, particularly for medium-sized companies. 
94 In other words, consultancy charging was sales commission in a different guise. FCA, March 
2015, Final rules for charges in workplace personal pension schemes and feedback on 
CP14/24, https://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/policy-statements/ps15-05.pdf 
95 DWP, Oct. 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/470489/banning-member-borne-commission-consultation-oct-2015.pdf 
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As a result, employers may suddenly find themselves faced with a bill for the 
consultant or provider’s implementation costs. This factor may also trigger an 
employer review of the market – a search for a provider that offers services direct 
to employers and does not impose an implementation fee. However, from the 
research, it seems that over the last 12 months, implementation fees have 
become the norm, leaving NEST as one of the few schemes that do not make 
this charge.
The major consultants that have launched their own-brand master trusts – for 
example, Aon, Mercer and Towers Watson – should be well-placed to capture 
re-brokered business, due to their close relationships with larger and medium-
sized employers. However, it could be argued that these firms, as both 
independent consultants and scheme providers, are conflicted – a point we have 
raised in previous research.96 
1.4.5 The inclusion of transaction costs in the DC default fund charge cap? (2017)
At present, the charge cap excludes the transaction costs associated with asset 
management. ‘Transaction costs’ are the expenses incurred when the asset 
manager (which may or may not be the scheme provider) buys and sells 
securities and include broker commissions and dealing spreads (the difference in 
the price the dealer and the buyer pays). Typically, such costs are hidden, but are 
reflected in a lower value of the assets than otherwise would be the case.97 
The DWP plans to review the exclusion of transaction costs from the charge cap 
in 2017, but it already requires the trustees of trust-based workplace master trust 
schemes and the IGCs of contract-based schemes to request details of the default 
fund transaction costs from their asset managers.98 At present, there are no 
regulatory requirements on asset managers to respond, but trustees and IGCs 
must publish the details of their enquiries in their annual reports, which is likely to 
put asset managers under pressure to ‘come clean’. 
We believe that the DWP is minded to formally include transaction costs in the 
charge cap after its review in 2017. It will be interesting to see whether it will 
adjust the member charge cap to accommodate the additional costs. If it does 
not, then, in effect, the member charge will have been reduced, although the 
extent of the reduction will depend on the default fund investment strategy, as 
passive index funds incur lower transaction costs than actively-managed funds. 
One example of the impact of transaction costs on charges is found in the Local 
Government Pension Scheme (LGPS), where reported asset management fees 
have increased by about 40%, following the inclusion of these costs.99 
96 See Pensions Institute, Jan. 2014, Value for money,  
http://www.pensions-institute.org/reports/ValueForMoney.pdf
97 For more details on investment costs, see FSCP, 2014,  
https://www.fs-cp.org.uk/sites/default/files/investment_report_executive_summary_for_the_fscp.
pdf. See also David Blake (2014). On the disclosure of the costs of investment management, 
Pensions Institute. http://www.pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/wp1407.pdf 
98 The requirement can be found in the DWP October 2014 report, Better workplace pensions, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/364567/
better-workplace-pensions-putting-savers-interests-first.pdf 
99 Reported in a letter to the Financial Times, 5 Nov. 2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/58ad07ee-
8240-11e5-8095-ed1a37d1e096.html?ftcamp=crm/email/_2015___11___20151105__/
emailalerts/Keyword_alert/product#axzz3qhb7Ugr6 
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1.4.6 A charge cap for drawdown?
It is clear from policy statements that the Government is unlikely to restrict its 
enthusiasm for charge caps to the auto-enrolment accumulation stage, and 
could extend this form of product regulation to drawdown products – a move that 
the actuarial profession has welcomed.100 This will present challenges to 
providers and advisers in a market that has grown in a fairly disorderly manner 
following the 2014 Budget. Apart from the nascent market in institutional 
products, where decumulation options are bolted on to auto-enrolment 
accumulation schemes, retail products range from comparatively simple DIY 
drawdown plans, via complicated multi-charging advised retail products, to 
hybrids that combine drawdown with some form of guarantee. 
The 2015 Which? report on drawdown costs showed the impact of high 
total charges:101
Which? calculated that someone with a pension pot of £50,000, taking 4 per cent 
a year through income drawdown, could be more than £3,000 better off over 10 
years if they used the cheapest provider, Fidelity (£4,993), rather than the most 
expensive, The Share Centre (£8,100).
The loss was even more dramatic for an investor with a larger fund of £250,000, 
who would see as much as £10,000 of their fund absorbed by charges depending 
on where they invested.
Not surprisingly, providers and advisers have been largely hostile to the prospect 
of a charge cap for drawdown, but their arguments need to be unpicked carefully 
to separate self-interest from the more genuine concerns about stifling innovation. 
It is reasonable to argue that it is premature to introduce a charge cap in a market 
that is new and where consumer demand is likely to change, as DC decumulators 
come to depend increasingly on their DC pot for the bulk of their supplementary 
retirement income, although it is difficult to separate this point from the more 
self-serving arguments that have been put forward. Providers regard drawdown 
products as one of the few sources of significant profit in an industry that is 
already subject to a cap on auto-enrolment accumulation default funds, is subject 
to downward pressure on legacy policy charges, and in which sales of lifetime 
annuities have more than halved. For life companies in the auto-enrolment 
market, an ideal scenario would be to replace the steady flow of roll-over annuity 
business sold to scheme members with roll-over retail drawdown plans. 
There is a particular concern about the widespread use of complex multiple 
charges for drawdown plans, which can only be analysed and compared using 
the traditional ‘reduction in yield’ (RIY) formula – a formula that many customers 
do not appear (and arguably should not be expected) to understand. These 
include set-up fees, annual charges, platform fees, TERs, additional costs for 
certain types of funds, and charges for each withdrawal. In one example that 
we were shown, the ‘wrapper’ costs (an annual flat-rate fee for the use of the 
provider’s SIPP), the TER applied as a percentage on funds, the hidden costs on 
sub-funds in multi-asset funds, plus the adviser’s annual fee/commission, resulted 
in a total RIY of 4%. We believe that this is an extreme case, but we cannot be sure.
100 http://www.theactuary.com/news/2015/06/government-urged-to-cap-drawdown-charges/ 
101 FT, 21 July 2015.  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b1fb7b12-2f90-11e5-8873-775ba7c2ea3d.html?ftcamp=crm/
email/follow/author/Q0ItMDAwMTI3NQ==-QXV0aG9ycw==/product#axzz3hIRe08LM 
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The Government and the regulators are right to take a keen interest in this issue, 
since the benefits of a single and comparatively low TER for auto-enrolment 
accumulation can be lost during decumulation. However, the very complexity 
of drawdown charges raises an important question in relation to policy and 
regulation; namely, which charge or charges would you cap? Due to the 
administration costs of withdrawals, a fully-flexible drawdown plan does not lend 
itself to a single charge. The simplest structure we identified was a scheme with 
a TER and a per-transaction cost, where ‘transaction’ means a withdrawal. 
The alternative, if a single charge were required, would be for the scheme to limit 
the number of withdrawals to, say, four per year, at quarterly dates set by the 
scheme. This approach might work well in the mass market, where full flexibility 
is not required, especially if the DC decumulators end up paying for features that 
are never used. 
1.5 The future shape of the annuities market
Annuities have come under a barrage of criticism in recent years. Some of this 
is justified, for example, the poor rates available in the roll-over market (where 
the customer passively accepts the accumulation provider’s rate), the sale of 
a conventional annuity when medical underwriting would have secured a better 
rate, and the opacity of insurance company underwriting techniques (including 
the mortality tables used), and their profits.102
Even in a competitive open market, annuity rates will appear unattractive to DC 
customers unless they fully understand the pricing of a longevity risk hedge and 
can trust the market to work in a competitive manner. Unfortunately, until their 
near-monopoly on the DC market was threatened, life companies were rather 
complacent and did not bother to explain in plain English the value of annuities 
– until it was too late and customers, now encouraged by the new freedom and 
choice regime, have sought alternatives to this product. 
With a LTA, the annuity ‘rate’ is the level of annual income the insurance 
company guarantees per £100 of the pot size (the insurance premium). Annuity 
rates fluctuate because they depend on a range of factors, including interest rates 
(insurers hold gilts and corporate bonds to back their annuity payments, 
although increasingly other assets are held due to low bond yields), the age and 
the life expectancy of the annuitant, and the ‘load factor’, which is the deduction 
insurers make to cover profits and overheads, including distribution costs. 
Annuity rates have fallen steadily over the past 20 years, due to increasingly 
longevity, falling gilt yields, and quantitative easing (QE), among other factors. 
The prospect of a continuing period of very low interest rates is a real concern 
for both prospective annuitants and for providers which must hold reserves 
against annuity guarantees, including GARs. Such reserves are likely to increase 
under Solvency II (see below).
1.5.1 An important, but more flexible role for annuities in DC decumulation 
One of the unintended consequences of liberalising the decumulation market has 
102 See FSCP, Dec. 2013, Annuities and the consumer perspective,  
https://www.fs-cp.org.uk/file/publication/research-paper-annuities-and-consumer-perspective. 
Since Feb. 2014, the FCA has published a series of reports on the retirement income market.  
See, for example, http://www.fca.org.uk/news/tr14-02-thematic-review-of-annuities and  
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-publishes-the-findings-of-its-work-into-annuities-sales-practices-
and-retirement-income-market
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been to turn a compulsory purchase annuity market into a voluntary market. 
While medical underwriting will continue to evolve to cater for annuitants with 
life-shortening lifestyle and medical conditions, the voluntary nature of the 
purchase will affect the underwriting approach. This is because insurance 
companies, quite rightly, will be concerned about adverse selection – i.e., in a 
voluntary market, purchases are likely to be made by those who believe that they 
will enjoy above-average longevity, possibly because of their family history and 
their healthy lifestyle. 
We expect the next five years to be challenging for annuity providers. Annuity 
sales have fallen by almost 80% in 2015,103 although this is at least in part due 
to the pent-up demand for alternatives following the announcement of freedom 
and choice in the March 2014 Budget, and its implementation in April 2015. 
The consultant Oliver Wyman104 has predicted that annuity sales will stabilise at 
about £6bn per annum by 2018 – that is, about half the size of the pre-April 
2014 market. This figure is in line with our own prediction.
Despite the above challenges, we firmly believe that annuities (both immediate 
and deferred) have a crucial part to play in the mass market for DC decumulation. 
However, the shape of the market and the design of the products offered will 
change. An important feature of the annuity market post-April 2015 will be the 
timing of purchase, which we expect to be staggered, rather than concentrated 
at the point of retirement, as was previously the case. 
1.5.2 Lessons from overseas markets
There will continue to be a significant market in immediate annuities purchased 
at retirement. Here the Government and FCA might learn from the experience of 
successful overseas annuity markets where annuitisation is common at the point 
of retirement. In Chile and Switzerland, for example, the annuity markets are 
more tightly regulated, with the result that confidence in the product in terms of 
value for money is much higher than is the case in the UK. 
The experience in New Zealand is interesting, particularly in relation to the 
bequest motive and, in particular, the crucial connection between the appetite for 
annuities and the level of the state pension. In 1993, there were nine annuity 
providers In New Zealand. In 2013, the last provider exited the market, having 
sold just one policy in the previous year. JP Morgan provides the following 
overview of the reasons for the decline and fall of the NZ annuity market:105 
First, there’s the bequest motive: the desire to leave some assets to the next 
generation. Second, life insurance companies in New Zealand have historically been 
taxed at a higher rate on annuity assets than the marginal rate for many 
individuals, taking the shine of annuities as a retirement option. And third, in 
2001, the New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZ Super) was created to 
provide a basic level of income for all individuals that have lived in the country for 
at least 10 years, of which at least five should be since age 50. So Kiwis can count 
103 Sources: ABI and FCA. 
104 Oliver Wyman, 2014, The future of the UK life industry,  
http://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/global/en/files/insights/financial-services/ 
2014/September/LON-MKT10307-001%20-%20Future%20of%20UK%20Life%20-%20FINAL.pdf
105 http://insights.jpmorgan.co.uk/adviser/commentary-and-analysis/why-the-uk-annuity-market-
wont-go-the-way-of-the-dinosaurs/ 
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on a guaranteed lifelong income that keeps pace with inflation, and even adjusts to 
lifestyle changes. With a guaranteed income like this, buying an annuity on top 
seems counterintuitive.
We believe that in the UK, DC retirees’ interest in annuities will increase in later 
life, due to the natural desire to avoid the risk of running out of money in favour 
of a secure life-long income. There is no consensus at present about the age for 
this trigger point, but it is likely to be at some point between age 75 and 85 – as 
opposed to the previous age range for annuity purchase, which was between 55 
and 65. Innovation in the annuity market, therefore, will be driven by the 
demand from drawdown customers for later-life longevity-hedging products, for 
example, a competitive immediate annuity market for those aged 75+, and the 
introduction of retail and scheme-based deferred annuities. NEST has already 
decided to incorporate some form of later-life annuity purchase in its auto-
enrolment scheme decumulation default stage, and we expect other auto-
enrolment providers to follow suit. Life companies have the opportunity to design 
and develop the annuity products these schemes need. Lessons from the US will 
be relevant in relation to deferred annuities, where the product has been 
available for some time, although overall demand still remains low. 
In Australia, where its own version of freedom and choice has led to a crisis 
situation, with about half of DC savers emptying their pension pots by the age of 
70, the Australian Government has decided to adopt the proposals of the Murray 
Review. 106 It has announced its commitment to develop and consult on 
legislation by the end of 2016 that would ‘facilitate trustees of superannuation 
funds providing pre-selected comprehensive income products for retirement’, in 
effect annuities. It is ironic that as DC savers in the UK begin to enjoy the fruits of 
freedom and choice, their counterparts in Australia are heading in the opposite 
direction towards a more secure retirement income.
1.6 A secondary market for annuities?
It is difficult to predict the impact of a secondary market in annuities should the 
Government give the green light in 2017. However, essential lessons might be 
learned from the US traded life policy107 (TLP) market, where the success of this 
secondary market has been undermined by weak governance in the value chain 
and by moral hazard and market abuse – as we noted in a previous Pensions 
Institute report.108 The sale of TLP funds in the UK retail market led to a mis-selling 
scandal. This came about partly as a result of the sale of this high-risk alternative 
asset in the mass market – it was sold as a ‘safe’ high yield investment. 
Of immediate concern is the question of what represents value for money (VfM) 
for customers seeking to sell annuities. To enhance the prospects of this potential 
106 Financial System Inquiry (FSI), Dec. 2014, The Murray Review, http://fsi.gov.au/publications/
final-report/; Australian Treasury announcement: http://treasury.gov.au/
ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2014/FSI-Final-Report. See Sydney Morning Herald, 
20 Oct. 2015, Annuities and private pensions to replace lump sums as default for retirees
107 This is a type of whole of life insurance policy. In the US market, the most commonly sold product 
is called universal life, which pays out a sum on death in return for regular premiums. Such 
policies were sold in the UK in the past and now form a component of ‘legacy’ back books. 
108 TLPs are also known as life settlements in the US. See Pensions Institute, July 2008, And death 
shall have no dominion: Life settlements and the ethics of profiting from mortality,  
http://www.pensions-institute.org/DeathShallHaveNoDominion_Final_3July08.pdf 
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market, life companies – or the FCA – might develop a ‘selling money’s worth’109 
measure of VfM for policyholders.
Apart from the sales process, which in itself poses questions about the fair 
treatment of customers, this type of market might also raise concerns about data 
protection, as the organisation that buys annuities acquires considerable 
information about an insured’s age, state of health, and financial circumstances.
The price buyers will be prepared to pay will be based on medical underwriting 
at the point of purchase. The price will also be discounted – possibly deeply – 
to offset the mortality risks the purchaser bears. The infrastructure is likely to be 
expensive – a cost the seller will bear – due to the complexity of the value chain 
and the requirement for several layers of intermediation. If it goes ahead, the 
success of the new asset class will depend on the purchasers’ expertise in 
portfolio construction, the accuracy of life expectancy (LE) reports, and robust 
standards in the regulation of purchase and resale processes. We believe that 
the Government and regulators should consider very carefully the target market 
for funds of retail annuities. While institutional purchasers – such as DB pension 
schemes and insurance companies – can be expected to apply actuarial and 
investment methodologies in order to evaluate the risk-reward profile, sales of 
such funds in the retail market will represent a high risk to customers, advisers 
and to the FCA. 
If the secondary market for retail annuities does go ahead and proves popular, 
we see the potential for buyers of these retail policies to develop commoditised 
funds which could be attractive to pension schemes110 and insurers seeking to 
invest in alternative asset classes to diversify their longevity risk exposure. Interest 
in this type of strategy is already evident. A recent example is the Canada 
Pension Plan Investment Board’s (CPPIB’s) 2014 purchase of Wilton Re Holdings, 
a US provider of life insurance and reinsurance and a leading consolidator in 
closed books of life assurance policies. The CPPIB considers closed books of life 
policies (which include the US equivalent of whole of life) to be an asset class 
with attractive risk-adjusted returns, well-suited to its long-term horizon.111 
This example is also interesting because it demonstrates that the market in back 
books – and, in this cases, in whole consolidation businesses – operates on 
a cross-border, as well as national level.
109 See, for example,  
http://www.bath.ac.uk/management/research/pdf/tonks-cannon-annuity-markets.pdf and  
https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10036/52333/rrep563.pdf?sequence=1
110 DB pension schemes might consider such funds as an alternative asset class that can aid 
diversification and form part of a liability driven investment (LDI) strategy. 
111 http://www.cppib.com/en/public-media/news-releases/2014/cppib-wilton.html 
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1.7 Identifying the pension and benefit needs of private-sector employers
The position of employers in relation to the business benefits of workplace 
pension schemes is complicated and now – unlike in the past – conflicted. 
1.7.1 Employers’ concerns about DC decumulation freedom and choice
While employers may wish to ensure their DC pension scheme members make 
informed choices at retirement and secure value for money in the retirement 
income products they buy, most are equally keen to sever the connection between 
the employer’s business and the pension scheme in relation to retirees. 
Employers told us that that there is no business benefit in providing services to 
people who no longer work for them. They also said that there is a reputational 
risk, and possibly also a regulatory risk, if a workplace drawdown scheme, for 
example, does not deliver what its members expect. These attitudes are now very 
different from the paternalism shown by such employers in the past.
For most employers, it will now be more attractive to outsource the DC 
decumulation function. Where their existing provider does not offer this facility, 
they will look to third parties to provide a ‘default’ for members, by which we 
mean employers will automatically transfer members to the third-party 
decumulation scheme, although members will have the right to opt out. Some 
employers might find the default mechanism a concern, for the regulatory 
reasons mentioned above. In these cases, they will include the transfer as an 
option rather than a default in the pre-retirement packs. The main advantage for 
employers that offer access to a decumulation scheme, with strong suggestions 
about the maximum rate of withdrawal, is that this may deter employees from 
depleting their DC pots too quickly and too early. Nevertheless, employers 
remain nervous about making such suggestions.
The challenge and opportunity for life companies is to develop third-party 
decumulation schemes that are open to non-member employers as well as 
existing employer customers. If life companies do not rise to this challenge, then 
employers are likely to use NEST for this purpose or The People’s Pension, 
assuming it develops a decumulation scheme shortly, as rumours suggest it might 
do. Consultants, such as Xafinity, have entered this market, but it will be some 
time before we see whether they secure a profitable share, especially if a charge 
cap on drawdown schemes and plans is introduced.
1.7.2 Employer-controlled long-term savings schemes
Employers, especially the larger quoted companies, have supported voluntary 
workplace provision for many decades. They have also given their support to 
auto-enrolment. Unfortunately – albeit for very good reasons – their enthusiasm 
is waning. 
In the interviews for this report, finance directors were vociferous about the fact 
that the business purpose of a pension scheme no longer pertains, yet employers 
must contribute the minimum required under auto-enrolment and, in many 
cases, voluntarily contribute well in excess of the minimum. FDs – and HR 
directors – said they cannot rely on the pension scheme to facilitate retirement 
management, that is, to ensure employees can retire at an age that suits the 
company, which, in turn, ensures the company can maintain its retention policy 
in relation to talented younger employees. 
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The original purpose of the company pension scheme as a retirement 
management tool has been undermined by two recent policy changes, which 
were wholly separate in purpose, but when combined have had very important 
unintended consequences:
• The abolition of the default retirement age112 in 2011 means that an employer 
cannot force an employee to retire, even if the employee has reached the 
pension scheme’s ‘normal retirement age’ (NRA). 
• The April 2015 pension regime means that workplace pension scheme 
members can draw on their DC pots from age 55. In theory, they could 
deplete their entire pot before NRA and hence not be able to afford to retire.
This problem affects all companies, not just the larger and more paternalistic 
employers. One solution would be for the Government to reverse part of the 
April 2015 reforms and increase the age at which DC savers can access their 
retirement savings to 65, as was proposed by the Society of Pension Professionals 
(SPP) in November 2015.113 
Employers are also angry about the loss of tax reliefs that were previously 
available to higher earners and which will now be severely capped, due to the 
restrictions on the lifetime allowance.114 This was introduced in 2006 at a level of 
£1.5m. It was then increased each year to £1.8m in 2010, since when it has 
been reduced. In the 2015-16 tax year, the lifetime allowance was £1.25m. It 
falls to £1m from April 2016. The effect is to disconnect higher earners – 
directors included – from their company pension scheme, as it will no longer 
cover their anticipated retirement income needs.
As a result of these developments, we understand that some of the larger 
employers – in particular those with low staff turnover that employ people 
through to retirement – are looking for new types of long-term savings scheme 
over which they would have full control in terms of the timing of withdrawing 
cash. Employers could use this alternative type of arrangement, which would 
most likely be set up under trust, for all employees (where older workers are an 
important cohort of the workforce) or for executives only, in an attempt to regain 
control over the retirement management and recruitment functions.
1.8 The advice and guidance market
Our research identified a serious gap in the DC decumulation advice market. 
Advisers, understandably, said that they fear the risk of regulatory reprisals if they 
make a personal recommendation in relation to a low-value DC pot that the 
customer wishes to use for a high-risk drawdown investment strategy. They are 
equally reluctant to make go-or-stay recommendations in relation to older DC 
policies that have a complex combination of guarantees and exit penalties. 
112 https://www.gov.uk/retirement-age 
113 Reported in the FT, 13 Nov. 2015.  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/98de7dec-8962-11e5-9f8c-a8d619fa707c.html?ftcamp=crm/
email/follow/author/Q0ItMDAwMTI3NQ==-QXV0aG9ycw==/product#axzz3rZackUKB
114 See, for example,  
http://www.pensionsadvisoryservice.org.uk/about-pensions/saving-into-a-pension/pensions-and-
tax/the-limetime-allowance 
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Adviser and provider concerns – again understandably – are further exacerbated 
by the activities of modern claims management companies (‘ambulance 
chasers’), which have successfully exploited the PPI mis-selling scandal and, at 
the time of writing, had turned their attention to packaged bank accounts. Given 
the PPI ambulance-chasing window is coming to an end, and the packaged bank 
account ‘mis-selling’ campaign is likely to have a similarly limited lifespan, sales 
of drawdown plans and transfers of legacy policies will be attractive propositions 
to these large and sophisticated organisations. The ABI’s proposal, in September 
2015, that claims management companies should be regulated by the FCA, is 
timely.115 At present, these companies are licensed and regulated by the Ministry 
of Justice (MoJ), which outsources this function to the Staffordshire County 
Council Trading Standards Department.
The challenge for the FCA and the Government is to introduce a form of low-cost 
simplified or focused decumulation advice suitable for clients with medium-sized 
pots which leaves those clients with little or no recourse for redress if the product 
towards which they are steered ends up giving a poorer outcome than 
anticipated. This challenge is made more testing by the fact that the success 
of auto-enrolment is predicated on member inertia. DC decumulation does, 
however, need to be initiated by the member. Members do have to contact their 
providers if they want to draw money from their DC pots: they have to provide 
personal bank details or the details of the provider to which they wish to make 
a transfer. This point of contact is not, of itself, sufficient, but it could be used to 
direct DC customers into a focused advice service, which might take the form of 
a helpline and a guided-choice website. 
Interviewees for our report said that many DC savers do not need – and certainly 
do not want to pay for – fee-based advice, which might cost a minimum of 
£1,500, even where the DC pot is only worth £20,000, for example. 
One interviewee put it this way:
Mass-market customers don’t want holistic advice – they want straight answers to 
specific questions like ‘should I buy an annuity or should I do drawdown?’ and 
‘if I do drawdown, which is the best product?’ Customers with older policies have 
similarly specific questions which boil down to ‘should I go or should I stay?’
Another said:
Above all DC customers want to understand the risks in plain language. The risks 
of drawdown were demonstrated only too clearly at the turn of the present century 
and again in 2008-09, when customers who were heavily invested in growth assets 
saw their pots decimated by the equity bear market and global financial crisis. The 
high charges associated with drawdown plans exacerbated the damage. Today, 
smarter design seeks to construct a growth investment strategy that is less bullish 
and is more focused on volatility-management, but there is no way you can compare 
drawdown with an annuity. There is no such thing as a ‘safe’ drawdown plan. 
115 https://www.abi.org.uk/News/News-releases/2015/09/ABI-clampdown-rogue-claims-
management-companies-as-people-continue-bombarded-by-nuisance-calls-texts 
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The imperative to fill the advice gap was made clear in a report from the 
consultant Oliver Wyman: 
A critical decision will be to decide the firm’s [pension provider’s] appetite and 
strategy around direct distribution, guidance and advice. Customers will seek out 
help to support their multiple retirement decisions, and are likely to place business 
where they find this help. Insurers cannot afford to let the fear of regulatory risk 
stop them meeting this demand. Conduct risk issues will remain, but it is expected 
that the regulatory uncertainty that has prevented insurers (and others) developing 
simplified advice models will start to be addressed by the FCA, allowing insurers to 
more confidently deliver guidance, execution-only and simplified advice models, with 
a focus on automated processes, digital channels and mobile.116
We believe that focused or simplified advice delivered on a direct-to-customer 
(D2C) basis, which dealt with questions relating to the DC pot, would meet most 
DC savers needs. Clearly this type of service would need to spell out in plain 
language the degree of responsibility the service took for the customer outcome 
and the degree of responsibility remaining with the customer. 
Major life companies told us that they were ready to provide a D2C focused 
advice service – or that they can secure this by outsourcing to a third-party. Some 
companies have already established this arrangement, but others are holding 
back because the regulation of this type of advice is unclear. Given the complex 
FCA rules, they are concerned that any form of ‘non-advice’ – i.e., generic 
support that encourages the customer to make a choice of decumulation product 
– could easily stray into the regulator’s definition of regulated advice which can 
lead to the provider being sued many years later if things go wrong. 
A key factor in the successful business model of any focused or simplified advice 
proposition is the ease with which it attracts customers. Customer acquisition costs 
are estimated at £200 per case in the UK. According to a report by FinaMetrica, 
this is ‘beyond the means’ of many advisory firms and explains their slow growth.
As reported in Professional Pensions,117 FinaMetrica takes ‘a macro look at automated 
advice models around the world’. Robo-advice is ‘established and blooming’ in 
the US market, ‘but almost invisible in the UK by comparison’. The report argues 
that ‘robo-advisers are the most significant development in the delivery of financial 
advice in the past three decades’, but says that in the UK, the future of this business 
model ‘lies in the white label market, via channels that target communities’. 
The need for cheaper forms of advice first emerged after the RDR in 2012 and 
again after the introduction of the freedom and choice pension regime in 2015. 
By the fourth quarter of 2015, there was increasing evidence that some form of 
‘robo-advice’ was expected to play a major role in the UK DC-decumulation 
market. 
116 Oliver Wyman, 2014. The future of the UK life industry. http://www.oliverwyman.com/content/
dam/oliver-wyman/global/en/files/insights/financial-services/2014/September/LON-
MKT10307-001%20-%20Future%20of%20UK%20Life%20-%20FINAL.pdf 
117 FinaMetrica, Nov. 2015. The Robo-Revolution. http://www.riskprofiling.com/ereport.  
The report costs £995. It was described in Professional Adviser, 5 Nov. 2015. http://www.
professionaladviser.com/professional-adviser/news/2433425/robo-advice-report-detects-
elephant-in-the-room?utm_medium=email&utm_term=&utm_content=Robo-advice%3A%20
Report%20detects%20%27elephant%20in%20the%20room%27&utm_campaign=IFA.SP_06.
Update_RL.EU.A.U&utm_source=PA.DCM.Editors_Updates 
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By November 2015, the robo-advice service (‘Cora’, Clear Online Retirement 
Advice) developed by LV= and Wealth Wizards, a technology-driven advisory 
firm majority-owned by LV=,118 was up and running. The service charges £199 
to produce a report that sets out product recommendations based on the user’s 
input in relation to their objectives and risk tolerance. The key feature of this 
algorithm-based technology is that it provides fully regulated advice, which 
means that LV= takes regulatory responsibility for the product recommendations. 
We cannot overemphasise the importance of having an acceptable (by the FCA) 
advice-delivery mechanism for mass-market DC decumulators. Otherwise, 
customers will either opt for a risky DIY model, fall for a scam, or accept the 
accumulation provider’s ‘roll over’ decumulation strategy, which is what happens 
in the US market.
The DC decumulation and advice market in Australia119
Lack of trust in advisers is not confined to the UK market, as the Australian 
experience demonstrates, where the compulsory workplace-based DC 
system has been in place since the early 1990s. 
The accumulation stage has been largely successful in building up significant 
assets, although concerns remain about very high member charges. However, 
the real flaws in the system relate to the decumulation stage. Although 
annuities are available, the market is very small: most DC retirees take their 
capital in a series of lump sums. This has caused two significant problems, 
which are very relevant to the UK’s future experience of ‘freedom and choice’. 
The influential 2014 Murray Review found that about half of DC retirees 
withdraw all their DC savings by the age of 70. Murray criticised pension 
providers for failing to innovate and offer better-designed products to help 
DC decumulators to hedge longevity risk. His proposed solutions, which 
have largely been accepted by the Australian Government, are set out below.
DC savers with large pots use ‘self-managed superannuation funds’ 
(SMSFs), which are similar in structure and investment choice to SIPP 
drawdown products in the UK. The Australian risk tolerance consultant 
FinaMetrica Risk has been critical of the investment risks associated with 
SMSFs. Paul Resnik, co-founder, said: 
The language those retirees use is one of ‘taking control’. It’s nonsensical. They’re 
not in control; they’re running a high-risk formula they don’t understand. 
Almost all of SMSF money is invested in Australian assets. About 70% on 
average is in growth assets, creating ‘a huge concentration risk’, Resnik 
said. His conclusion was that the DIY model is flawed and that DC retirees 
need expert advice. 
118 https://www.wealthwizards.com/lv-invests-in-leading-robo-adviser-wealth-wizards.  
See also, FT, 6 Nov 2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a8598908-8316-11e5-8e80-
1574112844fd.html?ftcamp=crm/email/follow/author/Q0ItMDAwMTI3NQ==-
QXV0aG9ycw==/product#axzz3qoZfmwZZ 
119 We are grateful for permission to include analysis here from ‘the lang cat’, an independent 
research centre. See the lang cat, April 2015. When the levee breaks: What next for the UK 
retirement savings market? http://langcatfinancial.co.uk/white-paper/when-the-levee-breaks/ 
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Unfortunately, The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 
believes that the advice market cannot meet DC retirees’ need. Pauline 
Vamos, chief executive, said:
The problem is both caused and compounded by a dislike of financial advisers. 
We are seeing trends across the world, including in Australia, in terms of where 
advice is going and we know that, over the next few years, the vast majority of 
advice will be self-guided advice. Australia is all about do-it-yourself: they hate 
advisers; they hate intermediaries.
It is very interesting to note that the lack of trust in the retail intermediary 
market is a problem for other major DC systems. Given the maturity of the 
Australian market, which is 20 years older than the UK auto-enrolment 
system, the UK Government, regulators, and product advisers should look 
very carefully at the issues noted above. Without affordable and easily-
accessible advice, DC decumulators will make very big mistakes in terms 
of the charges they pay and the investment risk they take in their 
drawdown plans.
The Murray Review proposals for DC decumulators in Australia
1.  Set a clear objective for the superannuation system to provide income 
in retirement.
2.  Improve long-term net returns for members by introducing a formal 
competitive process to allocate new workforce entrants to high-
performing superannuation funds.
3.  Meet the needs of retirees better by requiring superannuation trustees 
to pre-select, on members’ behalf, a default ‘comprehensive income 
product for retirement’ (CIPR) which included a longevity risk hedge. 
This would exploit behavioural biases to encourage, rather than 
discourage the use of products that provide longevity risk protection.
The report argued that the introduction of the CIPR, as a scheme default for 
decumulation (i.e., members would have the right to opt out) would 
influence behaviour but not limit personal choice and freedom. It would 
‘bring the policy philosophy at retirement closer to that of the accumulation 
phase’. Importantly, the CIPR would be run on a scheme basis, so that the 
longevity risk would be managed through a risk pool. ‘An enduring income 
stream would give retirees the confidence to spend in retirement, which 
would help to sustain economic growth as the population ages and reduce 
the extent to which longevity risk falls on the taxpayer’, the report said.
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The US decumulation model
The US DC market is more mature than the new UK system, due to the 
earlier decline in the DB market. While some employers still offer DB 
schemes, most offer what are known as ‘401k’120 schemes, which in 
practice operate in a similar way to the UK’s DC auto-enrolment workplace 
schemes. Coverage is far from universal. In October 2015, Bloomberg 
reported that half of US workers in paid employment are not covered by 
401k schemes.121
At retirement the most common form of decumulation is an individual 
retirement account (IRA), which is similar to the UK’s income drawdown 
plan. Lifetime annuities and deferred annuities are available in the US 
market but these are not popular options, accounting for less than 5% of 
the market. It is likely that the US Government will do more to encourage 
annuitisation in future.
There are two relevant lessons from the US for UK life companies:
•  The US DC market is dominated by asset managers rather than UK-style 
traditional life companies. Big names include Fidelity, BlackRock and 
Vanguard. The reason for the dominance of asset managers is the 
absence of a strong annuity market – accumulation and decumulation 
are delivered via investment products. Having said that, the dominant 
asset managers benefit from a similar ‘rollover’ market that has benefited 
UK insurers in the past. The difference is that instead of rolling over from 
an investment-based accumulation stage into an annuity, the roll-over is 
to an investment-based IRA. Inertia, it seems, is a major force in customer 
choice irrespective of the products offered or where the customer resides.
•  As we noted earlier, in Australia the major concern is that DC retirees are 
drawing too much too soon from their pension pot, with the result that 
half of retirees have emptied their pot by age 70. In the US the opposite 
is true. According to Fidelity the average age at which DC retirees start to 
make withdrawals is 70.
120 These are ‘401 (k)’ schemes named subsection 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code, which was 
enacted into law in 1978 and which allowed the setting up of tax-qualified DC pension accounts.
121 Bloomberg, 21 Oct. 2015. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-21/bad-math-
68-million-americans-no-401-k-epic-savings-crisis 
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Competitive markets for annuities in Switzerland, Denmark, Chile 
and Singapore 
In Switzerland, enrolment in an occupational scheme is mandatory, as it is 
in Australia. However, the DC system is largely ‘cash balance’, which means 
that the retiree gets a lump sum at retirement which depends on the 
contributions made and a pre-agreed investment return on these 
contributions – irrespective of the actual performance of the underlying 
investment fund. 
As the Pensions Policy Institute (PPI)122 has observed, despite the fact that 
DC savers in Switzerland have the same decumulation freedom and choice 
that is now available in the UK, annuitisation levels are remarkably high 
at about 80%. ‘This is attributed to cultural attitudes; Swiss workers are 
described as being “financially conservative” and “preferring guaranteed 
incomes for life” over taking lump sums.’
We believe that there is more to this pattern of decumulation than cultural 
attitudes, however. In Switzerland, annuities are heavily regulated by the 
Government, including the annuity rates, which are considered to be very 
generous. While in the UK, low interest rates and increasing longevity have 
forced down annuity rates, this has not happened in Switzerland.
It is not clear if such favourable rates are sustainable, particularly since they 
are funded by the occupational pension schemes, which might give rise to 
concerns about scheme solvency in the future. There is a private market for 
annuities, but, at present, this is small because insurance companies cannot 
compete with the generous rates provided by the occupational schemes.
In Denmark, most employees belong to the national earnings-related 
ATP scheme (ATP is the parent company of NOW: Pensions in the UK). 
A minority of employees are covered by private schemes and there is also 
a voluntary pension scheme market for employees who are not eligible for 
either of the above. ATP pays a lifetime income direct from the scheme. 
PPI says that for those in other voluntary pension schemes, there are 
different options available at retirement which include life annuities, fixed-
term annuities and access to lump sums. Each pension scheme has different 
rules regarding how pension savings can be accessed.
In Chile, the annuity market is also very popular and this is once again 
attributed to government intervention in pricing. The DC market is 
mandatory in Chile and at retirement about 70% of DC savers buy an 
annuity. Annuity providers are required to offer a minimum rate of return, 
which is backed by the Government. The PPI explains:
On reaching retirement, Chileans who wish to access their DC pension savings 
must opt either for a lifetime (deferred or immediate), index-linked annuity or for 
phased withdrawals from a pension fund. Married DC savers are required to 
purchase joint-life annuities. The fund providers must guarantee a minimum rate of 
return, which is backed by the Government. The number of DC savers purchasing 
122 PPI, Nov. 2015. Retirement funding: analysis of retirement income patterns.  
http://www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/publications/reports/retirement-funding-analysis-of-
retirement-income-patterns 
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an annuity in Chile has risen from 3% of pensioners in 1985 to just under 70% 
of DC savers for whom annuities were an option in 2007. This also equates to 
around 70% of DC assets.
There is a high demand for lifetime annuities in Chile, attributed to the restrictions 
on accessing savings and on the lack of a sufficient universal state pension to fall 
back on. The annuities market in Chile is highly competitive and developed.
In Singapore, the mandatory system for employees builds pots that are 
used for a range of purposes including pensions, healthcare and housing. 
At age 55, savers with pots above a minimum size are required to buy 
either a deferred annuity or a form of longevity insurance that hedges the 
risk by providing a standard annuity that pays out until age 90 and then 
what the PPI describes as a ‘deeply deferred’ annuity that pays out from age 
90. Joint-life and index-linked or escalating annuities are not available.
1.9 Competitors to traditional life companies in the auto-enrolment market 
A clear taxonomy of the major players in the auto-enrolment market has yet to 
emerge, due to the constantly shifting boundaries between life companies, asset 
managers and investment consultants, among others. Another confusing factor is 
the trend towards mergers and acquisitions, often between firms with different 
business models, for example, the acquisition of an asset manager or a firm of 
advisers by a life company. It can be difficult to determine the true profile of the 
merged company until well after the event.
Past convention tended to divide providers into ABI and non-ABI member firms – 
the latter generally being members of the Investment Association (IA). In other 
words, providers marketed themselves as (multi-line or mono-line) life companies 
or as asset managers.
This approach to provider classification is now outdated, as major providers in 
the auto-enrolment market have emerged from very different backgrounds, 
including asset management, advisory, and, of course, public policy, as in the 
case of NEST. Moreover, both the ABI and the IA are currently losing high-profile 
members, as major financial institutions question the role of trade associations in 
a rapidly-changing market where difference and autonomy are perceived as 
more valuable than consensus.123 
Another way to classify auto-enrolment schemes is by their legal structure, i.e., 
trust-based schemes, which are regulated by TPR, and contract-based schemes, 
which are regulated by the FCA. In the past, this distinction was very clear-cut, 
but again the lines have blurred under auto-enrolment. Originally, trust-based 
DC schemes were established by employers that closed their DB schemes but 
which wanted to run a DC scheme just for their own employees. Such schemes 
used the DB trust framework and ran the DC scheme’s investment strategy along 
similar lines, for example, by appointing external asset managers and third party 
administrators. The hallmark of the original trust-based scheme, therefore, was 
that it was associated with a single employer.
123 L&G and Aegon left the ABI in 2014 and 2015 respectively. 
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Multi-trust, multi-employer schemes have flourished under auto-enrolment, but 
they sit uncomfortably within TPR’s remit, since most are run more like contract-
based group personal pensions (GPPs), than like traditional single-trust, single-
employer schemes. One of the advantages of the trust-based model is that when 
employees change employer, they can remain in the former’s scheme as 
deferred members. Another advantage is that trustees have the power to make 
block transfers of members where they decide to change the incumbent asset 
manager or administration provider, or the provider of a bundled scheme. This is 
because the service contracts are between the trustees and the provider. Blanket 
transfers generally are not possible under a GPP because the contract is between 
the individual member and the provider, which means that a transfer requires all 
individuals to consent. 
1.9.1 The position of life companies in the auto-enrolment market
In a 2014 report, ‘Value for Money’,124 the Pensions Institute predicted that the 
number of mass-market providers of workplace schemes would fall from about 
20 at the turn of the century to about five or six, as those providers that fail to 
generate critical mass leave the industry. We do not believe that this will lead to a 
cartel-like behaviour by the surviving providers, given the very different structures 
of the dominant auto-enrolment multi-employer schemes. However, the 
Government and regulators do need to consider how best to ensure effective 
competition is maintained, particularly for smaller employers. There is already 
evidence of providers withdrawing from sections of the market they originally 
planned to serve. The Government and regulators also need to ensure that 
further consolidation happens smoothly, so as not to undermine confidence in 
auto-enrolment. 
Life companies that are very active in the auto-enrolment market tend to offer 
both a contract-based and trust-based scheme. In most cases, these are mirror 
arrangements, that is, they use the same organisations for administration, asset 
management, and even governance. At the time of writing, there were fewer 
than 10 traditional life companies that offered qualifying auto-enrolment 
schemes. These included Aegon, Aviva (which now owns Friends Life), L&G, 
Prudential, Royal London, Scottish Widows, and Standard Life.125
Life companies are also dominant in the retail DC pensions market, where they 
sell personal pensions and SIPPs for accumulation, and annuities and drawdown 
plans for decumulation.126 SIPPs are also available from providers other than life 
offices, such as investment trusts, asset managers, advisers, wealth managers 
and platforms. Examples include Alliance Trust and Hargreaves Lansdown.
In the mass market for auto-enrolment, there are some powerful competitors to 
the traditional life companies and these providers have non-standard business 
models that appear to be very successful. Of the major master-trust providers, 
probably the toughest competition comes from The People’s Pension, NEST and 
NOW: Pensions. 
124 Pensions Institute, Jan. 2014.
125 https://www.abi.org.uk/Insurance-and-savings/Products/Pensions/Saving-into-a-pension/
Automatic-enrolment/Providers. The list also includes B&CE, which we consider to be a 
‘challenger’. L&G and Aegon are no longer members of the ABI.
126 They also sell small self-administered schemes (SASSs), which are used by small family businesses.
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What distinguishes these providers from traditional life companies is the mono-
line business model: their main or sole focus is their auto-enrolment schemes. In 
addition, one of the hallmarks of The People’s Pension, NEST and NOW is that 
they are among the lowest-cost providers in the market and their trustee boards 
are independent of the provider.
Successful business development under this mono-line low-cost model is 
predicated on scale of operations and volume of new business. The People’s 
Pension, NEST and NOW compete in broadly the same market – that is, they are 
more than happy to accept larger employers and/or employers with an attractive 
workforce profile, but they have made a point of promoting their open-door 
policy to employers that are less attractive to traditional life companies, for 
example, where the company is very small, has a high staff turnover rate and/or 
a large proportion of lower earners.127 NEST is the only scheme with a public 
service obligation to accept any employer that applies to join. However, NEST’s 
contribution charge of 1.8% will disadvantage older eligible workers who are 
enrolled for a short period. For thousands of employers and their employees, 
direct-to-provider is likely to be the only option – this substantial tail-end will be 
unprofitable for traditional provider and adviser alike. 
This point is well-understood by the Government, which, in an October 2015 
report,128 said:
The profile of employers affected by automatic enrolment is now changing 
dramatically. Small employers are expected to have different requirements and 
responses to automatic enrolment. They will also create greater operational 
challenges as volumes increase.
At the time of writing – Q4 2015 – auto-enrolment was being rolled out to 
employers with fewer than 50 employees. The process will be completed by 
2017-18, with the staging of micro-employers with fewer than five employees. 
The number of employers implementing automatic enrolment duties is expected 
to peak between July and September 2017.
What this means is that we have entered the high volume/low profitability phase of 
auto-enrolment staging. The next two years will prove to be the true test of the auto-
enrolment system as a whole, and of The People’s Pension and NOW’s open-door 
policy, in particular. Volume of business is essential if these schemes are to maintain 
their low charges and to be profitable – although we emphasise that profitability is 
defined in different ways for not-for-profit providers, such as The People’s Pension, 
which has no shareholders and ploughs profits back into the business. 
Although mono-line, these multi-employer schemes also have the potential to 
exploit the biggest opportunity since auto-enrolment was announced, namely, 
scheme decumulation. NEST set out the details of its scheme design in 2015129 
which could well become a benchmark for the industry, as happened with the 
127 In the past, life companies used underwriting techniques to price new business, which meant that 
they increased the member charge if staff turnover was high and/or earnings were low. This had 
the unfortunate effect of penalising lower earners in general.
128 NAO/DWP, Oct. 2015. https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Automatic-
enrolment-to-workplace-pensions.pdf 
129 NEST, 2015, The future of retirement, https://www.nestpensions.org.uk/schemeweb/NestWeb/
includes/public/docs/The-future-of-retirement,pdf.pdf 
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scheme’s accumulation model. The People’s Pension and NOW have not so far 
announced their own plans. 
With the caveat that boundaries and distinctions are changing constantly, we 
can make the following distinctions between providers’ business models and 
scheme structures.
1.9.2 Government-backed master-trust: NEST
The first, and most obvious challenger to the traditional life company model is 
NEST. In 2012, NEST set a clear benchmark for the design and governance of 
low-cost multi-employer schemes in the auto-enrolment accumulation market. 
In 2015, it set a similar benchmark for scheme decumulation. 
NEST is a non-departmental public body (NDPB) and is run as a trust by NEST 
Corporation, which is the trustee. The scheme was introduced by the Government 
to avoid the danger of market failure under auto-enrolment, whereby employers 
considered economically unattractive to traditional life companies might not be 
able to find a suitable provider. NEST is a fully outsourced model in terms of 
asset management for its target date funds (TDFs) and the administration. 
The same is true of its scheme decumulation model, announced in 2015. The 
proposed scheme caters for both members who want to take their pot as cash 
and those who want to use drawdown with a deferred annuity to hedge longevity 
risk. The UK does not have a retail deferred annuity market at present, although 
bulk purchase annuity (BPA) buy-outs do involve such a product. We expect NEST 
to design its deferred annuities and to outsource this function to a life company 
or possibly to provide its own deferred annuities, assuming it achieves the 
appropriate critical mass to manage the longevity risk. 
NEST’s legal structure is very similar to a multi-trust scheme, but as a NDPB, 
NEST Corporation is accountable to Parliament through the DWP. NEST does not 
have shareholders (unusual, but not in itself unique in the auto-enrolment market) 
or a parent company that provides new business capital. Instead its establishment 
and administration costs are funded by a Government (DWP) loan facility.
At present, NEST operates under significant restrictions, namely a cap on annual 
contributions and the inability to accept transfers in. Even with these restrictions in 
place, it has proved to be a formidable competitor in the auto-enrolment market. 
When the restrictions are lifted in 2017, we predict it will be a top-three provider 
in terms of number of employers and number of employees. By 2018, when the 
staging for auto-enrolment is complete, we expect NEST to be the largest 
provider in the market in terms of numbers of members, although not necessarily 
in terms of AUM. Whether it will be profitable is a very different question. 
As mentioned above, it is the only scheme with a public service obligation to 
accept all employers irrespective of profile. 
An unusual feature of NEST is that it is open to the self-employed. This means 
– in theory at least – that it can compete in the retail market as well as in the 
workplace market. To date, it has not devoted significant resources to promoting 
this feature, but it might well do so in future if the Government decides to 
address the plight of the millions of private-sector workers whose contracts of 
employment exclude them from auto-enrolment. If the Government were so 
minded, it could require employers to direct contract workers into NEST, which 
would offer them a straight-through accumulation and decumulation service.
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We expect NEST to develop a major role in the market as an aggregator for 
scheme decumulation for those employers and providers that do not wish to offer 
this service. 
The above overview, suggests a promising future for NEST. But while its new-
business acquisition targets look very substantial, in terms of the number of 
employers it will take on by 2018, it is not yet clear whether NEST will ever 
become profitable or when it will finally repay its Government loan.130 The 
Government has said that NEST’s funding model is ‘inherently uncertain’:131
The role of NEST within the pensions market is still evolving. Revenues at 
NEST and other pension providers are highly uncertain and are affected by greater 
than expected private provision, extensions of start dates and lower real wage 
increases. NEST is funded by a Government loan and it will grow its funds under 
management as enrolment and contributions increase. It will need to grow funds 
under management significantly before it can be self-supporting.
In the same report, the Government said that it would continue to review NEST’s 
role in the auto-enrolment market, the impact of the competitive restrictions that 
it faces, and the long-term sustainability of the current funding arrangement.
1.9.3 Overseas entrant: Example – NOW: Pensions
The most obvious example of this category is NOW: Pensions, which is proving to 
be successful in the same mass market as NEST. NOW’s reputation rests on its 
in-house asset management, which is run by the scheme’s parent company in 
Denmark, ATP, one of the largest pension funds in Europe. ATP’s experience of 
managing the ‘straight-through’ customer journey, from accumulation to 
decumulation, may make NOW well-placed to develop scheme drawdown, 
possibly with an in-house annuity function if it achieves the appropriate critical 
mass. However, unlike NEST, NOW has made no public statements on this point 
to date.
1.9.4 Industry-wide heritage: Examples – The People’s Pension, the Pensions 
Trust, and BlueSky
Further challenges comes from former industry-wide schemes, for example, 
The People’s Pension, the Pensions Trust, and BlueSky. The advantage these 
schemes have is a long history of administering the comparatively low-value pots 
of workers in industries associated with peripatetic careers and, in the case of 
The People’s Pension in particular, seasonal variations in the job markets on 
which it formerly focused exclusively (building and civil engineering).
130 The initial loan was £171m. By 2013 this had increased to £239m. By March 2015, it had 
increased to £387m. Details about the loan are available here: https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/national-employment-savings-trust-nest-loan-agreement. However, one section 
redacted in this document relates to the applicable interest rate. This is because ‘the description 
contained within it could prejudice Government policy in future lending to other public sector 
bodies and the methodology used by the Debt Management Office in setting interest rates for 
such loans’. A second redaction has been made ‘because we have concluded the information 
would otherwise prejudice NEST Corporation’s commercial interests and has commercial 
importance to other pension providers’.
131 NAO/DWP, Oct. 2015. The National Audit Office shares the Government’s concerns about 
NEST’s ability to become self-sustaining. NAO, Nov. 2015. Automatic enrolment to workplace 
pensions. https://www.nao.org.uk/report/automatic-enrolment-to-workplace-pensions/
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The People’s Pension is a multi-trust, not-for-profit scheme. Where B&CE’s 
stakeholder scheme was only open to employers in the building and civil 
engineering sector, The People’s has no restrictions. The scheme outsources asset 
management to Legal & General Investment Management (LGIM) and 
undertakes the administration and customer services in-house. 
BlueSky has a similar background and was first off the block with its scheme 
drawdown product, based on AllianceBernstein’s TDFs, which it also uses for 
accumulation stage. The Pension Trust also uses AllianceBernstein’s TDFs.
1.9.5 Pension and employee benefit consultants: Examples – Aon Hewitt, JLT, 
Mercer, and Xafinity
Most employee benefits and investment consultants have introduced their own 
schemes, usually using in-house asset management capabilities together with a 
life company platform. While these schemes incorporate a very significant level 
of expertise and also knowledge about the employer market, these entrants have 
caused tensions in the market, with traditional providers raising questions about 
the ‘independence’ of a pension and employee benefit consultant that is also 
a provider in its own right. Nevertheless, as the closed DB market shrinks, we 
expect DC provision to become a major profit source for EBCs.
1.9.6 Platforms: Example – Hargreaves Lansdown
Hargreaves is best-known for its investment platform and, in the pensions 
market, for its self-invested personal pension (SIPP), which it offers for 
accumulation and decumulation. In the corporate market, it offers a GPP and a 
group SIPP, as well as an at-retirement service, using its annuity desk and its 
drawdown expertise. For employers, it offers a ‘corporate wrap’ which provides 
access to and the management of a range of workplace investment schemes, 
including the group SIPP, a stocks and shares ISA, and a fund and share account. 
1.9.7 Asset managers as investment solution providers: Examples – 
AllianceBernstein and SSgA
Under auto-enrolment, asset managers have raised their profile as third-party 
providers of investment solutions, in particular TDFs. The provision of a total 
investment solution via TDFs is quite different from the provision of asset 
management in the form of an outsourced mandate for a specific asset class or 
as a third-party component of an open-architecture ‘choice’ platform for retail 
plans or workplace schemes. In particular, TDFs incorporate multi-manager 
skills, governance and outsourcing as part of the package.
One of the earliest entrants in the TDF market was AllianceBernstein. In many 
ways AllianceBernstein performs the same function as NEST’s in-house 
investment team, which also uses TDFs. SSgA (State Street Global Advisers) is just 
one of several large US-based asset managers that is moving into this market. 
SSgA’s brand for auto-enrolment scheme decumulation is ‘Timewise Target 
Retirement Funds’.
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1.9.8 Asset managers as scheme providers: Examples – Fidelity and BlackRock
In a market, where success is predicated on asset management rather than 
insurance solutions, life companies face increasing competition from high-profile 
asset managers in the UK, including those with US parents that are major players 
in the asset-management dominated DC market for workplace accumulation plans 
(401k) and decumulation products (IRAs). In the UK, Fidelity and BlackRock operate 
multi-disciplinary in-house pension functions that rival those of traditional life offices. 
It is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between an ‘asset manager’ that 
starts its own life company to distribute retail and workplace DC products (in this 
case Fidelity and BlackRock, for example), and a life company with an asset-
management capability, such as L&G/Legal & General Investment management 
(LGIM) and Standard Life/Standard Life Investments (SLI), for example).
What both models have is the ability to offer a ‘straight through’ customer 
journey from accumulation to decumulation. Fidelity, for example, is known for its 
extensive funds platform, its low-cost drawdown model and also its in-house 
annuity-broking operation.
1.10 Future-proofing the life company business model
To maintain a model based on purported excellence in all relevant areas of 
expertise – asset management, insurance, administration, and governance – is a 
challenge only the largest and most successful multi-line providers will be in a 
position to undertake. Even so, they will still face tough competition across all 
their functions and many are prepared to outsource some functions where 
appropriate. The careful management of business partners can provide greater 
flexibility to expand and contract the outsourced functions in line with changing 
demand. In this way, outsourcing confers the potential to reduce costs and to 
avoid tying up capital in business areas where demand has fallen. 
While we expect a small number of large-scale bundled life companies to survive 
and thrive, others will need to give careful consideration to the future focus of 
their business model to concentrate on areas of the business that they believe 
reflects their core strengths. This might be asset management, for example, but if 
so, this needs to have a genuine reputation for excellence that can be 
demonstrated through third-party mandates with both DC and DB schemes. 
Administration and a life company platform are alternatives, the latter already in 
evidence, as the consultants usually use a third-party life platform for their 
auto-enrolment schemes. The sale of non-core business lines, especially back 
books, will enhance this more focused-business model and lead to a more 
efficient use of capital. 
Mid-tier traditional life companies are particularly vulnerable to the pace of 
change in the DC pensions market. In the past, these companies relied largely – 
often exclusively – on commission-based corporate advisers and IFAs to sell their 
products in the workplace and retail markets. This model is now obsolete, partly 
because of the ban on sales commission, but also because of the development of 
direct-to-customer (D2C) sales channels. Employers – especially medium and 
smaller firms – may find that D2C is the best route to the available auto-
enrolment scheme providers, while individual customers will increasingly buy 
their pension savings and decumulation products via non-advice platforms, 
product comparison websites, and direct from providers. 
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For vulnerable life companies, there are several options to consider when 
choosing the way forward, but each one requires considerable structural change:
1. Life companies with a sufficiently profitable share of the auto-enrolment 
market – possibly as niche providers to small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), for example – should consider outsourcing non-core functions and 
establish joint ventures and other third-party arrangements in order to 
improve efficiency and reduce costs.
2. Life companies that find they cannot compete in the auto-enrolment market 
should consider selling non-core functions and focus on a key strength that 
has a potential for profitability in the business-to-business (B2B) market. 
In many cases, that strength will be administration and customer services 
– the functions many asset managers lack and are seeking through 
partnership arrangements.
3. Several well-known mid-tier companies will recognise that the key to survival 
lies in scale. These companies are likely to seek a merger with a stronger 
parent company. 
4. Forward-looking life offices will examine potential business lines outside of 
the workplace pensions market and focus on cross-selling protection 
insurance. This will be on a group basis, where the employer is prepared 
to foot the bill, and on an individual basis, via the workplace, where the 
employer offers protection insurance as part of a flexible benefits menu. 
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Section 2: Challenges and opportunities for life companies in 
the back books markets
In this section, we set out our findings on the future of the back book markets. 
(Note ‘markets’ is plural: there are many more ‘back books’ than is generally 
appreciated.) We begin with the investigation into legacy charges, terms and 
conditions, and then consider potential policy and regulatory reforms, the aims 
of which are to build DC investor confidence and to address concerns about 
efficiency, as the market seeks to rectify its poor reputation for ‘treating customers 
fairly’ (TCF). We conclude with an overview of the new taxonomy of back books, 
in which each product is categorised according to the era and the legal and 
regulatory framework to which it belongs. 
2.1 Addressing back book policy charges terms and conditions 
The focus on back books, triggered by the Office of Fair Trading and Independent 
Project Board reports,132 has directed the industry and media spotlight on the 
extensive range of legacy companies and legacy systems. The ‘original’ pensions 
back book market, which is our main focus, is associated with DC policies sold 
before 2001. The 1990s signalled the mass transition from the with-profits 
investment model to the unit-linked investment model for DC pension policies 
and also for long-term savings products, such as endowment mortgages.133
In this period, in addition to growing life company concerns about the long-term 
liabilities associated with with-profits guarantees, the imminent introduction of 
stakeholder pension schemes in 2001 brought to an end the widespread practice 
of multiple-charging. In fact, the writing was already on the wall for multiple-
charge policies in 1999, when the then regulator, the Personal Investments 
Authority (PIA), issued Regulatory Update 64 (RU64), which warned advisers not 
to sell DC pensions workplace schemes and retail products that had high 
charges and complex terms and conditions, relative to those in a stakeholder 
scheme. For reasons that are not entirely clear, mass-market sales of single-
premium with-profits bonds continued until about 2005-06. It is likely that a 
major influence here was the high sales commissions paid by life companies to 
advisers: 5-7% of the single premium lump sum was typical, which compared 
very favourably (for commission-based advisers) with commissions paid by asset 
managers for sales of mutual funds, such as unit trusts and investment trusts.
132 OFT, Sept. 2013, revised Feb. 2014, Defined Contribution Workplace Pension Market Study, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http:/www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/
market-studies/oft1505. IPB, Dec. 2014, Defined Contribution Workplace Pensions: The audit of 
charges and benefits in legacy schemes - A report from the Independent Project Board,  
https://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/defined-contribution-workplace-pensions 
133 The move away from with-profits pension policies with GARs of around 12% (i.e., an annuity of 
£12,000 for a fund of £100,000 (twice current rates)) began earlier. Equitable Life stopped sales 
in 1988 and launched proceedings to enable the company to abandon its guaranteed pay-outs 
in 1999, but by then the damage was already done. It closed its doors to all new business in 
December 2000 after failing to find a buyer. For a useful timeline on these and subsequent 
events, see Financial Adviser, 12 Nov, 2015, p. 4.
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The OFT identified £40bn of assets in high-charging pre-2001 contract-based 
workplace schemes, representing 1.4m customers.134 We estimate that at least an 
equivalent sum – and that the true figure could be closer to double this – relates 
to high-charging pre-2001 retail policies, on account of the common practice of 
transferring a member to a retail personal pension scheme when the employee 
changed employment and left the workplace scheme.
In July 2015, HM Treasury (HMT) published a consultation on the subject of 
charges on pension transfers and on exit penalties.135 The closing date for 
responses was 21 October 2015. HMT said it would publish further details 
towards the end of the year, when the FCA and PRA have also completed their 
‘comprehensive evidence gathering exercise’. The scope of HMT’s consultation 
is wide and searching. The House of Commons Work and Pensions Select 
Committee, chaired by Frank Field MP, is also examining the charges, terms and 
conditions of older policies. 
It is to be hoped that these two official investigations, together with the work of 
the regulators, result in a clear plan for action. One area in particular where the 
Government should consider delivering a robust plan is where the past collides 
with the present. This involves addressing the restrictive terms and conditions that 
are likely to undermine the success of its ‘freedom and choice’ pension regime, 
which is predicated on DC savers’ ability to access and transfer their pension 
pots easily and quickly, without excessive exit charges. 
2.2 Proposed reforms for the ‘original’ back book market
The reforms we propose address market behaviour, as well as charges, terms 
and conditions. For example, we argue that the reputation of back book 
providers would improve if the market were made more visible to public scrutiny. 
At present, with the exception of the consolidators,136 information about back 
books can be difficult to locate, since they are not necessarily named on the 
company’s main website, but are listed under a separate website address. While 
the separation of closed and open business might make sense in terms of 
customer access to information, it also serves to disconnect this important 
business line from the insurer’s public profile and to create an artificial gap 
between older and newer customers, both of which should feel that they are 
being treated equally fairly.
For the wider back book market to thrive, there needs to be change at both 
policy and regulatory level. We propose that the Government and regulators 
should consider taking the following steps.
134 Bear in mind that at this time, trust-based schemes were confined to single-employer trusts, which 
generally were large-scale and offered comparatively low member charges, since the ‘provider’ 
was the employer, which was not seeking to make a profit from this core employee benefit.
135 HMT, July 2015, Pension Transfers and Early Exit Charges: Consultation,  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/449861/
PU1847_Pensions_transfers_v4.pdf 
136 Examples of consolidators include Phoenix Group (http://www.thephoenixgroup.com/our-
companies.aspx) and Zurich-based Admin Re, Swiss Re’s business unit. Admin’s parent company 
is ReAssure (formerly Windsor Life): https://www.reassure.co.uk/Pages/default.aspx.  
Admin Re operates across European borders and in September 2015, it announced the 
acquisition of the UK life company Guardian Financial Services for £1.6bn. 
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2.2.1 Resolve the legacy charge issue
The Government and regulators should provide a clear resolution to the 
investigation into legacy charges. Despite the likely prudential impact on life 
companies, we believe that the FCA, first to strongly urge, and then, if necessary, 
to require providers to address the perceived customer detriment in relation to 
the charges and the terms and conditions of older policies, including, but not 
limited to those sold before 2001. At the time of writing this report, the industry 
was awaiting the delayed final results of the FCA’s thematic review of legacy 
charges, which began in 2014. We will be interested to see what actions are 
taken as a result of this review.
2.2.2 Ensure TCF applies equally to legacy workplace scheme and 
retail customers
If the Government and regulators decide that there is inconsistency between the 
treatment of consumers in legacy workplace pension schemes, which are under 
review, and consumers with legacy retail pension policies, which are not, they 
should consider initiating a second investigation into retail back books especially 
if life companies do not apply the same degree of reform to these policies, as is 
now required for workplace DC schemes. To date, however, there has been no 
indication that this is what the Government and regulators intend. 
The arguments in favour of including retail customers are clear-cut:
• First, if TCF is to apply to legacy policies, it should apply equally to all 
customers and should not be dependent on the origins of the policy, which in 
many cases will have begun with membership of a workplace pension scheme, 
but was converted to a retail pension policy when the member changed jobs. 
While the latter problem is generally associated with contract-based schemes, 
which do not have ‘deferred’ members, we understand that some trust-based 
schemes ‘sweep up’ deferred members annually and convert these 
memberships into individual contract-based personal pensions. There was 
evidence of such practices in the OFT report, which found that active member 
discounts (AMDs), which confer lower charges on active members, but higher 
charges on leavers (via deferred member penalties or DMPs), were evident in 
10,000 schemes, representing £13.4bn AUM. 
• Second, we do not accept the argument that, where retail policies were sold 
via advisers, the customer made an informed choice, because the commission-
based system and the assumption that with-profits was the best structure for 
pension policies created a very biased advice market.
Moreover, we would not expect mass-market retail customers, who purchased 
policies in the 1980s and 1990s, to have much if any contact with their 
original adviser, so they will be ‘advice orphans’.
Any argument against this extension of the reforms would be based on 
precedent, as far as we can see – that is, retail policies were not included in the 
2013 OFT review, and therefore were excluded from the Independent Project 
The meaning of life 76
Board review.137 This was because the original context of the OFT investigation 
was auto-enrolment. While this focus on workplace schemes was 
understandable, in the context of the Government’s flagship new private-sector 
pension system, to ignore retail policyholders would be seriously remiss. 
From our interviews with providers that manage back books, we expect 
behaviour to differ in relation to this important point. Some providers will apply 
the same revised charges, terms and conditions to legacy retail policyholders as 
they do to members of legacy workplace schemes. Others will resist, due to 
concerns about the impact on profits and on shareholder support. 
2.2.3 A de minimis for the return of fund to customers with smaller policies
The Government and regulators should consider practical solutions to the 
difficulties of managing smaller policies, where annual administration costs are 
material relative to the pot size. One option would be for the FCA to introduce a 
de minimis, whereby providers can release funds to pensions and long-term 
savings customers. For the former, it would be necessary to change the legislation 
to allow for this process where policyholders are under the age of 55, which 
currently is the minimum age for access. Given the difficulties and the cost of 
communicating the option to customers, life companies would need a regulatory 
‘amnesty’, under which they would have the right to undertake a blanket 
communications exercise, to return funds to customers that requested the value of 
their policy in cash and also to send cheques to policyholders who do not 
respond. This last point is important because life companies told us that 
communication exercises with legacy policyholders are rarely fruitful.
With this in mind we make the following proposals:
• The FCA should consider introducing a facility to make automatic transfers – 
i.e., without individual customer consent – to the life company’s own modern 
products or to an aggregator. This would mirror the process under Part VII 
transfers permitted under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and 
allow firms to transfer business when merging, provided that the impact on 
members is independently assessed and a court approves the transfer.
• The FCA should consider introducing the facility to issue automatic refunds – 
again without requiring individual customer consent. 
In relation to workplace schemes, the ABI appears to be thinking along 
similar lines:138
Giving pension providers a legislative mandate to act in the collective best interests 
of savers will put all contract-based scheme members on an equal footing with 
members of trust-based schemes; trustees currently have much more discretion to 
take actions that they believe are in the best interests of scheme members.
137 OFT, Sept. 2013, revised Feb. 2014, Defined Contribution Workplace Pension Market Study, 
2014 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http:/www.oft.gov.uk/
shared_oft/market-studies/oft1505. IPB, Dec. 2014, Defined Contribution Workplace Pensions: 
The audit of charges and benefits in legacy schemes - A report from the Independent Project 
Board, https://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/defined-contribution-workplace-pensions 
138  ABI blog by Yvonne Braun, Director, Long Term Savings Policy, Feb. 2015, http://blog.abi.org.
uk/2015/02/legacy-pensions-tackling-the-problem-head-on
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This could be achieved by allowing without-consent transfers on the basis that three 
broad conditions have been met:
1.  The provider’s IGC establishes that the scheme does not offer value for money 
for members and changes are required;
2.  The provider demonstrates to the satisfaction of the IGC that there is no 
practicable alternative to a transfer; and
3.  It is independently established that the benefits and fund characteristics in the 
new scheme are broadly equal to those in existing scheme.
An important point the ABI made, and with which we agree, is that there is no 
single solution that will benefit all policyholders equally:
As the IPB [Independent Projects Board] set out, changes that benefit one saver 
may disadvantage another. This means IGCs may need to make tough decisions 
about what is in the best interests of the majority of scheme members collectively, 
rather than individually.
In other words, there is a persuasive argument in favour of taking action that 
represent ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’.139
In considering these proposals, the Government and the FCA should bear in 
mind the fact that pension customers age 55+ can take their policy values as 
cash, but might lose out if the cash value includes fixed exit penalties, 
discretionary market value adjustments (MVAs), and/or does not take into 
account valuable guarantees that are only triggered at the maturity date. HMT’s 
July 2015 consultation on pension transfers and legacy policies appears to 
exclude any prospect of imposing significant changes to the way that these 
legacy charges, terms and conditions apply.
2.3 Increased capital requirements under Solvency II
We set out briefly the provisions of Solvency II in the summary of reforms earlier 
in this report. Here we look at the potential impact more closely.
Life companies and analysts remain uncertain about the full extent of the impact 
of SII, but it seems clear that the additional capital requirements will trigger a 
review of capital-intensive business lines, such as annuities and with-profits 
policies with significant guarantees attached – a review that we understand is 
already underway, due, at least in part, to the persistently low interest-rate 
environment.140 Unit-linked business and protection insurance are considered 
‘capital-light’ by comparison.
Interviewees said that the biggest issue with SII is the uncertainty it brings to the 
market in the short term. Life companies will not find out until December 2015 
if their internal models for capital reserving have been approved, which includes 
the treatment of ‘transitional assets’, or assets related to run-off business, which 
139 The phrase ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ is attributed to Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), 
the founder of Utilitarianism.
140 See, for example, The Actuary, Aug. 2015, pp. 26-27. Leading the way, by Simon Woods, 
partner at EY; See also http://uk.milliman.com/insight/2014/Capital-management-in-a-
Solvency-II-world/ and http://www.solvencyiiwire.com/solvency-ii-update-2015-sponsors-
feature/1582669
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might or might not be counted as an asset class on the balance sheet. If 
transitional assets are not included on the balance sheet, this could affect the life 
company’s ability to pay dividends.141 
One aspect of SII will have particular significance for the back book market. By 
1 July 2015, life companies had to request permission from the PRA to use the 
‘Matching Adjustment’ (MA) reserving methodology. MA provisions give insurers 
relief for holding certain long-term assets that match the cash-flows of a 
designated portfolio of life or annuity insurance and reinsurance obligations. 
It does so by allowing an adjustment to the discount rate at which the firm is 
required to value the cash flows of its insurance/reinsurance obligations in order 
to determine the amount of technical provisions it is required to hold to cover 
them. As a minimum, the PRA has said that it expects firms to demonstrate that 
separate processes will be in place relating to: accounting systems; investment 
policy and mandates; processes and controls, including controls to ensure that 
assets within the portfolio will not be used to cover losses arising elsewhere; 
governance; and management information.142 
We understand that if an insurer secures MA status, it can hold lower reserves. 
Interviewees who had studied the legislation said that where a life company does 
not secure MA status, it is likely to sell its back books to those that do have this 
status, in order ‘to relieve the inefficiencies in capital’ and ‘to offload unwanted 
risks’ (in an interviewee’s words) that are already under strain following the FCA’s 
additional requirements for legacy books that are formally closed to new 
business. A key issue for MA is that SII favours certain asset classes over others.  
As a result, some businesses may have to restructure their capital investment in 
business lines: for example, it is not yet clear if equity release mortgages are 
permissible life company capital investments under MA status.
The FCA already requires higher levels of capital reserves when a legacy book 
is formally closed for business. Interviewees said that if an insurer achieves MA, 
it can hold lower reserves, and might become a buyer of back books from life 
companies that do not achieve MA status and which might feel the need to 
‘relieve the inefficiencies in in capital’.
A further but related issue for the life sector is the potential introduction of 
stress-testing by the Bank of England, as part of its programme for dealing with 
financial institutions that have the potential to create systemic risks that could 
de-stabilise the entire financial system, as happened with the banks in the Global 
Financial Crisis 2007-09. We understand that the regulatory intention is to 
prevent a repeat of the failure of AIG in 2008. If introduced, this measure could 
trigger an increase in capital reserving and, in turn, prompt life companies to 
take a more risk-averse approach to many of their business lines.143 The stress-
testing may apply to nine of the world’s biggest insurers, including the UK’s Aviva 
141 This problem also arose in the banking sector under Basel III.
142 See https://www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx?id_Content=11470, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
pra/Documents/about/praletter280315.pdf, and https://eiopa.europa.eu/regulation-
supervision/insurance/solvency-ii-technical-information/risk-free-interest-rate-term-structures. 
For analysis, see, for example, http://uk.milliman.com/insight/2015/Stepping-stones-to-ORSA-
Looking-beyond-the-preparatory-phase-of-Solvency-II/.
143 See, for example, FT March 17 2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1940e7dc-ccd4-11e4-b252-
00144feab7de.html?ftcamp=crm/email/_2015___03___20150317__/emailalerts/Keyword_
alert/product&siteedition=uk#axzz3UiiZq295
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and Prudential.144  Overseas-headquartered insurers that operate in the UK 
include Germany’s Allianz and New York-based MetLife could also be covered. 
If the stress-testing goes ahead, as seems likely, these companies will be required 
to increase the amount of capital they must hold as a cushion against unexpected 
losses by 10% on average we were told.
Depending on the outcome of these developments, for some providers’ back 
books might continue to represent a profitable business line, even if customer 
charges are reduced and restrictive terms and conditions relaxed – either on a 
voluntary or prescriptive basis (both options are set out in HMT’s consultation 
paper). For others, the combination of reduced profits and increased capital 
reserving might mean that the back books no longer represent a profitable core 
business and instead act as a drag on investment in new business development.
One final factor that will influence a life company’s decision to hold or sell back 
books is its ability to attract and retain with-profits experts. The with-profits market 
is vast, but it has a limited remaining life-span, which means that the smarter 
newly-trained actuaries are likely to eschew a career in this line of business. 
2.4 A changing market for buyers and sellers of back books
Our research reveals that a back book is not necessarily an old book or a closed 
book, and that there is a clear synergy in managing the back books of both the 
DC and the DB segments of business. Insurers that recognise this reality have the 
opportunity to make profitable purchases over the next five years or so. The 
research indicates that the market in back books is on the cusp of a period of 
major expansion and restructuring. There are several reasons for this, including 
the pressure on certain life companies to sell legacy books – and possibly 
complete brands – due to the increased capital requirements under SII. 
At the same time that increased transactions in older legacy books take place, we 
expect to see more recent books of life company pensions business to be offered 
for sale, due to the anticipated consolidation in the auto-enrolment market we 
discussed in Section 1. A parallel increase in de-risking transactions in the DB 
pension scheme market will see further transfers of DB liabilities from the 
corporate balance sheets of sponsoring employers to the balance sheets of life 
company BPA buy-out specialists. BPA books of business represent the back 
books of employers’ closed DB schemes and there are interesting parallels 
between this and the retail annuity back book market, among others. 
Completing the line-up in this new market will be back books of equity release 
policies. We expect the number and value of transactions in this business line to 
be small for some while, but to increase as equity release becomes a mainstream 
product in the retirement-income market as private-sector workers with small DC 
pots look to their home to support their retirement standard of living. 
Participation in the broader market for back books will not be limited to 
traditional life companies, but will include mono-line insurers in the retail and 
bulk annuity business, and also other types of financial institutions, such as large 
UK and overseas DB pension schemes, for which an investment in certain types 
of back books will represent a hedge against longevity liabilities. Purchases on 
the part of DB schemes increasingly will be cross-border.
144 FT, 5 Oct. 2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4e44e49c-6a90-11e5-8608-a0853fb4e1fe.
html?ftcamp=crm/email/follow/author/Q0ItMDAwMTA5MA==-QXV0aG9ycw==/
product#axzz3qG5JMxRJ 
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To succeed in the back book market requires significant investment, since the 
technology and platforms associated with older books will need to be updated to 
improve efficiency and customer services. For open life companies, this means 
that the back books will require the same commitment to resources, governance 
and TCF principles that are applied in the acquisition of new business in the 
auto-enrolment accumulation and decumulation markets. In other words, the 
decision on the part of open life companies to participate in the back book 
market will change from passive – where ownership of back books has been 
organic (due to changes in regulation or demand, for example) and/or a result 
of mergers and acquisitions – to a proactive strategy predicated on the ability to 
extract value, while at the same time demonstrably treating customers fairly. 
Back book markets in future will include:
• Mutual society with-profits businesses. In March 2014, the FCA published 
‘Response to CP12/38 – Mutuality and With-Profit Funds: A way forward’. The 
report confirmed mutual societies can apply to the FCA for permission to 
divide their common funds, so that they can separate older and less profitable 
with-profits business from the more profitable unit-linked business – the market 
in which some mutuals believe their future lies. We expect some mutuals to 
take this decision and sell their closed with-profits books to free up capital to 
invest in the on-going unit-linked business. Although most mutuals are small, 
in terms of AUM, the shedding of with-profits businesses will be seen as a 
significant move within the industry, since the sharing of risk and reward 
between the firm and customer-members, has been the hallmark of this 
business model. In future, it is likely that mutuals that remain independent may 
look and behave more like proprietary life companies. 
• Single-employer trust-based DC schemes. We expect single-employer 
schemes to move to an outsourced, multi-trust auto-enrolment scheme, once 
employers have transferred their DB pension scheme liabilities to a BPA insurer 
– a process that is likely to occur within the next 10-15 years in the majority of 
cases. This will be an opportunity for employers to dismantle their trustee 
infrastructure, which at present they use for both the closed DB scheme and 
the open DC scheme. The trend may take place earlier where the DC scheme 
includes a large number of ex-employees – as is likely to occur where, pre-
auto-enrolment, only a small percentage of employees voluntarily joined. 
Under the above circumstances, it is not yet known if employers will transfer 
their single-trust DC assets to a multi-trust provider or if they will look for a 
third-party provider to manage the run-off as a separate arrangement. Much 
will depend on the wording of the DC trust deed and rules.
• Group DC 2000-2012. Many of the workplace DC schemes sold after the 
turn of the century (that is, after the RU64 and stakeholder watershed) and 
before the start of auto-enrolment in 2012 are likely to be uncompetitive 
compared with the new large-scale multi-trust auto-enrolment schemes. Some 
will have been replaced when the employer introduced auto-enrolment; others 
will be replaced when the employer reaches the third anniversary of their 
staging date. Unless the employer and new provider arrange a block transfer 
of members, which will be difficult under a contract-based scheme, these older 
DC schemes will form legacy books of business.
• Auto-enrolment schemes sold between 2012 and 2018. We expect several 
mid-tier life companies to pull out of the auto-enrolment market when the 
selling frenzy is over in 2018 and companies have time to assess their market 
share. The same applies to the majority of the 50 master trust providers. 
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TPR has conferred ‘master trust assurance’ status on only five schemes to date: 
NEST, NOW Pensions, SEI Master Trust, The People’s Pension, and Welplan.145 
The implication is that schemes not on the list might not be suitable for auto-
enrolment purposes. TPR says: ‘If you run a master trust pension scheme, we 
expect you to obtain independent master trust assurance to help you demonstrate 
high quality governance and administration standards’. We expect most of the 
master trusts to consider a merger or to close and sell their business.
• Retail annuity books. There is a clear synergy between managing retail 
annuity books and the pensioner sections of institutional BPAs. BPAs represent 
the ‘back books’ of sponsoring employers of DB schemes that are able to 
transfer some or all of the scheme’s liability from the corporate balance sheet 
to an insurance company. While it is not unusual for annuity books to change 
hands between multi-line life companies, as firms restructure,146 Zurich’s 2015 
sale of its retail annuity book to Rothesay Life, a major mono-line life company 
in the BPA market, demonstrates this synergy between what hitherto have been 
classed as two separate markets for retail DC and institutional DB business. 
It is not yet clear to us whether the specialist (mono-line) BPA market would 
also consider buying mature books of legacy with-profits pension policies that 
have guaranteed annuity rates (GARs), but we were told that there is synergy 
in the management of closed books in run-off and BPAs.
• BPA buy-outs. This is the biggest growth area for back books and represents 
the transfer of the liabilities of closed DB schemes to insurance companies. 
The Pension Protection Fund (PPF) is the national compensation scheme, 
established by the Government under the Pensions Act 2004, to accept the 
schemes of qualifying insolvent employers, where the DB scheme’s assets 
cannot secure a BPA buy-out that offers at least the equivalent of PPF 
compensation levels. Since 2005, when the PPF opened its doors to business, 
more than 700 closed DB schemes have entered the compensation scheme. 
In most cases, the employer had become insolvent and the scheme was 
underfunded relative to the PPF compensation levels.
If the funding level is above the PPF level (this situation is known as PPF+), the 
trustees are required to arrange a BPA buy-out with an insurance company. 
Today between 20% and 40% of the 6000 schemes in the PPF Index are 
underfunded and the sponsor’s covenant is weak. For most of these schemes, 
the DB deficit is significant relative to market capitalisation (quoted companies) 
or relative to the enterprise value (privately-owned companies). Over the next 
10 years, we believe many more PPF+ BPA buy-outs will be negotiated. 
• Equity release. As this market develops and matures, we expect to see new 
entrants and books of business exchanging hands.147 As with the (proposed) 
secondary market in annuities, we expect some consolidators to develop 
commoditised funds of equity release policies, which will create a new asset 
class that will be of interest to insurance companies and DB schemes. 
145 The master trust assurance framework provides an independent review against an industry-wide 
benchmark of quality, http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/trustees/master-trust-assurance.
aspx#s19297 
146 In September 2015, press reports said that Aegon was considering the sale of its annuity 
business as part of its intention to restructure. See, for example, http://citywire.co.uk/new-model-
adviser/news/aegon-annuity-business-on-the-block/a841298. In March 2015, Equitable Life 
agreed to sell its annuity business to Canada Life. http://www.equitable.co.uk/media/41574/
equitable-life-and-canada-life-press-release-3-march-2015-finalb.pdf 
147 L&G recently entered the equity release market with the acquisition of Newlife Home Finance. 
It said an estimated £14bn of equity release transactions has been completed over the last two 
decades, http://www.professionaladviser.com/professional-adviser/
news/2397881/l-g-posts-10-profit-growth-as-retirement-profits-up-38 
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Conclusion 
This report makes clear that the traditional life company business model has 
become anachronistic as a result of market developments and, in particular, the 
new auto-enrolment and ‘freedom and choice’ DC pension regimes for the 
private sector. It is likely to become obsolete if the Government introduces further 
tax changes that convert the pension tax regime – a regime on which, arguably, 
the success of life companies to date has been predicated – to that of the long-
term savings tax regime of ISAs. 
It would be fruitless for financial institutions in the DC pensions market to strive to 
maintain the archaic distinctions between insurance-based and investment-based 
providers, between advice and so-called ‘non-advice’ distribution channels, and, 
in the decumulation market, the distinction between workplace and retail. 
We hope that the issues raised in this report will form the basis for an open 
debate about the DC provider’s business model of the future – with reference to 
traditional life companies and the new provider-challengers. The research 
indicates that the new business model will be based on specialist distributors that 
rely on a combination of joint ventures and outsourcing arrangements to deliver 
excellence across all the component parts of DC pension schemes and plans – for 
new business and back books alike. We look forward to this industry debate and 
to the Government’s and regulators’ response to the challenges we have raised.
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Appendices
Glossary of terms148 
Accumulation: In defined contribution (DC) workplace pension schemes and 
individual plans, this refers to the period of pension contributions and investment. 
See decumulation.
Active member: A member of a DC scheme who is working for the sponsoring 
employer. See also deferred member.
Active member discount (AMD): A lower annual management charge that applies 
to active members of a scheme, which is increased when they leave employment. 
AMDs will be banned from April 2016. See deferred member penalty.
Additional voluntary contribution (AVC): A type of individual DC pension policy, 
used to top up a workplace pension scheme (usually defined benefit). 
Alternative asset class: A collective term used to describe asset classes that 
generally are illiquid, such as commodities, hedge funds, infrastructure, private 
equity, and real estate, among others.
Annual management charge (AMC): The charge deducted from member funds, 
which covers disclosed investment costs and administration, among other items. 
The AMC is regarded as an incomplete disclosure measure. The total expense 
ratio is more comprehensive, but is still not complete, nor is ongoing charges. 
There is growing pressure for asset managers to disclose all fund costs such as 
transaction costs and the costs of sub-funds.
Annuity: A lifetime annuity – the most common in the UK – is an insurance policy 
that that pays out immediately on purchase and guarantees the income for life in 
return for the DC pension fund (the insurance premium). The purchaser is 
described as an annuitant. See deferred annuity and bulk purchase annuity.
Annuity rate: The income the insurance company guarantees to pay per month 
or per annum in return for the lump sum. It can also be expressed as a 
percentage yield.
Auto-enrolment: The system of pension scheme provision for all employers, 
which mainly affects the private sector and which is being phased in between 
October 2012 and 2018. Employers and qualifying employees (‘eligible 
jobholders’ are those aged between 22 and the state pension age, earning at 
least £10,000 per annum in 2015-16) must make minimum contributions based 
on band earnings. Employees have the right to opt out. Qualifying auto-
enrolment schemes do not have to be DC, but, in practice, the majority will 
adopt this structure. Qualifying schemes must offer a default fund for members 
who do not wish to make their own investment decisions. Pre-existing workplace 
schemes can continue to be used if they offer at least the equivalent benefits of a 
qualifying scheme. This means that, in practice, some employers will retain a 
more generous pre-auto-enrolment scheme for employees who joined under the 
voluntary system, and use a new qualifying scheme for auto-enrolment purposes.
148 Sources include previous Pensions Institute reports, the DC Investment Forum, the DWP, the FCA, 
the Financial Times Lexicon, and the OFT.
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Back book: Also known as legacy business, this is a block of older policies and 
contracts that were sold at a particular period in time. See also closed book. 
Products in back books usually are no longer sold, for example, where they are 
replaced with modern products with different charges, terms, conditions, and 
investment strategies. A product can become dated and replaced, due to policy 
and regulatory change, among other factors. 
Band earnings: Under auto-enrolment, by 2018, the annual minimum 
contribution for all qualifying workers will be 8% (comprising 4% from the 
employee, 3% from the employer, and 1% in tax relief), based on band earnings 
of £5,668- £42,385 in 2015-16. The contribution requirements are being 
phased in, starting with a minimum of 2% of qualifying earnings, of which the 
employer must pay a minimum of 1%.
Bonus: The annual and final (discretionary) amount added to a with-profits 
policy to reflect the actuarially smoothed investment performance of the fund.
Bulk purchase annuity (BPA): A single transaction that involves the transfer of 
defined benefit pension scheme liabilities from the sponsoring employer’s 
corporate balance sheet to the BPA life company. Pension scheme trustees pay a 
premium (cash) and in exchange the insurer writes an annuity contract that pays 
the retirement income of a large chunk of a scheme’s members. The BPA might 
cover only the pensioner section of members, or it might cover the whole 
scheme, including pensioners, active members (who still work for the employer), 
if relevant, and deferred members (who no longer work for the employer, 
but have yet to reach the normal retirement age to qualify for the pension). 
By arranging the BPA, the trustees offload all of the schemes risks, including 
investment, inflation and longevity risks.
Bundled scheme: A DC scheme where the provider is responsible for both the 
asset management and administration functions. An alternative description is 
vertical integration.
Closed book: Also known as a closed life fund, this term is used as a synonym 
for back book to describe the position where a life company no longer actively 
sells products based on its with-profits fund. Technically, ‘closed’ refers to a back 
book that has been closed formally under the Financial Conduct Authority’s 
(FCA’s) rules, which means that additional protections are put in place 
(e.g. capital requirements) in order to protect policyholders.
Commission: Until the implementation of the Retail Distribution Review (RDR) 
in January 2013, many intermediaries that sold pension schemes to employers 
– e.g. corporate advisers – were remunerated by the scheme provider in the form 
of sales commission, the cost of which was incorporated into the scheme 
member’s annual management charge. In principle, from this date, commission 
was banned for sales of investment products and replaced by an explicit advice 
fee, but, for a short while, intermediaries that sold auto-enrolment schemes could 
receive a consultancy charge from providers, which was very similar to the 
commission-style form of remuneration. 
Composite insurer: A company that has a life and pensions business (a life 
company) and a general insurance business (e.g., protection insurance, car and 
home insurance).
Consultancy charge: Between January and September 2013, many auto-
enrolment scheme providers offered a consultancy charge to intermediaries 
instead of commission, which was banned from January 2013 under the Retail 
Distribution Review. The Government banned the consultancy charge in 
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September 2013, as it was concerned that the deduction of the charge from 
member contributions would undermine auto-enrolment, especially for lower 
earners and frequent job changers. If a scheme had already been sold under this 
arrangement, it could remain in place. The final ban on the charge is expected to 
come into force in April 2016. Even then, the Government might permit it to 
continue under certain circumstances. Details will be announced in 2016.
Consumer Price Index (CPI): This index, calculated and published monthly 
by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), measures changes in the price 
(i.e. inflation or deflation) of a basket of a representative sample consumer 
goods and services. Since December 2003, the Government has used the CPI as 
its main measure of inflation in the economy, rather than the Retail Prices 
Index (RPI). The CPI is calculated as the geometric average price of a basket of 
700 different goods and services. This contrasts with the RPI which takes the 
arithmetic average of a different basket of goods and services. Because of the 
different ways of calculating average prices, CPI inflation is generally 1% p.a. 
lower than RPI inflation.
Contract-based DC: DC schemes can be established under contract or trust law. 
In a contract-based scheme, the contract is between the member and the 
provider, for example, a life company. Contract-based DC schemes and plans 
are regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). See also trust-based DC.
Corporate adviser: The distinction between employee benefits consultants and 
corporate advisers is blurred. Historically it denoted the remuneration basis (fees 
or commission respectively), but it also denotes the target market, which, for 
corporate advisers, tends to be smaller and medium-sized employers, whereas 
for consultants, this tends to be medium-to-large employers.
Decreasing life assurance policy: A life assurance policy that reduces in value 
over the predetermined number of years (the term). Often used to support a 
repayment mortgage, where the size of the debt reduces over the mortgage term, 
or with a savings plan used to pay off a mortgage at the end of the term.
Decumulation: The process whereby the DC fund built up during the 
accumulation stage is drawn as cash or in the form of regular income via an 
annuity or income drawdown. Until April 2014, most DC savers were required to 
buy an annuity. From April 2015, under ‘freedom and choice’, DC savers can 
make unlimited withdrawals from their fund (subject to product or scheme rules). 
These withdrawals are subject to the individual’s marginal rate of income tax, 
with the exception of the 25% tax-free lump sum.
Default fund: In a DC scheme, this is the multi-asset fund designated to receive 
the contributions of members who do not make an investment choice. Under 
auto-enrolment, an estimated 90% of members rely on this fund.
Deferred annuity: An annuity which begins payments at a predetermined date 
in the future. 
Deferred member: The description applied to members of DC schemes who 
leave the sponsoring employer’s company. In a trust-based scheme, membership 
can continue and so former employees continue to be the responsibility of the 
scheme trustees. In a contract-based scheme, the contract would usually be 
reclassified as an individual personal pension, so the individual is no longer 
a member of the previous employer’s scheme.
Deferred member penalty (DMP): An increased annual management charge 
applied when a member leaves a scheme where an active member discount 
(AMD) is used. AMDs are banned from April 2016.
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Defined benefit (DB): Members’ pensions are linked to salary (e.g., final salary 
or now more commonly earnings averaged over the period of membership). 
The sponsoring employer is ultimately responsible for meeting the liability if the 
scheme is underfunded. Most DB schemes in the private sector are closed and 
have been replaced with defined contribution schemes.
Defined contribution (DC): In DC, the member’s pension is based mainly on the 
level of contributions invested, the charges deducted, and investment returns. 
There is no guaranteed pension linked to salary, as is the case in a defined 
benefit scheme. Therefore the investment and longevity risks, among others, fall 
solely on the individual members.
Embedded value: The value to equity shareholders of the net assets and 
expected future profits of a life company.
Endowment (regular premium): A with-profits investment policy combined with 
decreasing life assurance. In the case of a mortgage endowment, for example, 
on the early death of the policyholder, the combination of the fund value and the 
life assurance would be sufficient to repay the mortgage debt.
Employee benefit consultant (EBC): The distinction between EBCs and corporate 
advisers is historic and generally denoted the remuneration basis. EBCs generally 
target the larger employers (DB and DC) and trustees. They might also act as a 
fiduciary manager of their own DC scheme.
Executive pension plan (EPP): An older-style defined contribution policy 
established by employers to provide pensions for key employees, e.g., senior 
managers and directors.
Fiduciary manager: With reference to DC schemes, this is where an asset 
manager or EBC offers a full asset management service for the default fund, 
drawing on third-party asset manager funds (and sometimes their own funds) for 
each asset class. The role is broadly equivalent to that of a chief investment officer. 
Where an EBC offers its own scheme, it would manage the administration (in-
house or, more likely, via third-party arrangements, including life office platforms).
Financial Reporting Council (FRC): The FRC promotes high standards of 
corporate governance through the UK Corporate Governance Code for quoted 
companies. It sets standards for corporate reporting, audit and actuarial practice, 
and monitors and enforces accounting and auditing standards. In addition, the 
FRC oversees the regulation of the actuarial profession and the professional 
accountancy bodies. 
Free-standing AVC (FSAVC): An older type of individual pension plan used to 
top-up a workplace DC scheme. Generally these would be held in back books, 
as the product is dated.
Governance: A generic term used to describe the responsibilities – set out as 
best-practice rules and processes – of an individual or body in charge of 
protecting the assets and/or interests of stakeholders, for example shareholders 
and employees, in the case of a listed company, and members and their 
beneficiaries, in the case of a pension scheme. Directors of quoted companies in 
the UK have to comply with the UK Corporate Governance Code, or explain to 
investors why they are non-compliant.
Group personal pension (GPP): A contract-based workplace pension scheme. In 
effect a grouping of individual personal pension plans but with pricing to reflect 
the group nature of the arrangement.
Guaranteed annuity rate (GAR): A predetermined annuity-conversion rate 
attached to a with-profits pension policy, which guarantees the rate, e.g., a 10% 
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of fund annual income per £1,000 of the accumulated fund, irrespective of the 
prevailing gilt yield at the time of the annuity purchase.
Income drawdown: At retirement, instead of purchasing an annuity, the member 
draws a regular income directly from the fund, which is subject to income tax, 
apart from the tax-free cash lump sum.
Liabilities: Obligations under law or regulation. In the case of a defined benefit 
pension scheme, the sponsoring employer is responsible for meeting any 
shortfall in the value of the fund and in the assets needed to pay future benefits 
to members, as they are set out in the scheme’s trust deed and rules.
Life assurance: An insurance policy that pays out on the death of the insured. 
See term assurance, decreasing term assurance and whole of life. 
Life company: Life companies (also known as life and pensions companies) and 
general insurance companies are financial institutions set up to sell life and 
pension products and general insurance products, respectively. (Composite 
insurers offer life, pensions and general insurance products through different 
arms of the business.) These companies are highly regulated and their 
accounting rules are highly specialised. Company valuations require calculations 
of embedded value in order to determine what can be taken as profit for 
distribution to shareholders, in the case of companies, and to members, in the 
case of mutual societies. In particular, there are specific regulatory requirements 
in relation to capital adequacy – that is, the reserves a life company must hold in 
order to back its guarantees to policyholders. In the UK, life companies are 
regulated for prudential purposes (i.e., to determine the soundness of the 
business) by the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) and for conduct of business 
purposes by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
Lifetime allowance (LTA): The LTA limits the amount of pension benefit that can 
be drawn from pension schemes – whether in the form of lump sums or 
retirement income – before an additional tax is imposed. The LTA was introduced 
in 2006 as a cap of £1.5m on an individual’s total pension fund value. It 
increased each year to 2010 (£1.8m) and then reduced. In the 2015-16 tax year, 
the LTA is £1.25m, reducing to £1m from April 2016.
Mass market: An imprecise term, but used in this report to refer to average 
earners, who do not have significant sources of wealth. Their investible (‘spare’) 
savings and investments outside of their DC pension are likely to be less than 
about £30,000 at present, unless the individual has received a substantial bequest.
Master trust: A trust-based DC workplace pension scheme that can accommodate 
multiple non-related employers. The trustee board might be wholly independent 
of the scheme provider or might include provider representation.
Mid-tier life company: An imprecise term, but used in this report to refer to 
medium-sized life companies that historically have relied on paying sales 
commission to advisers to distribute pension schemes and plans. Mid-tier life 
companies may provide bundled workplace schemes and retail products, but do 
not necessarily excel across the key component functions, such as asset 
management and administration.
Money’s worth: A measure of the value for money of an annuity based on the 
conversion rate between, say, £1000 of the defined contribution fund at retirement 
and the annual income the insurer will pay for life in exchange. The money’s worth 
will be less than 100% to allow for provider operating costs and profit.
Mutual society: A life and pensions organisation that is owned by its members, 
rather than by shareholders, as is the case with a quoted (proprietary) life company.
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Normal retirement age (NRA): In an employer-sponsored pension scheme, this 
is the age at which benefits are paid in full.
Personal pension plan (PPP): An individual (retail) DC pension plan, introduced 
in 1988 to replace the retirement annuity contract. A personal pension could be 
used to contract-out of the state earnings-related pension scheme (SERPS), in 
return for which the individual would receive a rebate of national insurance 
contributions (NICs). 
Platform: With reference to DC schemes, this is the life office IT ‘engine’, which 
manages the day-to-day running of a range of functions including asset 
management, administration (e.g., of contributions), and compliance. It might 
also include member communication and documentation.
Quantitative easing (QE): A form of monetary policy where a Central Bank – 
in the UK, the Bank of England – creates new money electronically to buy 
financial assets, like government bonds. QE aims to increase private-sector 
spending in the economy in response to a financial crisis.
Retail Distribution Review (RDR): The RDR came into effect on 1 January 2013. 
It banned adviser commission for new sales of investment products, including 
pension schemes and plans. From this date onwards, all advice relating to the sale 
of new investment products was supposed to be fee-based, but the consultancy 
charge was used to get round the commission ban until September 2013.
Retail Price Index (RPI): Similar to the Consumer Price Index, but the basket of 
goods and services includes more items, e.g., mortgage interest payments and 
other housing costs. RPI usually is about 1% higher than CPI.
Retirement annuity contract (RAC): An early type of individual pension policy, 
which was replaced by the personal pension in 1988.
Section 179 (s179): One of several funding and valuation measures used to 
calculate the funding position of a defined benefit pension scheme. The s179 
valuation (s179 of the Pensions Act 2004) is a useful benchmark for the funding 
position of underfunded closed DB schemes, i.e., where the fund is worth less 
than the liabilities and there is a deficit. This is the main measure used by the 
Pensions Regulator (TPR) and the Pension Protection Fund (PPF – the compensation 
scheme for DB members) in their joint annual publication, The Purple Book, 
which examines the risks that the 6,000+ schemes in the PPF Index face. Broadly, 
s179 represents the cost of PPF compensation, if a qualifying scheme were to 
enter the PPF in the event of a sponsor’s insolvency. S179 is also known as the 
PPF level of funding, or just ‘PPF’. 
Section 32 buy-out bond (s32): With reference to Section 32 of the Finance Act 
1981, this is an older-style deferred annuity contract that was used, at times, for 
transfer purposes if a member left a defined benefit scheme. It was also used to 
secure members’ benefits if a DB scheme was wound up (closed down).
Self-invested personal pension (SIPP): An individual pension plan that offers a 
wider investment choice than a personal pension, which is limited to funds only. 
A SIPP, which is a type of personal pension, can be used to invest directly in 
equities and property, for example, although the actual choice of investments will 
depend on the providers’ plan rules. SIPPs can be sold by life companies but also 
by asset managers and firms of advisers.
Single premium bond: A fixed-term savings plan (typically 5 or 10 years). Single 
premium bonds based on with-profits investment funds represented a major market 
in the 1990s and up to about 2005-06. Most policies are now in back books. 
Solvency II: A major review of the capital adequacy regime – i.e., capital 
requirements and risk management – for the European Union insurance industry. 
The regulation comes into force in January 2016. 
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Staging date (auto-enrolment): This is the date at which employers’ new duties 
under auto-enrolment become obligatory. The date falls between October 2012 
and April 2018, starting with the largest employers and ending with the smallest, 
based on the size of the employer’s pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) scheme. 
Term assurance: A life assurance policy that pays out on the death of the insured 
if he or she dies during the term of the contract.
Total expense ratio (TER): The TER is a more comprehensive measure of the 
member’s total annual cost than the annual management charge (AMC), but is 
still not complete. It includes the AMC and fees for a range of services including 
legal, administration, audit, marketing, directors, and regulatory costs. There is 
growing pressure on schemes to reveal all fund costs, including transaction costs 
and the cost of sub-funds.
Transaction costs: Costs that are incurred as a consequence of dealing in assets. 
These include bid-offer spreads, transaction costs of underlying (sub) funds, 
profits from stock lending retained by fund managers, interest on cash balances 
retained by fund managers, and FX spreads on currency hedging, among others.
Treating customers fairly (TCF): A regulatory principle that all regulated financial 
services firms must protect the best interests of all customers.
Trust-based DC: Schemes set up under trust law where the trustees are the legal 
owners of the assets on behalf of members and have a fiduciary duty to act in 
members’ best interests. These schemes are regulated by The Pensions 
Regulator (TPR).
Unit-linked policy: A life company policy (or wrapper) used to hold one or more 
funds for the purpose of saving for retirement, for example. Unlike with-profits 
funds, there is no actuarial smoothing of returns and so the unit value directly 
reflects the performance of the underlying fund.
Value for money (VfM): In relation to auto-enrolment schemes, VfM for 
members denotes the optimal combination of scheme costs and design – 
including governance, the investment strategy for the default fund, and 
administration – sustainable over the accumulation and decumulation periods.
With-profits fund: The fund invests in a range of assets, including equities, 
bonds and cash (and sometime property). The asset mix will depend on the 
maturity of the fund, e.g., where there is a high proportion of policies that are 
due to pay out shortly, the asset mix will be more conservative and hold a higher 
proportion of bonds and cash. The value of the policyholder’s policy is not 
directly linked to the value of the fund because returns are subject to actuarial 
smoothing in order to reduce volatility (put simply, some of the profits are held 
back in good years in order to maintain a steady return in the years when 
performance is poor). The policy value builds up through ‘bonuses’. To the basic 
value of the policy (the ‘sum assured’) are added regular (annual or 
‘reversionary’) bonuses. The rate of regular bonuses is not guaranteed in 
advance, but, once added, cannot be removed from the policy. There may also 
be a discretionary terminal bonus added when the policy matures (reaches the 
end of its term), which is usually based on more recent performance. A common 
feature of older with-profits pension policies is the guaranteed annuity rate 
(GAR), which usually is worth far more than the prevailing (current) rates on offer.
Whole of life policy: A combination of savings (typically with-profits in the 
pre-2001 era) and life assurance. The policy pays out on the death of the 
policyholder, whenever this occurs, which means that there is always a death 
benefit (unlike term assurance, which only pays out if the policyholder dies during 
the term covered).
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Sponsor Statement
The life and pensions industry is undergoing a period of unprecedented change. 
New policy and regulation has impacted the shape and scope of the defined 
contribution (DC) market, providing both opportunities and challenges to the 
life and pensions market. We will see yet more changes. The introduction of 
auto-enrolment has brought in powerful challengers into the UK market; the 
full impact of the new DC pension tax regime – or pension freedoms – is yet 
to be known, but we have seen a steep decline in the number of annuities 
purchased to date. 
It is therefore far from clear what the market of the future will look like from 
the perspective of the industry as a whole, for the individual providers and for 
our customers. 
Phoenix Group commissioned the Pensions Institute to write this report, which 
combines academic rigour with a thorough understanding of the market in 
practice. We believe that it is important to have an independent view of the 
impact of the challenges the life industry is facing, and what the industry needs 
to do to meet them. As the UK’s leading consolidator of closed life funds, we 
believe that Phoenix has a key role to play in supporting our customers through 
these changes.
This study is timely. From UK to European policy reform, it is clear that the 
traditional life company business model must continue to adapt and, whilst we 
do not claim that the report covers every aspect of the market, it should help the 
industry engage with the reforms and equip itself with a clearer understanding 
of the rapidly changing market.
The views contained in this report are those of the Pensions Institute. We hope 
that the report will act as a catalyst for discussion and debate not only around 
the future direction of the UK life industry but also around the role that life 
companies have played in the UK’s economy and how they need to adapt if they 
are to continue to play a key role. 
The findings should be of interest to life companies, asset managers, 
policymakers, regulators, investors and a range of other key stakeholders. 
It sheds some much needed light on the challenges in the new DC pension  
back book markets, along with offering proposed solutions for the business 
model of the future and regulation and management of back books.
I would like to thank Dr Debbie Harrison and Dr David Blake personally for 
the huge commitment they have both made to the development of this report, 
along with the contribution from organisations and expert colleagues. 
We look forward to hearing your views. 
Clive Bannister 
Phoenix Group Chief Executive
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The objectives of the Pensions Institute are:
• to undertake high quality research in all fields related to pensions
• to communicate the results of that research to the academic and 
practitioner community
• to establish an international network of pensions researchers from a variety 
of disciplines
• to provide expert independent advice to the pensions industry and Government.
We take a fully multidisciplinary approach. For the first time disciplines such as 
economics, finance, insurance, and actuarial science through to accounting, 
corporate governance, law and regulation have been brought together in order 
to enhance strategic thinking, research and teaching in pensions. As the first and 
only UK academic research centre focused entirely on pensions, the Pensions 
Institute unites some of the world’s leading experts in these fields in order to 
offer an integrated approach to the complex problems that arise in this field. 
The Pensions Institute undertakes research in a wide range of fields, including:
• Pension microeconomics 
The economics of individual and corporate pension planning, long term 
savings and retirement decisions.
• Pension fund management and performance 
The investment management and investment performance of occupational 
and personal pension schemes.
• Pension funding and valuations 
The actuarial and insurance issues related to pension schemes, including risk 
management, asset liability management, funding, scheme design, annuities, 
and guarantees.
• Pension law and regulation 
The legal aspects of pension schemes and pension fund management.
• Pension accounting, taxation and administration 
The operational aspects of running pension schemes.
• Marketing 
The practice and ethics of selling group and individual pension products.
• Macroeconomics of pensions 
The implications of aggregate pension savings and the impact of the size and 
maturity of pension funds on other sectors of the economy (e.g., corporate, 
public and international sectors).
• Public policy 
Domestic and EU social policy towards pension provision and other employee 
benefits in the light of factors such as the Social Chapter of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the demographic developments in Europe and other countries. 
Research disseminated by the Pensions Institute may include views on policy but 
the Pensions Institute itself takes no institutional policy positions.
For more details, see: www.pensions-institute.org
